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ABSTRACT
A big corporate governance debate concerns the corporation’s time horizons and the balance of power between shareholders and managers. In response to pressure from shareholder activists – typically activist hedge funds – companies
are, some say, becoming too short-term. If this is true, shareholders and the greater society may be being harmed. We
argue here that this may reect a heretofore neglected facet
of decision-making: an actor’s accountability and her anticipated need to justify decisions in the case of a bad outcome.
Our account does three novel things. First, we demonstrate
that the need to justify is pervasive. Our account identies a type of agency cost, “justication costs,” resulting
from decisions motivated by justication. Second, to our
knowledge, the relationship between these sorts of agency
costs and more traditional agency costs has not been considered. Reducing traditional agency costs typically means
increasing accountability and the consequent anticipated
Claire A. Hill and Alessio M. Pacces (2018), “The Neglected Role of Justication
under Uncertainty in Corporate Governance and Finance”, Annals of Corporate
Governance: Vol. 3, No. 4, pp 276–407. DOI: 10.1561/109.00000016.

The Neglected Role of Justication
need for justication; in contrast, reducing costs of justication generally means increasing managerial leeway, which
might increase traditional agency costs. Third, we introduce
a role for uncertainty. We show that under conditions of
low(er) uncertainty, more accountability does not necessarily increase justication costs but does reduce traditional
agency costs. But under conditions of uncertainty, accountability increases justication costs, potentially in an amount
greater than any reduction in traditional agency costs.
We propose a mechanism by which managers and stockholders can agree on granting managers some leeway for a
specied period of time, in the form of “Control-EnhancingMechanisms” (CEMs). A CEM may or may not condition
continuing leeway during the period on management’s meeting certain agreed-upon conditions. We consider how our
argument as to the existence of justication costs might
apply in some private and public nancial contexts, and
suggest some solutions in those contexts as well.
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1
Introduction

The big corporate governance debates nowadays concern the corporation’s time horizons, and the balance of power between shareholders and managers.1 In response to actual and anticipated pressure
from shareholder activists – typically, activist hedge funds – companies are, some say, becoming too short-term, shunning research and
development expenditures, and hobbling their prospects (and perhaps
their continued existence) by borrowing, paying out their available
cash, raising cash via sales of their divisions, and otherwise excessively reducing expenditures, in order to distribute big sums quickly to
shareholders.
We are now nearly recovered from a nancial crisis in which housing
prices increased precipitously and then collapsed, in part – perhaps in
signicant part – because many money managers made huge bets on
housing as such bets became ‘hot’ and sought after, not doing enough
of their own research but instead simply trying to make sure they could
get as much as they could of the latest AAA rated issuance.
1

These questions have been at the core of the corporate governance debate for
decades. See M. Becht, P. Bolton, and A. Röell, “Corporate Law and Governance”,
in A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 2
(North-Holland, 2007).
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If these stories are credited, private actors – shareholders and clients
of the money managers – as well as the greater society are being harmed.
We argue here that these stories, with their short-termism and herding,
may reect, at least in part, a heretofore neglected facet of decisionmaking: an actor’s accountability, and consequently, her anticipated
need to justify her decision in the case of a bad outcome. Two examples quickly summon up the intuition, albeit in contexts far from the
corporate and nance realm: “defensive medicine” and assessments of
dangerousness of mental patients being considered for release. In the
rst case, the anticipated need for justication, especially in a case
involving unusual symptoms, can yield excessive and costly testing. 2
In the second case, it can yield continuing connement of a person who
should not have been conned, since the decision-maker suers far more
releasing a dangerous person than continuing to conne a non-dangerous
person. In both cases, the anticipated need for justication yields a
decision that is based on something other than the best available assessment on the merits. We argue here that in the corporate and nance
spheres as well, justication is a neglected factor in decision-making.
Particularly under conditions of uncertainty, justication-motivated
decision-making can impose both agency costs and social costs. We
focus mostly on the corporate realm, but also discuss some implications
for nance.
What is new in our account is both less and more than initially
appears to be the case. It is less insofar as management incentives in
the general family of justication have been considered in the literature. Indeed, the tyranny of the markets, demanding results each
quarter and smooth income trajectories, has long been bemoaned,
and blamed for short-termist and other “safe” decisions such as minimizing research and development expenditures. In response to this
rhetoric, the European Union has recently decided to abolish the
2

M. Sanger-Katz, “A Fear of Lawsuits Really Does Seem to Result in Extra
Medical Tests”, New York Times, July 23, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/23/upshot/malpractice-lawsuits-medical-costs.html; A. Kachalia and
M. M. Mello, “Defensive Medicine—Legally Necessary but Ethically Wrong? Inpatient
Stress Testing for Chest Pain in Low-Risk Patients”, 173 JAMA Internal Medicine
1056, 2013, doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2013.7293.
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obligation for listed companies to report nancial results every quarter;
the U.S. is considering following suit.3 Consider the rationale often
given when companies go private: that they need time that the market will not give them to make costly but ultimately value-enhancing
changes. Michael Dell took Dell private a few years ago, giving precisely this rationale.4 Indeed, corporate law has long been concerned
with managers’ ability and incentive to entrench themselves, and a
body of Delaware corporate law, notably the Unocal doctrine, has
arisen that nominally invokes judicial greater scrutiny when management entrenchment is a particular concern.5 This concern is part of
a broader story in the literature, including in our account, in which
shortcomings in corporate performance are attributed to managerial
agency costs.
3

See the Directive EU 2013/50 of 23 October 2013. See also R. C. Pozen
and M. Roe, “Keep Quarterly Reporting”, Brookings, September 5, 2018, https:
//www.brookings.edu/opinions/keep-quarterly-reporting/. Interestingly, the implementation of the EU Directive in the UK does not seem to have produced the
desired eects. Very few companies abandoned quarterly reporting and those
that did it lost analyst coverage. Moreover, there seems to be no association
between the frequency of reporting and investment in capital assets and R&D.
See R. C. Pozen, S. Nallareddy, and S. Rajgopal, “Impact of Reporting Frequency on UK Public Companies”, 3 CFA Institute Research Foundation Briefs,
March 2017, available at https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/foundation/2017/
impact-of-reporting-frequency-on-uk-public-companies.
4
“The Rationale for a Private Dell”, presentation to investors by Dell
CEO Michael S. Dell, June 2013, available at https://epsnews.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/The-Rationale-for-a-Private-Dell.pdf . Interestingly, ve years
after going private, Dell has announced that it will be going public. A.
Rosen, “Dell Is Going Public Again”, Boston Globe, July 2, 2018, available at https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/07/02/dell-going-public-again/
ITzK26NxQeOR0VLUqhb9RP/story.html. An obvious cost at issue when companies
go private is that public shareholders cannot share in the value creation. This is a
common observation; a recent article in a business publication describes some recent
examples. G. Colvin, “Take This Market and Shove It”, Fortune, May 17, 2016,
available at http://fortune.com/going-private/.
5
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del., 1985); see also C.
A. Hill, B. J. M. Quinn, and S. Davido Solomon, Mergers and Acquisitions: Law,
Theory, and Practice (West Academic, 2016), 473–475, 478–479. Indeed, the reigning
rationale for golden parachutes, provisions that pay management upon a change in
control, is to counter the eects of their excess concern for their own jobs so as to
make them be better agents, agreeing to a deal if it is in the best interests of their
principal, the corporation (and its shareholders).
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But our account does three novel things. First, we demonstrate
that the anticipated need to justify is far more important than has
previously been recognized. The need to justify is pervasive, and the
people who may anticipate the need to justify their decisions include
not just managers, but also their investors, who themselves may need
to justify their results to their clients or beneciaries. Moreover, what
might count as a justication (beyond the obvious, immediate good
results) has not been suciently well articulated.
Our account identies a type of agency cost, “justication costs.”
Justication costs are costs resulting from decisions insofar as and to
the extent that they are motivated by justication. The intuition is,
again, captured by the examples above. But for the doctor’s need to
justify herself, she would not have ordered nearly as many expensive
tests. Stated dierently, under conditions of uncertainty, justication
costs are higher. By contrast, in conditions of less uncertainty, the
most justiable decision is apt to be the decision made without regard
to justication. Justication costs are agency costs because they are
incurred to benet the agent at the expense of the principal. They may
also be social costs, harming the greater society.
Second, to our knowledge, the relationship between these sorts of
agency costs and more traditional agency costs, such as those involving
self-dealing or empire building, has not been considered. Reducing
traditional agency costs typically means increasing accountability and
the consequent anticipated need for justication; by contrast, reducing
costs of justication generally means increasing managerial leeway,
which might increase traditional agency costs.
Third, and most importantly, we introduce a role for uncertainty.
Under conditions of low(er) uncertainty, more accountability does not
necessarily increase justication costs, which are apt to be low in any
event, and does reduce traditional agency costs. But under conditions
of uncertainty, accountability increases justication costs, potentially
in an amount greater than any reduction in traditional agency costs;
under some circumstances, reducing accountability, thereby granting
managers more leeway, may be preferable.
We propose a solution to the problem posed by justication costs in
the corporate governance context – a mechanism by which managers and

282

Introduction

stockholders can agree on granting managers some leeway for a specied
period of time, in the form of “Control-Enhancing Mechanisms” (CEMs).
A CEM might, or might not, condition continuing leeway during the
period on management’s meeting certain agreed-upon conditions. We
consider how our argument as to the existence of justication costs
might apply in some private and public nancial contexts, and suggest
some solutions in those contexts as well.
1.1

Overview of the Argument

Our main focus is corporate governance. The paradigmatic reason,
in theory, to constrain managers is that managers have the ability
and incentive to benet themselves at the expense of the rm and its
shareholders. Unconstrained managers may seek to take advantage.
What sorts of managerial benets are at issue? Traditional examples
include a CEO and board who rebu an acquirer so they can keep their
jobs, or a CEO having his company make acquisitions as much or more
so he can lead a larger company, with the associated compensation
and prestige, as for the benets to his company. We refer to the costs
associated with managers’ ability and incentive to pursue these benets
as “traditional” agency costs.
To constrain managers, why not just give the shareholders more
power? As mentioned above, the power tends to be exercised by shareholder activists, a subset of shareholders whose interests, it is argued,
may dier from those of all the shareholders, and of the corporation –
and dier in a particular way: they may want the company to borrow
an enormous amount or sell large portions of its business to pay out
large dividends or make stock repurchases, without regard to whether
doing so undermines the company’s longer-term prospects. (Shareholder
activists are arguably the successors to corporate raiders who, in attempting to acquire control of a company as cheaply as possible, may
have been willing to threaten to freeze out the remaining shareholders
at a low price, or who might talk shareholders into voting for something
that would be less favorable to the corporation than what the managers
were proposing). Indeed, the specter of shareholder activist engagement
may make company managers pre-emptively adopt short-termist or

1.1. Overview of the Argument
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other strategies that are harmful to the company, the broader society,
or both.
This is, of course, a highly contentious characterization. Managers
might suer from long-termism, postponing the realization of underperformance for want of better times that will never come.6 And the
shareholder activists, ostensibly as principals, acting for themselves,
would (and do) say that they have a good idea as to how the company
should be run, one that is superior to the incumbent management’s
idea.7
Of course, ex ante, it’s not clear whether the management’s idea,
the activist’s idea, or some other idea, is best. We would go even
further, arguing that the characterization of shareholder activists as
being short-termist makes the concept seem far more determinate and
intelligible than it is. First, there is no way to dene short-termism
objectively in a world in which the optimal allocation of capital to
future projects is uncertain.8 Second, the need for managers to justify
under uncertainty creates a bias towards short-term performance. Third,
this bias could be detrimental in contexts of high uncertainty, where it
would be ecient for managers to be entrepreneurial, but the need to
justify to shareholders prevent them from being such. While we take no
position on whether short-termism is or not desirable, for we believe
the answer depends on the particular company, we note that the claim
that activist shareholders lead to short termism is both underspecied
and unproven – as is the opposite claim that activist shareholders are
not responsible for short-termism.
Managers and many shareholders (including activist investors as
well as institutional investors generally) are and/or believe themselves
to be accountable to others, who are themselves often accountable to
others and/or believe themselves to be. They may be called to account
if there is a bad outcome, even though the process they followed was
6

A. M. Pacces, “Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective of Hedge Funds
Activism in Corporate Governance”, 9 Erasmus Law Review 199, 2016, at 207.
7
Indeed, the activist’s idea may reect an agency or agency-like cost: activists,
too, need to justify their decisions and performance to their sources of funding.
8
For this reason, one of us has characterized shareholder activism as a “conict of
entrepreneurship”. See Pacces, “Exit, Voice and Loyalty”, supra note 6, at 207–211.
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thorough and otherwise appropriate, and untainted with self-interest.
Or they may be called to account if there has not been a good outcome
quickly enough. They therefore make their decisions with an eye towards
future justication – of bad outcomes, or of outcomes that are not good
quickly enough. Again, this holds true for the managers, the activists,
and for institutional investors.
A manager making a decision for its justiability may be imposing
an agency cost to the extent that the outcome departs from what would
be best for the principal, the corporation and its shareholders or, in the
case of a money manager, the client.9 Additionally, whether or not the
decision-maker is an agent, a decision made for its justiability may yield
social costs. There is some, but not complete, overlap between the two
types of costs. An obvious example is acceding to short-termist pressures
and cutting back on a research and development project that might
have led to signicant monetary benets to the company and signicant
health benets to the broader society.10 Institutional investors may
be imposing an agency cost insofar as their choices – with regard to
investing and voting – generate lower returns than would be the case if
they were not making decisions with justication in mind. And money
manager herding in the years leading up to the nancial crisis, motivated
in signicant part by concerns of justiability, yielded an agency cost,
as the managers’ clients’ returns suered from the managers’ purchase
of overpriced low-quality securities, as well as an enormous social cost.
9

M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305,
308–310, 1976.
10
Calling these “costs” is in a sense articial – they suggest an implicit baseline
relative to which the non-existence of a drug is worse, when there is no reason
why the baseline ‘should’ include the existence of the drug. Wherever the baseline
is, or even if no baseline can in principle be specied, the amounts at issue are
appropriately considered costs. That is, the costs are either costs the society should
not have to incur, such as the cost of pollution relative to pristine air, or foregone
benets, such as more money spent on drug development. For our purposes, we will
simply call some set of consequences to the society from a move to short-term focused
actions (research and development not pursued, radical reductions in immediate and
short-term costs) or more “justiable” actions “costs” even though we cannot specify
a principled baseline. Hill discusses this point further in C. A. Hill, “The Rhetoric of
Negative Externalities,” 39 Seattle University Law Review 517, 2016.
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What sorts of strategies would be most readily justied? The obvious candidates are following a well-worn path, doing less,11 and doing
something with a quick payo. These may be perfectly sensible strategies. But they are problematic when they don’t represent the best
assessment of how to proceed. When is that the case? This is where
uncertainty comes in. By uncertainty, we mean Knightian uncertainty, a
characterization of the future which does not yield a measurable prediction. Uncertainty is to be distinguished from risk, which is quantiable
and technically can be described by widely accepted probability distributions.12 Uncertainty makes justication more dicult; accountability
puts justication more in the forefront, as those who are accountable
envision the greater diculties of justifying their decisions made under
uncertainty.13 There are no established methods that can, ex ante, yield
a suciently determinate prediction or suciently useful probability
distribution; bad outcomes cannot be justied by reference to established methods. The problem of not being able to predict the future
is of course pervasive. But with risk, there are conventional, and thus
readily justiable, ways to proceed – conventional strategies, in both
the colloquial and technical uses of that term. A conventional strategy largely assumes that the future will look like the past, and gives
considerable credence to majority opinions.14
11

Consider in this regard the familiar nding that acts of omission are far less
harshly judged than acts of commission. See, e.g. M. Spranca, E. Minsk, and J. Baron,
“Omission and Commission in Judgment and Choice”, 27 Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 76, 1991.
12
Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Prot (Houghton Miin, 1921), 19–20.
“The practical dierence is that in [risk] the distribution of the outcome in a group
of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from statistics of past
experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in
general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt
with is in a high degree unique.” Ibid. at 233.
13
The higher the uncertainty ex ante, the higher the hindsight bias ex post. See
G. M. Gulati, J. J. Rachlinski, and D. C. Langevoort, “Fraud by Hindsight”, 98
Northwestern University Law Review 773, 2004. In the absence of a conventional risk
assessment justifying the decision at the outset, courts, peers, and investors may
be more apt to infer misjudgment from a negative outcome. See also H. Spamann,
“Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?”, 8 Journal of Legal Analysis
337, 2016.
14
According to Keynes, our judgments about the future, of which we know very
little, are made conventionally. “In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall
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The more uncertainty there is, the more the most readily justiable
strategy may diverge from the decisions that the decision-maker thinks
are best and would make but for the potential need for justication. 15 A
company, and the society, might be better o if the company pursued its
manager’s best ideas, not her most-readily-justied ideas; both investors,
and the society, might have been better o if money managers had
not just followed the herd and had made their own assessments of
investment quality.
That corporate actors are accountable and thus act with the need
for justication in mind has some good eects. As we discuss, it helps
address and minimize traditional agency costs. What a manager might
do that would yield such a cost is familiar; the manager’s knowledge that
she will be asked to demonstrate that she is, for instance, not empirebuilding or hiring an unqualied relative, might serve as a constraint
back on what is, in truth, a convention. The essence of this convention – though it
does not, of course, work out quite so simply – lies in assuming that the existing
state of aairs will continue indenitely, except in so far as we have specic reasons
to expect a change.” J. M. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money (1936), 152 (Ch. 12, IV).
15
Keynes later claried that deciding conventionally includes, among other things,
relying on the judgment of the majority of people:
How do we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves
our faces as rational, economic men? We have devised for the purpose a variety
of techniques, of which much the most important are the three following:
(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future
than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been
hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospect of future changes about
the actual character of which we know nothing.
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the
character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future
prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and until something new
and relevant comes into the picture.
(3) Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall
back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better informed.
That is, we endeavor to conform with the behavior of the majority or the
average. The psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is endeavoring
to copy the others leads to what we may strictly term a conventional judgment.
J. M. Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment”, 51 Quarterly Journal
of Economics 212, 1937, at 214 (emphases in the original).
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against her doing so. But the need for justication also has some potentially bad eects. For the most innovative businesses, the trajectory of
how the business will proceed and evolve is notably unpredictable, 16 and
the manager (and investor) will be particularly concerned with how to
justify themselves should there be a bad outcome. Where the innovation
is occurring at the outset of the enterprise, the managers and nanciers
can come together to decide on appropriate metrics for performance and
the desired amount of oversight vs. leeway for the managers. But going
forward, this becomes far more dicult, with perils present for excesses
on both sides. In order to deal with an uncertain future, adaptation is
crucial. However, the need for justication undermines adaptation of
decision-making to new circumstances, encouraging as it does resort to
known patterns, in eect, again, an assumption that the future will be
like the past.
With this in mind, let us consider how the allocation of power between managers and those who would challenge them has been addressed
in corporate law. The principal mechanisms that help management
fend o activists and acquirers are early disclosure of shareholdings,
staggered boards, poison pills, antitakeover laws, and, depending on how
they are structured, dual-class stock and tenure voting.17 Managers with
more ability to fend o activists and acquirers have more leeway, which
includes leeway to take advantage – to impose traditional agency costs.
But less leeway may yield more agency costs related to justication.
How do the two types of costs compare? And how should the fact
that activists themselves face justication costs be taken into account?
We argue that under conditions of uncertainty, the justication costs
become a bigger factor, and may exceed the reduction in traditional
agency costs that less leeway can yield.
We argue for a new mechanism: through agreement with shareholders, managers of existing public companies should be able to be
insulated from removal for a specied period of time, using a CEM.
16

C. M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Harvard Business School Press,
1997).
17
Neither antitakeover laws nor pills without staggered boards are eective against
activists; indeed, pills without staggered boards aren’t particularly eective at all.
See our discussion of this point in Chapter 3, infra.
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Our mechanism would be contractual. It would be chosen by companies, agreed to by shareholders, and tailored for companies’ particular
circumstances. In particular, the company’s management – or the controlling shareholder, if there is one – would need to persuade outside
(institutional) investors that their ‘big idea’ warrants a period of leeway,
during which they would not have to fend o shareholder activists. The
leeway could be for a specied period of time; it might, too, be subject
to being shortened if specied thresholds or conditions were not met.
Proceeding in this way should have signicant benets over alternatives
such as taking the company private, while yielding other eciencies,
such as making the prospective returns on innovation available to the
investing public. We expect that this mechanism would principally be
used under conditions of greater uncertainty.
We briey discuss the role of justication in other contexts as
well, including as to both private and public actors in the nancial
realm.18 As to the former, we suggest a change to law that could
discourage justication-motivated decision-making by money managers.
As to the latter, we suggest ways to make nancial policymakers more
entrepreneurial in various contexts, and in particular, more responsive
to changed circumstances.19
Our account is largely, although not exclusively, within the rational
paradigm. It is within the rational paradigm insofar as it concerns
self-interest that, in the case of agents, has costs to their principals, and
in the case of agents and principals, has costs to the broader society,
or at least, deprives the society of what would have been benecial
expenditures. It diers insofar as the rational paradigm and indeed,
even behavioral work, treats ‘reality’ as ultimately discernible – a person
18

One intriguing article, by Professors McDonnell and Schwarcz, suggests a role for
“Regulatory Contrarians” in helping regulators consider other perspectives, including
perspectives uninuenced by justication concerns. B. McDonnell and D. Schwarcz,
“Regulatory Contrarians”, 89 North Carolina Law Review 1629, 2011. We discuss
this article and this suggestion further in the text accompanying notes 317-321.
19
For the theoretical framing of this problem in nancial regulation, see H. Nabilou
and A. M. Pacces, “The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking”, in I. H.-Y. Chiu
and I. G. MacNeil, eds., Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory
Aspects (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/
9781785362620/9781785362620.00008.xml.
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is ‘overcondent,’ for instance, where the ‘correct’ level of condence is
known or somehow knowable.20 Again, a critical feature of uncertainty
is that the possible outcomes and associated probabilities the future
presents are not necessarily knowable even within a broad range. Ex ante
and even ex post, we may not know, for instance, whether a manager’s
idea was ‘wrong.’21 Circumstances may yield a bad ex post result; the
result may reect some defect in the idea, or it may not.
In sum, uncertainty in dealing with the future is pervasive, and so is
the need for agents and others to justify their decisions. Our contribution
in this article is to bring a consideration of justication costs and
notably, justication costs under uncertainty, into the realm of corporate
20

One of us has written extensively on this issue. See, C. A. Hill, “Beyond Mistakes:
The Next Wave of Behavioural Law and Economics”, 29 Queen’s Law Journal 563,
2004; C. A. Hill, “A Positive Agenda for Behavioral Law and Economics”, 3 Cognitive
Critique 85, 2011.
21
Behavioral law and economics, in our view, has come to have two dierent
and, to some extent conicting, meanings. The original meaning, and one that still
has considerable viability, is that behavioral law and economics concerns mistakes
and altruism, thus contrasting (and disagreeing) with law and economics, which
hypothesizes lack of systematic mistake-making and self-interest. This is not the
sense in which we are using the term “behavioral law and economics.” Rather,
we use the term as it is meant when applied to George Akerlof and some other
scholars, to explore dimensions of rational behavior not typically explored in the
standard economic models. Consider in this regard not only Akerlof’s recent work
on identity, but even his famous lemons paper (G. A. Akerlof, “The Market for
‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, 84 Quarterly Journal
of Economics 488, 1970). Going further than Professor Akerlof and his co-authors,
we question the dichotomy between good and bad decisions implicit in the labels
rational and irrational. Uncertainty may make it impossible to know even in theory
whether a decision is rational or irrational, or correct or incorrect, when it is made
or for some time afterwards. Because all decisions about the future are made under
uncertainty, they cannot be rational or irrational in the traditional sense. They are
as rational as they can be (H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”,
69 Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, 1955) or, to put it as Keynes (General
Theory of Employment, supra note 14, Ch. 12, IV, pp. 152-153) did, they are rational
inasmuch as they rely on a convention. In the law and economics literature, Richard
Posner (“Shorting Reason”, The New Republic, April 15, 2009) criticized Akerlof and
Shiller’s behavioral account of Keynes’ notion of animal spirits. Compare Keynes,
General Theory of Employment, supra note 14, Ch. 12, VII, pp. 161-163, with G.
A. Akerlof and R. J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton University Press,
2009).

290

Introduction

governance analysis, focusing on when uncertainty might warrant more
leeway for managers. When uncertainty is low, accountability should
be higher, which would naturally lead to decision-making made more
with justication in mind – that is, more conventional decision-making.
But this should not yield an increase in justication costs insofar as
the most justiable decision is also the decision that would have been
made had justication not been at issue. By contrast, when uncertainty
is higher, decision-making leeway, or discretion, should be higher, so as
to encourage non-conventional decision-making. The new mechanisms
and rules we propose allow the quantum of accountability to change
over the lifecycle of publicly held enterprises, as well as during market
cycles to which policymakers may be pressured to react.
Our article proceeds as follows.
Chapter 2 argues that the traditional framing of corporate governance debates neglects the role of justication and in particular,
justication under uncertainty, instead being undergirded by incomplete accounts of parties’ interests and aptitudes and parties’ views
of each other’s interests and aptitudes. In the canonical paradigms,
managers might take advantage or have bad ideas, something that
can and should be limited by appropriate incentive alignment, constraints and market discipline. Or, shareholders activists are out for
themselves, not shareholders generally, and hence, their ability to
force managers to listen to them should be limited. The lens of insuciently constrained traditional self-interest on the part of managers obscures the role of justication under uncertainty – of managers as well as investors. No distinction is made between managers
who would use leeway to benet themselves and those who would
use leeway to follow their best judgment. The need to justify acts
as an ecient constraint on the rst situation, but is inecient in
the second. Likewise, institutional investors who need to justify to
the individuals or entities whose money they are ultimately investing insist that managers are accountable in their turn. But when
uncertainty is high, there is more call for entrepreneurial judgment,
and thus less benet from the constraints the need for justication
imposes.
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In some respects, this is not so dierent from the standard story –
managers who claim to want time to let their ideas pay o, vs. investors
who are guarding against manager advantage-taking and incompetence
and can’t tell if the managers are telling the truth or not. And it’s
not as though there is a ‘fact of the matter’ as to advantage-taking
vs. incompetence. A manager might genuinely think the comfortable
way he has done things and wants to continue doing things (or, for
that matter, the risky way he wants to try) is the right way. It may
not be known until later, if ever, if the manager was right. What our
account does is to stress the extent to which conventional reactions
to uncertainty can harm rms and harm society, and suggest ways to
give managers constrained leeway that could yield a better result for
shareholders as well as society.22
In Chapter 3, we briey explore the history and some present-day
contexts in which the principal corporate governance debates are played
out in the U.S. and in Europe.
Our summary of the history and context includes discussions of the
background legal regime (as to the U.S., notably the Section 13(d) regime
and antitakeover laws), but we focus mainly on mechanisms such as staggered boards, poison pills, dual-class shares, and tenure voting/loyalty
shares. Most of the discussion concerns the U.S., where some of the mechanisms are more widely employed and ruled on by courts, but European
practices and legislation are discussed as well, particularly with regard to
dual-class and loyalty shares. Our main point is that these mechanisms
all assume that the corporate governance problem to be addressed is how
to balance the need for managerial leeway (what one might call a “less
accountability” regime) with the need for more accountability to guard
against managers’ incentive and ability to take advantage in traditional
ways, without taking into account the role justication costs should play.

22

Indeed, even readers not persuaded that justication is an important motivation
might favor our solution so long as they are persuaded that short-termism is a
problem that markets are not on track to correct. See C. A. Hill and B. McDonnell,
“Short and Long Term Investors (and Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their
Interests Conict?”, in C. A. Hill and S. Davido Solomon, eds., Research Handbook
on Mergers and Acquisitions (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), 396-415.
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Chapter 4 sets forth and defends our proposal for giving managers
leeway for a limited period of time under certain circumstances, contrasting it with other mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3. We argue
that managers should be able to negotiate with the corporation’s shareholders (or minority shareholders, if the managers are the corporation’s
controlling shareholders) for the issuance of dual-class shares which
would give managers (and controlling shareholders owning less than a
majority of the shares) control of the corporation for a specied period
of time under certain circumstances.
Chapter 5 discusses additional applications of our framework in
other spheres in private and public nance.
Chapter 6 concludes.

2
A Role for Justication in Corporate Governance

2.1

The Classic Articulation of the Manager vs. Activist Debate

The debate over the allocation of power between shareholders and
managers typically gives traditional agency costs an important role.
Perhaps overstating, but only slightly, traditional agency costs are the
problem that corporate governance needs to solve. Shareholders want
to invest, and want the corporation to be managed on their behalf. But
managers have the ability and incentive to benet themselves at the
expense of their principals (the corporation and its shareholders). 23
Common sense, and considerable evidence, supports the proposition
that managers can and do take advantage in some at least weak sense of
the term – that is, they behave in a manner that they might not behave
in but for the benets to themselves and their belief that they can,
without much harm to themselves, take those benets. But how strong
a factor are traditional agency costs relative to other forces aecting
23

For ease of exposition, we largely cast the debate as pitching pro-management
forces against pro-activist shareholder forces. We know, of course, that this is a
simplication on many fronts, and in particular, in recent times, the roles of long-term
institutional investors have become far more important, something we discuss later
in this article, in the text accompanying notes 77-89.
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corporate governance? We argue here that there are other forces and
costs that have not been suciently acknowledged.
In the past few years, the debate has pitted managers against activist
shareholders, typically hedge funds, whose business model is to choose
a few companies they think ought to be behaving very dierently, and
to pressure the companies accordingly. The opposing positions, promanagement vs. pro-activist, are strongly held, and strongly defended. 24
The debate embeds two competing paradigms or prototypes. One
gives prominence to managers taking advantage in canonical ways. Here
is Dan Loeb of Third Point, in a public letter to Sotheby’s management:
A review of the Company’s proxy statement reveals a perquisite
package that invokes the long-gone era of imperial CEOs: a car
allowance, coverage of tax planning costs, and reimbursement for
membership fees and dues to elite country clubs. . . . Typical of
the egregious examples was a story we heard of a recent osite
meeting consisting of an extravagant lunch and dinner at a famous
“farm-to-table” New York area restaurant where Sotheby’s senior
management feasted on organic delicacies and imbibed vintage
wines at a cost to shareholders of multiple hundreds of thousands
of dollars. We acknowledge that Sotheby’s is a luxury brand,
24

We note here, though, that the help empirical work can oer to settle the debate
is limited. Opponents of hedge fund activism argue that the activists inject shorttermism into corporate governance and that as is the case with hostile takeovers,
short-termism is conducive to poorer long-term performance and lowers social welfare.
Supporters of hedge fund activism contend that it is a welcome market response to
managerial shirking and incompetence, more eective than hostile takeovers because
of its lower cost. As we have argued independently in previous work, this debate
cannot be resolved by empirical analysis. First, companies that are engaged by
activists dier from those that are not engaged—hedge fund activists do not select
companies at random. Second, a large part of activism takes place behind closed
doors, or is simply anticipated by the potential targets. These circumstances are
not reected by the data; the data can only include what is observable. Both issues
fatally undermine the counterfactual of any statement to causality, be that in favor
or against the role of hedge fund activism in corporate governance. A. M. Pacces,
“Shareholder Activism in the CMU”, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini, and E. Avgouleas,
eds., Capital Markets Union in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2018), 511-512. See
also C. A. Hill, “An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate”,
41 Seattle University Law Review 475, 2018; Hill and McDonnell, “Short and Long
Term Investors”, supra note 22.
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but there appears to be some confusion – this does not entitle
senior management to live a life of luxury at the expense of
shareholders.25
Relatedly, there are criticisms that “performance-based” compensation is paid for bad performance. From Trian’s letter to shareholders
about the Dupont Corporation:
• The Board’s compensation practices have actually rewarded management for failing to meet its targets. In 2013, management’s
long-term incentive plan had a payout of 113% of target despite a
total shareholder return (a key metric of determining the payout)
in the 25th percentile of DuPont’s peers.
• That same year, short-term compensation payout was almost
90% despite adjusted EPS growth of 3%, signicantly below the
Company’s long-term target of 12% EPS growth.
• In 2014, the Board’s Human Resources and Compensation Committee acknowledged poor operating performance as it exercised
“negative discretion” and gave management a 0% payout factor
for “corporate performance” under DuPont’s short-term incentive program. However, the Human Resources and Compensation
Committee (chaired by Lois Juliber and including Mr. Cutler and
Lee Thomas as members) still found a way to pay management by
giving an 80-100% payout factor for “individual performance.”26
Besides taking what (from the critic’s perspective) are unwarranted
benets, there are also critiques of managerial performance, such as
continuing in the same path when new thinking (and new personnel)
might be needed. Returning to Loeb’s letter to Sotheby’s:
25

Email from Daniel S. Loeb, CEO of Third Point, to William F. Ruprecht,
CEO Sotheby’s (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/
000119312513388165/d605390dex993.htm[https://perma.cc/427M-SQDB].
26
“Trian Sends Letter to DuPont Stockholders”, Business Wire, April 9,
2015, available at https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150409005459/en/
Trian-Sends-Letter-DuPont-Stockholders.
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We acknowledge that you, [then-CEO] Ruprecht, were an able
steward for the Company following both the price xing scandal in
2000 and the nancial crisis in 2008. Unfortunately, you have not
led the business forward in today’s art market. . . . Our research
suggests Sotheby’s crisis of leadership has created dysfunctional
divisions and a fractured culture. There is a demoralizing recognition among employees that Sotheby’s is not at the cutting edge –
demonstrated by the Company’s inability to even develop a coherent plan for an internet sales strategy, much less implement one.
...
As with any important restoration, Sotheby’s must rst bring in
the right technicians. . . .
It is also time, Mr. Ruprecht, for you to step down from your
positions as Chairman, President and Chief Executive Ocer
and for the role of Chairman to be separated for your successor.. . . Sotheby’s requires a CEO with sucient knowledge of the
global art markets to make critical decisions, who can move seamlessly around the globe building the business and strengthening
client relationships. Respectfully, we do not see evidence that you
are the right person to repair the Company and drive its growth
in today’s dynamic global art market.27

The competing paradigm, that shareholder activists are out to ‘take
the money and run,’ is described in this American Lawyer article:
[A]ctivists are billionaire hedgies who are out to make a quick
buck, while driving great companies and the economy into a ditch.
Studies nd that activists typically hold a stock for only nine
months before bailing out. In that short time, they will aim at
all costs to hack employment, R&D and capital expenditures;
overload the company with debt; return money to shareholders
through dividends and buybacks; and, as the ultimate goal, goose
27

Loeb email, supra note 25.
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the stock through M&A activity. “At bottom, every activist campaign is one or two steps to sell the company,” says [a partner at
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Ne. The Wachtell rm, and in
particular, partner Marty Lipton, invented the poison pill, which
helps management keep unwanted (to them) acquirers at bay.]28
Consider the concerns about these actors as embedded in these accounts. The pro-activist/anti-management accounts describe managers
who are out for more money for themselves, and are rather less concerned about earning it for the company. Or maybe the managers
think old or mistaken ways of managing the company are good ones,
but, the intimation is, they haven’t thought hard enough about what
would be good, which might include them not leading the company.
The anti-activist account describes people who seek short-term positive
eects without regard to damage in the longer term: the company is
“overloaded” with debt, and the stock is “goosed.”29 Traditional selfinterest is being pursued in all of these stories – more money (or a
continuing entitlement to the same money), whether or not the pursuer
deserves it. Exacerbating the problem, the specter of activists can cause
even companies that have not (yet?) attracted activist engagement to
pre-emptively do what activists would want them to do, which is by
hypothesis problematically short-termist, as the managers seek to hold
onto their jobs.30
There are some middle ground positions on the management vs.
activist debate, tempering praise or criticism of one side or the other, or
suggesting that good accommodations could be or are made, including
28

M. D. Goldhaber, “Marty Lipton’s War on Hedge Fund Activists,” The American
Lawyer (Online), March 30, 2015, available at https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/
almID/1202721058301/?slreturn=20180206125103.
29
Perhaps only for a short while, as is the case with goosing (pinching) people?
Goosing also means pushing or encouraging, so perhaps the price rise would be
permanent, although those objecting to activists tend to argue that the stock price
rises are only in the short term. “Goose”, Oxford Learner’s Dictionary Online,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/denition/english/goose_2. See also
“Goose”, Cambridge Dictionary Online, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/
english/goose.
30
J. C. Coee, Jr. & D. Palia, “The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund
Activism on Corporate Governance”, 41 Journal of Corporation Law 545, 2016.
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that companies can, should, and/or do get the benet of activist insights
while avoiding a more formal and adversarial activist ‘engagement’ or
battle. One middle ground position is the activist-as-one-(sometimes
good) trick-pony position, as described in an article from January of
2015:
Activist investors are like UPS drivers. They turn in only one
direction.
By now, the activists’ rise is remarkable for its sheer scale and
ferocity. . . Their rise is also remarkable for another thing: their
intellectual sameness. Plot a map of the 10 largest activist rms
and you will nd that seven of them are based within 17 blocks of
each other in midtown Manhattan. The vast majority are making
similar demands of their targets, delivered with what now feels like
a dull percussion: Raise the dividend, buy back shares, cut these
costs, spin o that division, sell the company. What’s the average
length of an activist shareholding? Some 84% don’t last more
than two years, according to FactSet. Many of their grievances
are built around the idea that companies are misallocating their
capital. In this worldview, that capital is typically going toward
bad long-term projects, such as AOL Inc.’s ill-fated local news
service Patch or the research budget at Allergan Inc. Many times
they are right. . . [But why] can’t activists nd targets where the
misallocation is going the other way? In other words, identify
companies that are playing it too safe, perhaps pushing too much
into dividends or buybacks. Or missing a great opportunity in a
new market.31
What keeps corporate governance from working better is, according
to the pro-activist camp, largely, agents’ self-interested behavior that
harms, or at least does not help, their principal by insulating the agent
from threats to her job and allowing her to retain private benets of
31

D. K. Berman, “A Radical Idea for Activist Investors: What If the
Goal Were More Investment With an Eye on the Long Term?”, Wall Street
Journal Online, January 27, 2015, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
a-radical-idea-for-activist-investors-1422370260(emphasis added).
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control. (Assumed, probably correctly, in this account is that traditional
legal mechanisms of accountability such as lawsuits by shareholders
arguing that directors have breached their duciary duties will not
succeed, and may not have that much force in restraining the behavior
at issue). The primary challenge for corporate governance is therefore to
reduce agency costs by aligning agents’ incentives or by doing a better job
monitoring (or otherwise constraining) them. The opposing camp thinks
that these agency costs pale next to those arising from hostile acquirers
and shareholder activists, who have found ways to benet themselves
while not benetting the corporation or its (other) shareholders. Both
camps, as well as the middle ground position discussed above, frame the
issues around the negative eects of someone’s self-interest in getting
more money. The corporate managers’ or the activists’ pursuit of money
is shafting the corporation and its shareholders (or in the case of the
activist, the corporation’s other shareholders). A person’s view as to
what law should and should not allow, and what techniques used by
managers and shareholders are good, turns importantly on her view of
and appraisal of what managers and shareholders are apt to do. Courts’
deference to directors’ business judgment has not really been questioned,
but those taking more seriously the perils of traditional agency costs of
the sort described above favor more power for shareholders, while those
for whom shareholder advantage-taking is the more serious threat favor
more power for managers.
2.2

A Role for Uncertainty

We think this depiction of managers and shareholders, in which much
is determinate, neglects a very important motivator of conduct, arising
because of how much is actually indeterminate. Agents are accountable
to their principals (and, potentially, others as well, notably their peers
as well as, potentially, regulators), and anticipate needing to justify
their decisions and the results thereof. This anticipation aects their
decision-making. The eect can be especially pernicious when uncertainty is higher. In such contexts, decisions motivated by justication
are particularly likely to depart from what is in the principal’s best
interests, for reasons we explain below. Such departures constitute an
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agency cost, one that has, to our knowledge, not previously been suciently recognized.32 Briey summarizing our argument, the anticipated
need to justify may lead decision-makers to emulate others (herding) or
otherwise use more recognized and formulaic (conventional) approaches,
or seek demonstrable results quickly (short-termism). Insofar as we are
in a realm of uncertainty, where the future is particularly indeterminate,
the herd doesn’t necessarily know best, and there is no particularly
good reason to suppose recognized and formulaic approaches are best.
Seeking demonstrable results short-term unduly limits consideration
of projects with longer time horizons. With prediction of the outcome
more dicult, the anticipated need to justify assumes more importance
in the decision-making process. Agency costs associated with justication might seem to counsel less accountability and thus less need for
justication. But accountability is helpful in reducing traditional agency
costs. Our account explains how to strike the appropriate balance.
Costs associated with justication are not just to the agents’ direct
principals; they are societal as well. Again, consider in this regard the
extent to which retrenchments in research and development spending
for projects with long-term time horizons might yield fewer medical and
other advances; consider as well the extent to which investor herding
into subprime securities contributed to the 2008 nancial crisis.
In sum, dealing with uncertainty with a view towards justication
can deprive both companies and the broader society of the benets of
entrepreneurship.
2.3

What is Uncertainty?

In Frank Knight’s seminal 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty and Prot,
Knight dened uncertainty, distinguishing it from risk:
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the
familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The term “risk,” as loosely used in everyday speech and in
economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally
32

We discuss how our account of agency costs compares with the existing corporate
governance literature infra, note 51.
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at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena of economic
organization, are categorically dierent. . . . The essential fact is
that “risk” means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of
this character; and there are far reaching and crucial dierences
in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the
two is really present and operating. . . . It will appear that a
measurable uncertainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall use the term,
is so far dierent from an unmeasurable one that it is not in eect
an uncertainty at all.33
As Knight importantly recognized, the future is in many signicant
respects uncertain. Not only can the future not be known, but also, our
tools for predicting it, using a set of events with associated probabilities,
are imperfect, suggesting that far more is known than is actually the
case. It is trivially true that everything is uncertain. But some things
are more uncertain than others. As we discuss at greater length below,
mature businesses with established cycles seem less uncertain than a
new technology start-up. The former can plausibly be treated as mostly
involving risk; this is far less true of the latter. That being said, over
time, established rms may face more uncertainty, and start-ups may
face less. A mature business may be doomed to fail in the absence of
long-term investments in innovation. Likewise, companies old and new
may go bankrupt if they do not react on a timely basis to short-term
challenges such as macroeconomic shocks.34 For all companies, new
circumstances – a new market, a new product, a new business model –
may arise. Making adaptation to change dicult, Knight explains, is
33

Knight, supra note 12, at 19-20.
See, e.g. M. Giannetti and X. Yu, “Adapting to Radical Change: The Benets
of Short-Horizon Investors”, ECGI (European Corporate Governance Institute)
Finance Working Paper No. 467/2017, 2017, available at http://www.ecgi.global/
sites/default/les/working_papers/documents/4672017.pdf (nding that companies
with more short-term investors react more quickly to permanent negative shocks).
See also D. Hackbarth, A. Rivera, and T.-Y. Wong, “Optimal Short Termism”,
ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 546/2018, 2018, available at http://people.bu.
edu/dhackbar/HRW-2018.pdf (nding that short-termism is optimal for certain
companies, particularly those with low growth prospects and comparatively higher
debts).
34
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that “the existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the future
being dierent from the past while the possibility of the solution of the
problem depends on the future being like the past.”35
If the future is suciently like the past, methods to deal with risk
can be successfully used. Risk is tractable because, in principle it can
be described as a nite (known) set of events with associated (known)
probabilities. Statistical models of risk assessment rely on observational
data about past events of the same sort (that is, classied as being of
the same sort) as the subsequent event the risk of which is sought to
be assessed, the events’ frequency, and the shape of their distribution.
Again, the conventional assumption underlying these models is that the
future can be extrapolated from the past.36 Use of a conventional risk
assessment suggests that the future is more predictable, and hence can
be dealt with more eectively, than our knowledge allows us to say.37
35
36

Knight, supra note 12, at 313.
As Keynes observed:
In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in
truth, a convention. The essence of this convention — though it does not,
of course, work out quite so simply — lies in assuming that the existing
state of aairs will continue indenitely, except in so far as we have specic
reasons to expect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the
existing state of aairs will continue indenitely. [. . .] Nevertheless the above
conventional method of calculation will be compatible with a considerable
measure of continuity and stability in our aairs, so long as we can rely on
the maintenance of the convention.

Keynes, General Theory of Employment, supra note 14, at 152 (emphasis in original).
As an illustration of this, consider the hypothesis testing in much of the empirical
analysis that is carried out today. To determine whether a result in a sample of
observations – for instance, a correlation between takeover defenses and rm value –
is statistically signicant, researchers perform a test providing information about
the probability to observe the same result when there is actually no correlation in
the real world. In statistics, this situation is called the null hypothesis. Results are
signicant when the null hypothesis can be rejected persuasively. Who denes what
counts as persuasively? It is, again, a convention. In particular, results are considered
statistically signicant when the probability that the hypothesis is being rejected
when it is actually true (a type I error, or a false positive) is equal or lower than 5%.
The probability could be a dierent percentage, but 5% is the one conventionally
accepted.
37
See Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment”, supra note 15, at 213-214:
By “uncertain” knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to
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Because dealing with uncertainty is dicult, one common strategy
used is to treat it as risk.38 Certainly, the vocabulary and structure
of risk are commonly used. One scholar notes that “work in organizational theory suggests that most decisions are actually made in
absence of calculable probabilities and under conditions of enormous
contingent complexity, although they may be presented as if they were
mechanical.”39 Knight distinguishes between those who treat uncertainty as risk – who proceed as though the future will be like the past 40
– and those who do not, instead using their intuition, calling the latter
“entrepreneurs.”
2.4

Justication under Uncertainty

The preceding discussed decision-making and in particular, decisionmaking under uncertainty. Let us now return to the role of justication.
Market actors often have to explain and justify their decisions. This is
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game
of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect
of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is only
slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense
in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war
is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence,
or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth-owners
in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientic basis
on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.
Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical
men to do our best to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as
we should if we had behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of
prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate
probability, waiting to be summed.
38

A. M. Pacces, “Illiquidity and Financial Crisis”, 74 University of Pittsburgh
Law Review 383, 2013. Uncertainty aversion (also known as ambiguity aversion)
is a well-documented phenomenon in the literature. See, e.g. M. J. Machina and
M. Siniscalchi, “Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion”, in M. J. Machina and V. K.
Viscusi, eds., Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty (Elsevier, 2014),
729-807.
39
Michael Power, Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-14.
40
According to Knight, “[C]hange according to known law [. . . ] does not give rise
to uncertainty.” Knight, supra note 12, at 313.
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particularly true after a bad outcome, but it can also be true at any time
before ‘nature’ acts – that is, before there is an outcome that can be
assessed. The justications have to pass muster with the relevant community: shareholders and other nanciers, peers, and perhaps, courts
and regulators. When making any not-completely-inconsequential or
routine decision, market actors will typically consider how they would
justify themselves should they be called upon to do so. But the more
consequential decisions and the less routine ones may entail a considerable degree of uncertainty and are hence potentially more dicult
to justify. Actors who anticipate needing to justify their decisions will
therefore tend to choose the more conservative or conventional course
of action, in which the impact of uncertainty is minimized, so that they
can justify a bad outcome based on some existing accepted methodology
such as a probability distribution.
Justication is ultimately about accountability – the need to justify
is a recognition that one is accountable. Accountability is “a fundamental
feature of organizational life.”41 Accountability has a signicant eect
on decision-making.42 Whether accountability generally yields better
41

S. V. Patil, P. E. Tetlock, and B. A. Mellers, “Accountability Systems and
Group Norms: Balancing the Risks of Mindless Conformity and Reckless Deviation”,
30 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 282, 2017, DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1933.
42
The literature on accountability is voluminous. See, e.g. ibid.; P. E. Tetlock and
B. A. Mellers, “Structuring Accountability Systems in Organizations: Key TradeOs and Critical Unknowns”, in B. Fischho and C. Chauvin, eds., Intelligence
Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientic Foundations (National Academies Press
2011), 249-270, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/13062/chapter/16; P. E.
Tetlock, “Accountability and Complexity of Thought”, 45 Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 74, 1983; P. E. Tetlock, “Accountability—A Social Check on
the Fundamental Attribution Error”, 48 Social Psychology Quarterly 227, 1985; P.
E. Tetlock and J. I. Kim, “Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality
Prediction Task”, 52 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 700, 1987; P. E.
Tetlock and R. Boettger, “Accountability—A Social Manager of the Dilution Eect”,
57 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 388, 1989; P. E. Tetlock, “Social
and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability—Conformity, Complexity,
and Bolstering”, 57 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 632, 1989; P.
E. Tetlock, “The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice—Toward a
Contingency Model”, 25 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 331, 1992; P.
E. Tetlock and R. Boettger, “Accountability Amplies the Status-Quo Eect When
Change Creates Victims”, 7 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 1, 1994; J. S.
Lerner, J. H. Goldberg, and P. E. Tetlock, “Sober Second Thought: The Eects
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decisions is debated, as is, if it does yield better decisions, what form
accountability should take to elicit the best decision-making. There is
extensive literature, for instance, on whether accountability for process
or accountability for outcomes produces better decisions. There is, not
surprisingly, no denitive answer, especially given the vast variety of
possible contexts.43 Some work has considered accountability under
uncertainty, where the right answer is not known by anyone, or where
there is no consensus best practice that “leads to desired outcomes.”44
But studying decisions analogous to the types of decisions we are
concerned with is dicult. The decisions to be made in the corporate
context are highly consequential and often, they are highly uncertain
too. In the real world, there are too many confounding factors; in an
experimental setting, where the confounding factors can be controlled,
there is a signicant limit on how consequential the eects of the
decision, including on the decision maker, can be. After all, conducting
an experiment where the result of doing badly is the loss of a job
is not possible, nor are natural experiments or existing data always
amenable to making plausible extrapolations.45 The closest analogue
of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility”,
24 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 563, 1998; J. S. Lerner and P. E.
Tetlock, “Accounting for the Eects of Accountability”, 125 Psychological Bulletin
255, 1999; P. E. Tetlock and B. A. Mellers, “Intelligent Management of Intelligence
Agencies Beyond Accountability Ping-Pong”, 66 American Psychologist 542, 2011; P.
E. Tetlock et al., “Accountability and Ideology: When Left Looks Right and Right
Looks Left”, 122 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 22, 2013;
W. Chang et al., “Accountability and Adaptive Performance under Uncertainty: A
Long-Term View”, 12 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 610, 2017.
43
Among the scenarios as to which there have been tests are—those in which what
constitutes good process is agreed upon, those in which the result of the decision
can or cannot be reversed, how consequential the decision is, and to what extent
‘doing the same thing’ as one previously did is possible. See Chang et al., supra note
42; W. F. Messier, L. A. Quick, and S. D. Vandervelde, “The Inuence Of Process
Accountability And Accounting Standard Type On Auditor Usage Of A Status Quo
Heuristic”, 39 Accounting, Organizations and Society 59, 2014; Patil, Tetlock, and
Mellers, supra note 41.
44
Chang et al., supra note 42.
45
But, again, we know that accountability aects decision-making, and that in
particular contexts, certain types of process or outcome accountability were better or
worse; there is no general nding, even that accountability makes for better or worse
decisions than no accountability. A recent article co-authored by leading researchers
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that can be studied in the real world is probably medical decisionmaking, which we discuss below. Notably, medical decision-making is
notorious for sometimes inspiring justication-motivated decisions that
are not optimal.
What is considered a satisfactory justication? There are two obvious
alternatives. One is to proceed using conventional criteria and metrics
that are recognized as acceptable in the relevant community.46 (‘This is
what is generally done.’ ‘This is what others are doing.’) An alternative is
to seek to produce (good) results so quickly that the results themselves
serve as the justication – so that, it is hoped, no further justication
is needed. Stated dierently, conventional justicatory strategies can
be either process-based or outcome-based.47
As noted above, an excellent and wholly intuitive example of justicatory strategies relating to process is ‘defensive medicine,’ in which
doctors use accepted processes to insulate themselves against the consequences of possible bad outcomes. A recent article, describing a
particular case, explained the concept:
“Physicians make judgment calls every day. Clinical information is
often imperfect, and even when it is clear, the scientic evidence
in the eld “[cautioned] against a black-and-white perspective on the pros and cons
of process and outcome accountability,” noting that “Each system has its advantages
and disadvantages.” Patil, Tetlock, and Mellers, supra note 41, at 298.
46
This characterization nds support in the literature: "In those situations where
an accountable individual knows what response the evaluator will nd acceptable
(unambiguous), there is a tendency to conform to that standard (the “acceptability
heuristic”) in order to win approval. When the evaluator’s standard is unknown
(ambiguous), however, simple conformity is obviously no longer an option. Assuming
that the judge or decision maker still cares about winning approval, his next best
option will be to nd the most defensible course of action available.” K. Siegel-Jacobs
and J. F. Yates, “Eects of Procedural and Outcome Accountability on Judgment
Quality”, 65 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1, 1996, at 2.
Accountability could in the abstract result in more reasoned decision-making, but
that’s where doing so gets you a payo. Here, there are high stakes, the decisions
are not reversible, and there is no accepted way of proceeding. See, e.g. Tetlock and
Mellers, “Structuring Accountability Systems in Organizations”, supra note 42.
47
Megan Potter, Eects of Process vs. Outcome Accountability, Responsibility,
and Identiability on Solution Quality, Master’s Thesis, Psychology, University of
Nebraska, 1998, available at https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1156&context=
studentwork.
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about how to use it may not be. In addition, forces that sometimes run counter to a patient’s best interest can aect decision
making. This case highlights how physicians’ personal interests
in avoiding malpractice liability can inuence how they manage
clinical uncertainty.”
“Liability concerns can also loom large in decisions about ordering
tests because malpractice claims for missed or delayed diagnoses
are common. The legal standard of care reects what is reasonable
under the circumstances, and [the patient’s] physicians should
not be held liable for a missed diagnosis if their decision not to
admit her reected sound clinical judgment. However, reasonableness is often determined by what is customarily done in similar
circumstances. In practice, then, malpractice law could create a
vicious circle for physicians: the more their colleagues practice
defensive medicine, the more legally vulnerable they become if
they do not.”48
This description ts our context quite well except that those to
whom the actors are accountable are not just, and indeed, are often
not, courts. They are other market actors, including their nanciers and
their peers. What is determined to be acceptable is thus also not what
is ‘legally’ acceptable, but instead, what is considered to be acceptable
in the relevant community. (While this is beyond our scope, we suspect
that doctors are also accountable to and within their communities, and
that norms, not just legal standards, also play a signicant role).
Accountability in corporate governance is in the rst instance outcome accountability. That is, if there is a good outcome, the process
will probably not be second-guessed. Accountability works similarly in
nance – an investment decision that pays o will not be second guessed
even if the process by which it was made was deeply awed or even
random.
But what if there is a bad outcome, or the outcome is not unambiguously good? In such cases, the actor may point to her process to
justify her decision. Consider a manager’s choice to hire someone from
48

Kachalia and Mello, supra note 2.
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a culture dierent from the culture of others in the organization. If the
would-be employee has top mainstream credentials, even if the person
is not successful at the job, the manager can point to the mainstream
credentials as a justication for her decision.49 Or, in the nance sphere,
the money manager can point to rating agencies’ top ratings for the
securities the manager purchased. These strategies, abiding by accepted
norms or using an accepted process, come under the rubric of process accountability, and are, we think, used by both managers and shareholder
activists. We would argue that some of that is at issue as well, both as
to managers and as to shareholder activists. Indeed, notwithstanding
the activists’ supposed individualized plans for particular companies,
there does seem to be an ‘activist playbook;’ the ‘playbook’ may also
be used by managers who try to pre-empt activist campaigns.50 The
playbook is not just helpful for process accountability. Insofar as some
of what is in the playbook yields quick cash, either for the company,
the shareholders, or both, it may seem that there has been a good
outcome as well. (Of course, as is broadly recognized, we can’t know if
not pursuing the quick cash would have yielded a better outcome).
2.5

How Uncertainty Can Yield Agency Costs

Because good outcomes are never assured, a corporate actor will want,
ex ante, to formulate a justication in the event of a bad outcome. Bad
outcomes may, or may not, be the result of bad behavior; the actor
might simply have been unlucky. To avoid being judged unfavorably –
and perhaps red – by her principal in such situations, an agent will
tend to make the decision that is easier to justify if it turns out badly,
even if the decision is not the best one for the principal. Proceeding in
this manner is an agency cost to the extent that the principal’s welfare
fails to be maximized because of the agent’s self-interested behavior
in protecting her downside. These agency costs dier in important
respects from traditional agency costs (such as those stemming from
shirking, misappropriation, or empire building). Accountability is helpful
49

See C. A. Hill, “Justication Norms Under Uncertainty: A Preliminary Inquiry”,
17 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 27, 2010.
50
See note 24, supra.
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in reducing traditional agency costs; agents, knowing that they will
suer consequences for engaging in the behavior at issue, will be less
inclined to do so, such that monitoring and bonding costs of minimizing
such behavior are reduced.51 By contrast, the agency costs stemming
from justication-motivated decisions are exacerbated by accountability:
the more accountability, the more agents will make decisions with
justication in mind, diverging more from what would be best for
the principal, thus increasing the overall cost (“residual loss”) to the
principal.52
Which set of agency costs is likely to be bigger depends on context:
decision-making motivated by an anticipated need for justication is
sometimes ecient, sometimes not. When uncertainty is low, agents’
decisions can, and not infrequently do, represent the agent’s assessment
of the best decision for her principal as well as being readily justiable
in the event of a bad outcome; the decision in such cases does not reect
a justication cost. Stated dierently, accepted ways of proceeding,
supported by considerable information as to similar situations, exist. By
contrast, in the presence of high uncertainty, choosing what is justiable
may result in justication costs since what is justiable – relying on
51

See Jensen and Meckling, supra note 9, at 308.
Our point may be articulated within the realm of agency theory. Jensen and
Meckling, ibid., dene agency cost as the sum of ‘monitoring costs’, ‘bonding costs’,
and ‘residual loss’. The latter is the cost of the “divergence between the agent’s
decision and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.” While
accountability reduces monitoring costs and bonding costs, it does not necessarily
reduce the residual loss. On the contrary, we argue that the residual loss may increase
by a larger amount as a result of justication-motivated decisions. This problem
is akin to the problem of over-monitoring discussed in the economic literature on
principal-agent problems. Monitoring, particularly by large shareholders, constrains
managers’ ability to extract private benets, but it may be excessive insofar as it
undermines managerial discretion, which in turn may result in suboptimal choices.
See M. Burkart, D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi, “Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and
the Value of the Firm”, 112 Quarterly Journal of Economics 693, 1997. We take the
over-monitoring theory one step further by making justication costs explicit (albeit
without formally modelling them). This allows us to argue that accountability may
be excessive irrespective of the optimal ownership structure – i.e. justication costs
may be higher than traditional agency costs both in dispersed and in concentrated
ownership structures. In both contexts – we claim – Control Enhancing Mechanisms
(CEMs) may ameliorate the balance between justication costs and traditional agency
costs. See infra, text accompanying notes 251-261.
52
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what others are doing, what is generally done, or what should pay o
quickly – may not be what the agent would choose if her only aim was
to achieve value for the principal.
Both traditional and justicatory types of agency costs are aected
by institutional ownership, albeit in opposite directions. Institutional
ownership decreases traditional agency costs by reducing atomistic shareholders’ monitoring costs, particularly in cases of underperformance
when activist shareholder engagement itself activates institutional investors’ voice.53 But institutional investors can increase the agency
costs of justication. They are a constituency to which management
is, and believes itself to be, accountable. Moreover, institutional investors are themselves agents, accountable to the people giving them
money to invest. Institutional investors will wish to avoid outows from
their funds, since they are compensated as a percentage of their funds’
assets. They will thus side with managers who seek to protect their
downsides by making justication-motivated decisions. Such decisions
should allow both management and the investment fund to attribute
underperformance to ‘others’ or ‘bad luck’.
2.6

Assessing Uncertainty

Contrast a long-standing, oligopolistic business competing based on
established patterns (such as smartphones today or car manufacturing
before driverless cars) with a business involving cutting-edge technology
and the creation of new markets (e.g. car manufacturing today or
telecommunications before the smartphone). Both businesses will need
to innovate to survive, but a) the former will face tougher competition
and need to react faster than the latter; b) the former will face less
uncertainty than the latter; and c) for both businesses, the degree of
uncertainty exposure will change with time.54
53

R. J. Gilson and J. N. Gordon, “The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights”, 113 Columbia Law
Review 863, 2013.
54
In this regard, Knight notes that entrepreneurs have roles not only in new
enterprises, but also in established enterprises that are ripe for change. Knight, supra
note 12, at 333-334.
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While a company’s decision-making is always undertaken under
conditions of uncertainty, the degree of uncertainty varies between
companies and, within the same company, over time. For example, at
this juncture, the innovation cycle in the telecommunications industry
is short. Companies need to determine what works and what does
not within a few months, if not weeks, in order to react promptly to
competition. Because feedback is short-term, uncertainty is thereby
limited. Note how dierent the same industry looked only twenty years
ago. The innovation cycle was long, and the winners in the competitive
arena could arise from virtually anywhere. Uncertainty was very high.
Contrast this example with the automotive industry. Few would have
characterized this business as uncertain twenty years ago. Producers had
to keep up with short innovation cycles in safety and engine eciency,
or disappear. Fast-forward to today. Short of the fact that people will
still need cars in the next decade, little is known about how these will
be operated and powered. Uncertainty is thus high.
Uncertainty varies greatly across businesses and over time, making
the ecient response to the problem of allocation of power in corporate
governance vary as well. In contexts of low uncertainty, that managers
have to justify their actions to investors is benecial. One of the functions
of accountability is to alert management to mistakes. Bad managers
are not only those who shirk or take advantage of shareholders, but
also include those who don’t examine their own actions or leadership
suciently critically.
Our broader approach to agency costs echoes a point made by Albert
Hirschman in 1970 that when competition is vigorous, voice is preferable
to exit because it alerts management before it is too late.55 On this
perspective, the concentration of institutional ownership supporting the
business model of shareholder activists56 is benecial because activism
and the threat thereof can, in addition to discouraging self-interested
behavior, timely alert management that they are being slow in reacting
to the company’s competitors’ moves. This is very much the story
55

A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States (Harvard University Press, 1970), 33, 35-37.
56
See infra, text accompanying notes 74-75.
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of Third Point’s Sotheby’s engagement discussed above. Indeed, the
empirical evidence reveals that short-term feedback, including in the
form of sello by short-term investors, is often benecial.57
In business contexts where uncertainty is high, however, reliance on
short-term feedback may be counterproductive. Uncertainty means that
the future is not predictable even within a broad range, because there
is no reason to suppose that the future will be like the past. It might
be the same, similar, dierent, or even radically dierent.58
Building on the work of John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight,
we distinguish two dierent ways of proceeding in the face of uncertainty,
that of “entrepreneurs,” and that of “nanciers.”59 (Entrepreneurs can,
of course, be managers or those nancing business activities; the same
is true of nanciers. The terminology indicates an approach to decisions,
not a business role). Both Keynes and Knight consider entrepreneurship
to be an approach to uncertainty that is based on intuition rather than on
probability distributions or other mechanical or otherwise-conventional
57

Giannetti & Yu, supra note 34. That being said, there are such things as “death
spirals,” where short-term feedback turns a perhaps-surmountable situation into,
yes, a death spiral. This was much discussed around the time of Enron, where the
feedback was in the form of credit downgrades that had carryover and recursive
eects. It is hard to know how to balance all the relevant interests in such cases and,
as signicantly, how to tell the short-term problems from long-term ones. I discuss
this issue in C. A. Hill, “Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron”, 35
Connecticut Law Review 1145, 2003.
58
A. M. Pacces, The Future in Law and Finance (Eleven International Publishing,
2013). See also supra, text accompanying notes 34-36. According to Knight “change
according to known law (whether or not we call it change) does not give rise to
uncertainty.” Knight, supra note 12, at 313. Note that the phrase “the future is
(or is not) like the past” is shorthand, simplifying complexities that can largely be
ignored for purposes of our analysis. The future is always in some sense signicantly
similar to, and signicantly dierent from, the past. Descriptions are not mechanical
or neutral: reasonable people might disagree as to whether a particular business
outcome showed that strategy x ‘didn’t always work’ or ‘wasn’t properly attempted,’
for instance. There might be disagreement in characterizing the outcome as well. One
of us explores this issue further in the context of contract negotiations and contract
provisions in C. A. Hill, “Why Are Contracts Written in Legalese”, 77 Chicago Kent
Law Review 59, 2002.
59
See in particular Keynes, General Theory of Employment, supra note 14, Chapter
12, pp. 147–164, distinguishing between “speculation”, which motivates nance, and
“enterprise,” which determines real investment.
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methods.60 The mark of true entrepreneurship is having a “free hand”
to deal with uncertainty.61 Thus, an entrepreneur’s approach will by
denition not be conventional.62 Moreover, her performance will be
harder to monitor, since standard milestones may not capture her
interim achievements.
By contrast, the nancier’s approach will be conventional, again,
treating uncertainty like risk, implicitly assuming the future will not
be radically dierent from the past and that decisions can be made on
the basis of established probability distributions and other mechanical
techniques. Indeed, the nancier’s approach, treating uncertainty like
risk, is a common reaction to uncertainty.63
Investors’ insistence on justication undermines entrepreneurship
in two ways. First, management will be motivated to choose more
conventional courses of action, which can be more readily justied
in the event of a bad outcome. And those conventional courses of
action will be less good as guides to what they should do. Second,
management will be motivated to choose actions that, based on existing
conventional models, are expected to deliver results within the interval
in which investors evaluate performance. The shorter this interval is,
the stronger the management’s incentive to ‘play it safe.’ Inasmuch as
management choice departs from what their best judgment would be in
the absence of justication (which, again, is more likely the higher the
degree of uncertainty faced by the particular company), the frustration
of entrepreneurship also lowers shareholders’ expected returns and
therefore constitutes an agency cost.64
The degree of uncertainty varies, particularly as a function of the
kind of innovation at issue.65 For example, mature businesses normally
60

See Knight, supra note 12, at 232. Keynes famously characterized this intuition
as “animal spirits.” Keynes, General Theory of Employment, supra note 14, Ch. 12,
VII, 161-163.
61
Knight, supra note 12, at 361.
62
Ibid.
63
Pacces, “Illiquidity and Financial Crisis”, supra note 38. We elaborate on the
consequence of this approach on speculation and arbitrage in the text accompanying
notes 111-113.
64
See text accompanying notes 51-52.
65
For a classication of innovations, see R. Garcia and R. Calantone, “A Critical
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engage in incremental innovation. Incremental innovations imply improvements on existing (not new) markets or technology. The outcomes
of incremental innovation are somewhat predictable albeit within a
broad range. By contrast, discontinuous and radical innovations entail
a much higher degree of uncertainty. Discontinuous innovation involves
either a new market or a new technology, whereas radical innovation
involves both. There is also disruptive innovation, which commonly
has a signicant period of underperformance until one or more existing
markets is disrupted. The trajectory is inherently unpredictable. 66
A context frequently discussed in the manager vs. activist (and
hostile acquirer) debates is research and development (R&D) spending.
Keeping such spending low may or may not be best for the principal,
but it is often good for the agent. A larger investment might have
been hard to justify if it didn’t produce good results quickly enough.
Moreover, in the short term, the reduction in current spending improves
the company’s nancial appearance. Thus, a manager might be tempted
to minimize R&D spending, whether or not doing so is good for the
company.
Because the benets of R&D spending are dicult to measure,
assessing whether such spending is good for the company is dicult.
Empirical evidence suggests that the reduction of R&D input does
not necessarily undermine measurable R&D output.67 However, the
studies typically use patents or patent citation counts as measures.
This does not necessarily capture actual R&D output.68 It does it well
for certain types of innovation, but less well for others. Specically,
the benets of R&D spending are easier to measure for companies
engaging in incremental innovation than for those engaging in other
types of innovation, especially radical and disruptive innovation. Where
a company is engaged in incremental innovation, there is less uncertainty,
Look at Technological Innovation Typology and Innovativeness Terminology: A
Literature Review”, 19 Journal of Product Innovation Management 110, 120-124,
2002.
66
Christensen, supra note 16.
67
A. Brav et al., “How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?”, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming 2018, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jneco.2018.06.012.
68
Coee & Palia, supra note 30, at 575-576.
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such that patent counts and citations are good proxies for R&D output.
Moreover, in the realm of incremental innovation, competition is usually
erce, making the ability to maintain output levels at the lowest cost key
for survival. But reducing R&D expenditures may be inecient for other
companies, even if the reductions do not seem to reduce measurable
R&D output. Because the value of discontinuous and radical innovation
is hard to measure, patent counts and citations may well underestimate
it. Moreover, especially in the case of disruptive innovation, the initial
value of innovation may even appear negative in the short term. 69
In sum, cutting R&D expenditures may be tempting to managers
making justication-motivated decisions, and doing so may represent
a justication cost. Finally and notably, in addition to the agency
costs of decisions regarding reductions of R&D expenditures, there are
potentially social costs as well – a drug not produced, the benecial
health results not achieved, perhaps an invention postponed by a decade
or even forever which might have spurred other inventions.
A society with insucient entrepreneurship faces several costs. 70
As noted above, the most obvious and commonly remarked-upon costs
relate to the diminished entrepreneurship itself – the research stopped
early, the discovery not made, the products and services not produced.
Other familiar costs, where in lieu of entrepreneurship the managers
have made sizeable borrowings to placate or anticipate the demands of,
activist shareholders, are those that have been bemoaned in the context
of highly-leveraged transactions – the loss of exibility from high debt
loads, the societal costs of disruption given big cuts in payroll to meet
debt service payments, the costs if the business fails on grounds of these
high debt loads, and so on.71 Finally, albeit controversially, another cost
could be secular stagnation, a slowdown of the economy resulting from
lesser levels of innovation.72
69

See C. M. Christensen, M. E. Raynor, and R. McDonald, “What Is Disruptive
Innovation?”, Harvard Business Review, Dec. 2015, available at https://hbr.org/
2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation.
70
See Knight, supra note 12, at 347-375. See also Keynes, General Theory of
Employment, supra note 14, Ch. 12, VII, 161-162 (“animal spirits”).
71
S. N. Kaplan and P. Strömberg, “Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity”, 22
Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, 2008.
72
See L. H. Summers, “Demand Side Secular Stagnation”, 105 American Economic

316

A Role for Justication in Corporate Governance

This takes familiar arguments about the so-called ‘evils’ encouraged
by shareholder activists, notably including short-termism, one step
further. Short-term economies from selling divisions, and making capital
repurchases or paying dividends, and even borrowing money to do so,
as well as reducing payrolls, may have a good eect on the broader
economy if the capital is better deployed elsewhere. But they may not.
How would we know if capital is better deployed elsewhere? There may
be an inherent bias towards short-termism insofar as quicker returns on
capital are more readily justiable than uncertain and remote payos. 73
Public companies may thus become short-termist (or have to go private)
even when doing so is inecient for them. Moreover, there are social
costs if innovation and entrepreneurial activity are unduly chilled.
Arguments about short vs. long-termism embed a judgment about
what counts as being short term. What determines how long a (corporate
or fund) manager might be given to show results? The standard shorttermist critique, and indeed, our thesis, relies on managers not being
given enough time when they claim they need more time. How much
time are they given, and why that amount of time? Outcome and process
accountability are intertwined here – the better process does not just
justify a bad outcome; it also justies a longer wait for a good outcome.
Moreover, certain sorts of processes are encouraged – that is, deemed to
be justiable because they seem to pay o quickly. But the determination
of whether there has been a good outcome is more complicated than it
might seem. For instance, doing ‘just in time’ stang to cut costs might
seem to save money, but a more complicated computation could take
into account higher employee turnover, and perhaps, costs the company
later incurs in the form of reduced business or greater regulatory scrutiny
(or even lawsuits) arising from bad publicity, higher medical costs for
Review 60, 2015. One of the objections to the secular stagnation hypothesis is that
it does not take entrepreneurship and innovation fully into account. See Philippe
Aghion, “Entrepreneurship and Growth: Lessons from an Intellectual Journey”, 48
Small Business Economics 9, 2017.
73
Note how this could be easily reversed depending on market sentiment. Specifically, the conventional wisdom could be that long term bets on future returns,
however uncertain and far in the future, are more justiable. This happened not so
long ago, for certain kinds of business, such as Internet companies at the end of the
last century.
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the employees, and so on. Much follows from this, but for purposes of
our argument, it bolsters the case for the solution we suggest in Chapter
4 – that shareholders and managers should be able to, together, dene
what counts as an acceptable time horizon.
In sum, the foregoing identies social costs as well as agency costs
of decision-making motivated by justication. We do not suggest that
the classic concerns regarding traditional agency costs are nonexistent,
or that close monitoring, which may embed and encourage the use
of conventional metrics, is never appropriate. There are at least two
reasons why conventional decision-making is often the best individuals
can do. First, uncertainty of the future varies with context, being higher
in some situations than in others. Particularly when uncertainty is not
high – as in routine businesses having decades of history and long time
series from which to extrapolate – conventional decision-making may be
the best possible way to deal with the future. Indeed, where uncertainty
is low, doing what others do, which may resemble herding, may be both
individually and collectively appropriate. Second, conventional justications are useful because they reduce the cost of monitoring agents and
policymakers. Particularly in situations where conicts of interest are
high – as in countries with low investor protection and/or high levels
of corruption – having more accountable managers and policymakers
may be worth the inexibility and consequent discouragement of entrepreneurship stemming from more conventional decision-making. But,
as we explained above, we think there are situations where managers
should be given the opportunity to contract for more leeway. In Chapter
4, we explain what form the leeway would take.
2.7

A More Nuanced Picture of Activism

Everyone involved in the corporate governance sphere is to some extent
seeking buy-in, including managers as they guide their companies, but
the need is particularly acute for shareholder activists. After all, such
activists generally do not seek to take control;74 they buy relatively
74

See, e.g. C. Nathan, “Debunking Myths about Activist Investors”, Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), March 15,
2013 (“Today, activist investors rarely seek equity stakes in target companies above
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small (but signicant) stakes in a company and use various tactics to
exert pressure. Their business model is for the company to adopt their
agenda and thus provide them with a prot.75 To get the company
to adopt their agenda, they need other shareholders’ support. 76 This
should aect what they propose, and whether what they propose is
successful.
How does this constraint aect shareholder activist engagement
campaigns? It is dicult to know. Certainly, institutional investors must
be cultivated. What does that take? One recent strain is an increasing,
at least rhetorical, emphasis on longer time horizons and on social
purposes, which generally are long-term.77 As stated in a 2017 review
of activist investing: “All activists will seek to portray themselves as
keenly interested in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.
At a minimum, they will talk more about the long-term consequences
of their involvement.”78 Patience may fail, though: underperformance,
10%[.]”).That being said, activists do occasionally work in tandem with private
equity rms to, together, mount a takeover attempt. A recent well-known example is
Pershing Square’s attempt, with Valeant, to take over Allergan. A. Gara, “Bill Ackman and Valeant Settle Allergan Insider Trading Lawsuit for $290 Million”, Forbes,
Dec. 30, 2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2017/12/
30/bill-ackman-and-valeant-settle-allergan-insider-trading-lawsuit-for-290-million/
#7d134e731f32.
75
While their aim is to have their agenda adopted, they can also take into account
that even if the company does not adopt their agenda, they could prot from
heightened interest in the company spurred by their interest, or even by acquisitions
prompted by rivals or those invited by management. But see M. Becht et al., “Returns
to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study, 30 Review of Financial Studies
2933, 2017, at 2954 (showing that the returns on engagements with multiple outcomes
involving a takeover are roughly double to the returns on engagements involving
only a takeover).
76
Gilson and Gordon, supra note 53.
77
“A Sense of Purpose”, annual letter from BlackRock CEO Larry Fink to
major corporate CEOs, 2018, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
investor-relations/larry-nk-ceo-letter; see also Berman, supra note 31; David Benoit,
“Activist Investor Takes a Page From Greenpeace, Pushing Companies for Change”,
Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2017; Trian Fund Management, Environmental, Social
and Governance Policy Statement, June 2017, available at https://trianpartners.com/
content/uploads/2017/06/Trian_ESG_Policy_Statement_-_June_2017.pdf .
78
Activist Insight, The Activist Investing Annual Review 2018, at 7, available
at https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-InvestingAnnual-Review-2018-HiRes.pdf.
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though, will spur some sense of opportunity – and urgency. Indeed,
the impetus to ‘do something’ about underperformance is part of the
story of justication-motivated decision-making, by corporate managers,
institutional investors, and activist investors.
Of the institutional investors, those who are most often pivotal in an
activist’s campaign are index funds.79 Index funds do not have discretion
to enter or exit the investment in a particular company, since they need
to be tracking the relevant index. Thus, they are long-term shareholders.
But is their perspective a long-term perspective? First, they are the
opposite of activist shareholders themselves – they are passive investors.
But they are not passive shareholders.80 Regulation on both sides of the
Atlantic requires them to disclose their voting policies,81 which indirectly
compels them to vote. While voting decisions could be outsourced
entirely to proxy advisors, such as Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), empirical studies reveal that the large index fund managers – who
are often crucial in an activist’s campaign – do not necessarily vote
in accordance with ISS recommendations.82 This might seem puzzling
insofar as index funds’ business model consists in tracking a stock
index at the lowest possible cost. Informed voting, on the contrary, is
79

Pacces, “Exit, Voice and Loyalty”, supra note 6, at 208-9.
I. R. Appel, T. A. Gormley, and D. B. Keim, “Passive Investors, Not
Passive Owners”, 121 Journal of Financial Economics 111, forthcoming 2019,
earlier version available at https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Passive-Investor-Paper.pdf.
81
By mandating the disclosure of institutional investors’ voting, U.S. legislation
eectively compels them to vote in order to avoid embarrassment. See E. B. Rock,
“Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance”, University of Pennsylvania Faculty
Working Paper No. 1458, available at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_
scholarship/1458/. A similar outcome it to be expected in the European Union
after the entry into force of the revised Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive EU
2017/828 of 17 May 2017) in June 2019. See Pacces, “Shareholder Activism in the
CMU”, supra note 24, at 522.
82
There is considerable disagreement as to how much of investors’ votes ISS and
other proxy advisors, notably Glass Lewis, eectively control—that is, how much
inuence those recommendations have, with some commentators arguing that the
advisors’ inuence has been exaggerated. See generally S. Choi, J. Fisch, and M.
Kahan, “The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?”, 59 Emory Law Journal
869, 2010; P. Iliev and M. Lowry, “Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?”, 28 Review of
Financial Studies 446, 2015.
80
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expensive and benets every other investor in the particular company.
There is, however, one dimension of voting which is not chilled by this
free riding problem: low-cost policies that can be generalized across
portfolio companies, such as policies against takeover defenses or ControlEnhancing Mechanisms (CEMs). Because such policies, on average, help
address underperformance, they are worthwhile for index funds insofar,
again, as the funds cannot exit underperforming investments. 83 But they
are not based on a particular company’s situation. Thus, campaigns
seeking to address defects in governance as compared with ‘standard’
norms, or underperformance, are apt to be those that gain index funds’
support.
Some commentators have argued that institutional investors provide a reliable screening of activists’ proposals.84 Others have argued
the opposite, namely that the procedure determining activism’s success is biased towards short-termism and social costs.85 We disagree
with both of these views. Activists teaming up with index funds expected to vote in a standardized fashion does not necessarily lead
to short-termism, nor does it lead unambiguously to a good or a
bad outcome. For instance, this combination (and its credible threat)
constrains the ability of management to expropriate shareholders, receive excessive compensation, or engage in empire-building.86 However, the management of companies that can be targeted by activist
shareholders will also tend to make conventional choices, choices that
are justiable to investors, regardless of whether these choices reect
the managers’ best judgment as to what would be good for their
companies.
83

J. Fisch, A. Hamdani, and S. Davido Solomon, “Passive Investors”, Preliminary Draft, April 13, 2018, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/
les/upload_documents/Steven%20Davido-Solomon%20Passive%20Investors%
20april%2013%20clean%20copy.pdf.
84
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 53. See also W.-G. Ringe, “Shareholder Activism:
A Renaissance”, in J. N. Gordon and W.-G. Ringe, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
Corporate Law and Governance (Oxford University Press, 2018).
85
J. C. Coee, Jr., “The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted
Majorities, and the Public Morality”, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 373/2017,
November 2017, available at https://ecgi.global/sites/default/les/working_papers/
documents/nalcoee.pdf.
86
Pacces, “Exit, Voice and Loyalty”, supra note 6, at 210.
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A big question is thus the extent to which both activists and institutional investors will continue emphasizing one-size-ts-all solutions;
certainly, forces of justication favor such solutions, as does, for institutional investors, the cost incentive to have one generally applicable
approach rather than approaches specically tailored to particular portfolio companies in what may be an enormous portfolio. As to the latter
point, consider that the largest asset managers worldwide – Blackrock,
Vanguard, and State Street – manage, collectively, some 11 trillion
US dollars of nancial assets. They are the largest shareholders in the
majority of public corporations worldwide, including owning 90% of
the S&P 500 (that is, 90% of the total shares of the companies on the
S&P 500).87 Their analysts cannot monitor all portfolio companies on
an individualized basis, although they could decide to make long-term
contractual arrangements (of the sort we propose, which, while customized as to a few variables, such as the length of the arrangement,
nevertheless fall within a few circumscribed categories) with some of
them. We think they should do so, and should not accede to the push by
“governance activists” to pressure companies to adopt, across the board,
what the governance activists call “good” governance practices. These
practices eectively give managers less power, and shareholders more
power, and notably include discouraging the use of staggered boards as
well as poison pills.
In sum, there is voluminous literature, full consideration of which is
beyond our scope, as to how activists’ need to cultivate institutional
investors aects what ideas they propose and what proposals succeed.88
87

See J. Fichtner and E. Heemskerk, “These 3 Firms Own Corporate America”, Business Insider, May 10, 2017, available at http://www.businessinsider.
com/american-corporation-big-three-rms-2017-5. Blackrock, Vanguard, and State
Street have corporate governance oces made of respectively 31, 20, and 11
analysts. See “BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Bulk Up Governance
Sta”, Financial Times, Jan. 28, 2017, available at https://www.ft.com/content/
657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a.
88
The determination is complex. Whatever the activists are suggesting, their
ultimate success should turn on what shareholders other than them convey that they
favor. This may moderate activist shareholders’ ability to yield short-termism unless
the support they receive (or expect to receive) stems from short-termist institutional
investors. It should be noted that investors’ time horizons for their investments
are not dispositive in this regard: long-term investors do not necessarily support
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It might have been thought that insofar as activists are considered
“short term,” their need to cultivate more “long term” investors would
limit short-termism and thus, on this view, the associated societal and
perhaps agency costs of short-termism.89 We disagree, for two reasons.
First, as we have argued, we do not accept the ‘activists are/are not
clearly short-termist in problematic ways’ framing. Second, and more
importantly, the foregoing demonstrates that the eects of activist
shareholders’ need to cultivate institutional investors are complex – and
that there is no reason to suppose that the eects include a reduction
in agency costs associated with justication-motivated decision-making.
2.8

Application to Europe: The Role of Controlling Shareholders

The foregoing has largely assumed the U.S. paradigm, in which the battle
is between managers, who have control, and shareholders, who may
sometimes acquire fairly large stakes, but in general, not controlling
stakes. Certainly, very few large U.S. corporations have controlling
shareholders. In continental Europe, by contrast, a majority of listed
companies have controlling shareholders who by denition control the
board. This implies a dierent set of agency problems. In the presence
of a controlling shareholder, the conict of interest is not between
management and shareholders, but between the controlling and minority
shareholders.90 One might think, though, that the problem we are
concerned with – the need to justify – would not be present, insofar
as the controllers control, and hence need not face credible challenges
from activist shareholders. But even controlling shareholders and their
companies face justication problems, as we explain below.
Whether controlling shareholders of a company need to justify to
other shareholders of the company their choices vis-a-vis the company
depends on the company’s ownership structure and the controlling
long-term policies and short-term investors do not necessarily support short-term
policies. A. Edmans and C. G. Holderness, “Chapter 8—Blockholders: A Survey of
Theory and Evidence”, in B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, eds., The Handbook of the
Economics of Corporate Governance, Vol. 1 (North-Holland, 2017).
89
See particularly Ringe, supra note 84, 418-422.
90
See R. Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and
Functional Approach, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 79-89.
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shareholders’ ability to command voting power beyond that associated
with their ownership. Whereas the former largely depends on the controlling shareholder’s wealth and choices concerning the rm’s size, the
latter depends on whether, and to what extent, the law allows for socalled control-enhancing mechanisms. Control-Enhancing Mechanisms
(CEMs), such as dual-class shares and loyalty shares, allow for departures from the one-share one-vote (1S1V) principle, which we discuss in
Chapter 3 and expand on in Chapter 4. Indeed, CEMs are at the core
of our proposal to reduce justication-motivated decision-making where
such decision-making is inecient.
According to recent research,91 on average 44% of listed companies in
the world have a controlling shareholder. The U.S. and the UK, having,
respectively, 25% and 17% controlled companies, are substantially below
the world average. By contrast, about two-thirds of French, German,
and Italian listed companies have a controlling shareholder, whereas
Sweden and the Netherlands are more in line with the world average.
This roughly conrms previous ndings:92 apart from the U.S. and the
UK, in most countries a substantial portion of listed companies, if not
a majority of them, has a controlling shareholder.93
A global study of corporate ownership reveals not only that controlling shareholders are more common in Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon
world, but also that dispersed ownership as described in Berle & Means
is actually quite rare.94 Worldwide, 91% of listed companies have at
least one blockholder with a stake larger than 5%.95 This percentage
91

G. Aminadav and E. Papaioannou, “Corporate Control Around the World”,
NBER Working Paper No. 23010, December 2016, available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w23010.
92
Previous literature used cut-os (of 25%, 30% or 50%, which are somewhat
arbitrary) to determine whether a company had a controlling shareholders. By
contrast, Aminadav and Papaioannou, ibid., used power indices to estimate the
likelihood of the largest shareholder to win a voting contest.
93
R. LaPorta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around
the World”, NBER Working Paper No. 6625, June 1998, available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w6625.
94
A. A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(Transaction Publishers, 1932).
95
Aminadav and Papaioannou, supra note 91.
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is even higher (96%) in the U.S.96 The presence of such blockholders
gives shareholder activists the chance to engage the management of
a listed company to the extent that they can persuade institutional
blockholders to vote against the management.97
Even where there are controlling shareholders, a coalition of minority
shareholders can often outvote them so long as company law or the
charter requires a supermajority. Thus, controlling shareholders may be
insulated from hostile takeovers, but not from hedge fund activism. 98
Second, 47% of public companies around the world do not have technically a controlling shareholder but do have one or more blockholders.
The more blockholders there are in a corporation, the higher the chance
for activists to assemble enough support to mount a successful campaign against the management. It follows that shareholder activism can
target many companies worldwide, including companies with controlling
shareholders. Indeed, there are increasing numbers of activism campaigns outside the U.S. and U.K. Particularly in continental Europe, 99
shareholder activism correlates with the presence of blockholders such
as institutional investors, especially foreign ones, whether or not there
are controlling shareholders.100
96

C. G. Holderness, “Blockholders Are More Common in the United States Than
You Might Think”, 22 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 75, 2010. Ownership
is much more dispersed in the UK, though. See J. Franks and C. Mayer, “Chapter
10—Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The Changing Face of
Capitalism”, in B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, eds., The Handbook of the Economics
of Corporate Governance, Vol. 1 (North-Holland, 2017), at 724.
97
Gilson and Gordon, supra note 53.
98
Ringe (2018), supra note 84, 399, makes a related point in the context of
corporate governance in Germany.
99
Activism is booming in Europe. More than 100 companies were targets of activist campaigns in the period between January – September 2017.
See Activist Insight, Activist Investing in Europe: A Special Report, October
2017, available at https://www.activistinsight.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
ActivistInvestingInEuropeSpecialReport.pdf?x83756.
100
See, e.g. T. Poulsen, T. Strand, and S. Thomsen, “Voting Power and Shareholder
Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meetings”, 18 Corporate Governance 329,
2010; W. Bessler, W. Drobetz, and J. Holler, “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism
in Germany”, 21 European Financial Management 106, 2013; M. Belcredi and L.
Enriques, “Chapter 18—Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated
Ownership and High Private Benets of Control: The Case of Italy”, in J. G. Hill
and R. S. Thomas, eds., Research Handbook on Shareholder Power (Edward Elgar,
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Although activists may more easily prevail in the absence of controlling shareholders, even controlling shareholders cannot always ignore
activists. First, in many European jurisdictions, minority shareholders
have statutory rights such that they can’t simply be outvoted and
ignored. In Italy and Spain, for instance, minority shareholders have
the right to appoint their own directors. The charters of some U.S. companies with a controlling shareholder include similar provisions, which
have been used by activist shareholders.101 A jurisdiction may have
other provisions that eectively empower minority shareholders, thus
enabling shareholder activism in such a jurisdiction even in companies
with controlling shareholders.102 Second, many controlling shareholders
are not actually majority shareholders. For instance, a recent study nds
that less than half of the listed companies in France, Germany and Italy
have a majority shareholder.103 Given that about two thirds of publicly
2015), 383. Regarding the changes of ownership structure supporting the increase
in shareholder activism, for instance in Germany, see W.-G. Ringe, “Changing Law
and Ownership Patterns in Germany: Corporate Governance and the Erosion of
Deutschland AG”, 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 493, 2015 (documenting,
among other factors, the decreasing relevance of bank ownership and controlling
shareholders in the largest German listed companies); for Sweden, see P. Lekvall,
ed., The Nordic Corporate Governance Model (SNS Förlag, 2014), 47-48.
101
K. Kastiel, “Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies”,
2016 Columbia Business Law Review 60, 2016.
102
For instance, in Sweden, much of shareholder activism takes place through the
nomination committee. This is not a board committee, but a shareholder committee
comprising the 3 to 5 largest shareholders of a listed company. Every year, the
nomination committee makes a proposal as to who to appoint to the board, which is
usually rubberstamped by the general meeting. At least one member of the nomination
committee must be independent from the controlling shareholder. The nomination
committee normally decides unanimously. Note that none of this is legally binding.
The nomination committee is provided for by the Corporate Governance Code, which
formally could be opted out of (save that virtually no company does it). Moreover,
the general meeting could appoint other candidates to the board, but this does not
happen in practice. P. Lekvall, ed., The Nordic Corporate Governance Model (SNS
Förlag, 2014). As a result, shareholder activists conduct their campaigns in Sweden
by seeking representation on the nomination committee. Once this representation is
obtained, the activist enjoys signicant power in board appointments.
103
C. Van der Elst, “Law and Economics of Shareholder Rights and Ownership
Structures: How Trivial are Shareholder Rights for Shareholders?”, Tilburg Law and
Economics Center (TILEC) Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 2010-009,
February 2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553094.
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held companies in these countries have been recently categorized as
controlled,104 we can infer that around 17% of controlling shareholders,
on average, can in principle be outvoted. The more the minority blockholders are institutional investors, the more likely outvoting controlling
shareholders becomes. In conclusion, shareholder activists can and do
engage with companies having a controlling shareholder.
In Sweden, for instance, two so-called “spheres” – one of which is a
fund owned by the most inuential Swedish family, the Wallenbergs – traditionally control over half of the Swedish stock market capitalization. 105
Both spheres were successfully challenged by the local activist hedge fund
Cevian in recent years. The Swedish truckmaker Volvo, controlled by
the Industrivarden sphere by way of dual-class shares (6.7% ownership,
but 22% of votes) was targeted by Cevian, which succeeded in getting
agreements as to board composition and stock performance, and eventually sold its 7.9% stake (carrying, however, only 25% of voting rights)
to the Chinese Gelly (the owner of Volvo Cars).106 Similarly, Cevian had
a long engagement with Ericsson, controlled by Investor (the Wallenbergs’ sphere). Cevian managed to replace the board’s chairman despite
being only the third-largest shareholder in terms of voting power (but
the largest owner, with a 5.9% stake). In response, Investor raised its
ownership to 6.6% of capital, with its voting power remaining at about
22%.107 In this way, Investor reduced the dierence between voting
104
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power and ownership (the so-called wedge)108 enabled by the CEM.
This story suggests that controlling shareholders are no longer immune
from outside shareholders’ pressure, but instead, like the managers of
a typical U.S. company, they compete with activists for institutional
investors’ support. Increasing ownership, more than voting power, is
a way for controlling shareholders to look more credible to the institutional investors that will call the shots in the event there is an activist
campaign.109
Our argument that giving managers in manager-controlled companies leeway may be ecient in some cases applies with at least equal
force to companies with controlling shareholders, whose interests are
more aligned with their companies’ interests. There is therefore no
better reason – and perhaps a slightly worse reason – than in the case
of management-controlled companies why a coalition of activist shareholders and institutional investors (such as index funds) should prevail
over controlling shareholders in setting the company’s strategy. So long
as controlling shareholders’ control is not absolute, they are situated
similarly to corporate management, and the same arguments about
leeway apply.
Why don’t controlling shareholders simply acquire more shares
and become majority shareholders (or even 100% owners) and hence
signicantly lessen (or even eliminate) the need to justify their decisions?
Since the additional shares must be purchased, doing so is expensive. 110
In any event, a controller may not have enough wealth or may be
unwilling to forgo the benet of diversication to obtain control over a
large corporate project. Moreover, and even for far smaller companies, a
majority shareholder still would have justication needs given possible
charter and statutory provisions empowering minority shareholders.
rm Investor AB overtakes Cevian as top Ericsson owner”, Reuters, Oct. 16,
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ericsson-equity/investment-rm-investorab-overtakes-cevian-as-top-ericsson-owner-idUSKBN1CL14L.
108
See infra, text accompanying notes 210-212 (dening the “wedge”).
109
See infra, text accompanying notes 273-274.
110
However, as noted by I. M. Kirzner, Perception, Opportunity and Prot: Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago Press, 1979), at 94,
entrepreneurs do not need to be wealthy. In economics, ownership is never a condition for entrepreneurship; entrepreneurship is a special input rewarded by prot as
opposed to return on capital.
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Why Arbitrage Doesn’t Fix the Problem

Our argument rests largely on theory and, admittedly, intuition. How
can we know whether managers or other market actors are inuenced
by the need to justify their decisions? One analogy is to the debate as
to whether executive compensation is market driven or the result of
cronyism (or some other possibility). There are respectable arguments
on diering sides, with evidence that can be marshaled, but nothing
denitive exists.111 Moreover, our argument as to the role of justication
has much in common with the established alternatives – that managers
will take advantage when they can, thus yielding traditional agency
costs or that shareholder activists are also taking advantage or otherwise
imposing costs, advancing their own interests to the detriment of others.
In our account, the actors are also taking advantage, protecting their
downsides in a way that may be contrary to what they are charged
with doing. Finally, just as we cannot predict when and to what extent
a manager or other actor would be more or less inclined to look to
justication except to say that the costs of doing so should be more
pernicious with increasing uncertainty, neither can traditional agency
or other orthodox theorists explain to what extent advantage is taken
(or not) or constrained.
Where are arbitrageurs in this story? Why aren’t they ‘correcting’
the problematic decisions if there are costs being incurred that need not
be incurred? Because we are in the realm of uncertainty, assigning a value
to future possibilities, even within a broad range, is very dicult. 112
Arbitrage’s limits might be at issue in contexts like these, where there
is no easily-computable ‘fact of the matter’ – that is, the payo is
111

L. A. Bebchuk and J. M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfullled
Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004).
112
See Hill and McDonnell, “Short and Long Term Investors”, supra note 22, for
an explanation of why arbitrage might be unsuccessful in this context, albeit with
less explicit reference to the concept of uncertainty. We would expect arbitrage
to be more successful in contexts such as those involving traditional managerial
agency costs – indeed, the beginnings of the leveraged buyout ‘movement,’ can, in
signicant part, be explained as a market correction of manager advantage-taking.
Such advantage-taking was obviously value-decreasing (for those other than the
managers) providing a money-making opportunity that was exploited.
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uncertain and (far?) in the future. Arbitrageurs may be more attracted
to ‘informational ineciency’ than supposed ‘fundamental ineciency.’
Recall Keynes’s beauty contest analogy – markets are like beauty
contests in which people are judging who the other judges will nd
beautiful.113 The longer one has to wait for the payo, the more, and
more often, the trajectory has to be justied. This is true particularly
when, as is usually the case, the arbitrageur is using borrowed money.
There may be many people making the computations that are supposed
to make the market ecient but, again, since, for quite a while, they
only prot if they can convince others of their view, and since there may
be a chain of people who need a canonical approach or quick results to
continue funding, rather large potential value discrepancies might not
get arbitraged away. An article in The Business Insider about Michael
Burry, who became famous when he was described in Michael Lewis’s
The Big Short, helps make the point:
Michael Burry saw the riskiness of the subprime market as millions
of borrowers with low income and few assets bought homes and
cars with tremendous leverage. . . . However, the banking system
was valued as if these mortgages would all be paid. Burry realized
that this could not possibly continue over the long-term.
At the same time, Burry began to tell his investors of the enormous
risks to the system. His investors were mostly institutions that
did not want to hear his theory. Their other investments were
all built upon the concept of a sound system with no subprime
mortgage risk. Investors began to get nervous and demand their
money back.
Unfortunately, it was too late as Burry had already gotten into
several long-term, illiquid bets against the market using derivatives
113

See Keynes, General Theory of Employment, supra note 14, at 156. Interestingly,
Keynes concluded the discussion of what is known today as ‘limits to arbitrage’ (see A.
Shleifer & R. W. Vishny, “The Limits of Arbitrage”, 52 Journal of Finance 35, 1997,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x) with
this language, which has been quoted many times since: “Worldly wisdom teaches
that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Ibid., at 102.
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to bet the price of mortgages would fall. If he got out of the trades,
he would suer a huge loss – so Burry simply refused the investors’
requests.
All of a sudden in 2007 the market started to turn in his direction
. . . Burry’s investments paid o handsomely and he made $100
million for himself and $700 million for his investors.
[But] the relationship had become so tainted that his investors refused to work with him again. Despite all of his success, Burry could
not succeed in fundraising again for his fund and he liquidated
the assets.114

2.10

What follows?

We have argued thus far that management should be accountable
to nanciers, but the ecient level of accountability varies with context. Accountability is needed to make external nance, particularly
shareholding in publicly held companies, viable.115 Accountability of
corporate actors is particularly important today where a signicant
amount of retail savings is managed by institutional investors, which
are, in turn, accountable to their clients.116 Accountability, however,
may lead management to choose the actions that can be justied as
opposed to the actions reecting their best judgment. The problem is
when the two sets of actions dier. Managers’ judgment may dier from
what can be justied because managers are opportunist or incompetent,
in which cases one would prefer accountability. However, managerial
judgment may dier from what can be justied also when uncertainty is
high. In this situation, accountability is less desirable for it may result in
excessively defensive behavior.117 A tradeo exists between managerial
114

John Szramiakje, “Here’s the Story of One of the Heroes of ‘The Big Short”’,
BusinessInsider.com, May 22, 2017, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/
michael-burry-life-story-2017-5.
115
A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, 52 Journal
of Finance 737, 1997.
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See text accompanying note 52.
117
See text accompanying notes 68-73.
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discretion and accountability in corporate governance, the best solution
to which depends on the degree of uncertainty a particular company is
facing.118
When the uncertainty faced by the particular company at a particular point in time is high and competition is slow, it is ecient for
shareholders to give management leeway to be entrepreneurial. To use
Professor Gilson’s metaphor, shareholders may decide to keep management on a long leash.119 Conversely, when the competitive environment
is dynamic and uncertainty is low, it is ecient for management to be
responsive to short-term feedback in terms of voice and/or stock price
– in Gilson’s words, shareholders should have management on a short
leash. The key question is who should decide between long leash and
short leash, when, and how. In what follows, we endeavor to answer this
question based on theory, but also observation of corporate practices
(and trends) around the world. In Chapter 4, we argue that companies
should decide on the length of the leash through their charter, and be
able to alter this choice later on by way of a charter amendment.
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See A. M. Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Law and Economics
of Control Powers (Routledge, 2012), 145-146.
119
R. J. Gilson, “From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance”, in J. N. Gordon
and W.-G. Ringe, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance
(Oxford University Press, 2018) (noting the institutional complementarities for this
outcome to be viable (including the example of Japan)).

3
The Corporate Governance Debate through the
Lens of Existing Laws and Techniques

3.1

Setting the Stage

In the previous Section, we discussed Third Point’s 2013 activist engagement with Sotheby’s. One particularly interesting aspect of the
engagement is the following. To fend o Third Point and another hedge
fund, Sotheby’s adopted a poison pill with a dierential trigger, a higher
trigger for passive investors and a lower one for more active investors,
Third Point sued to get the dierential trigger removed, and lost in
court. Yet by most measures Third Point “won” the battle. First, it got
paid $10 million towards its expenses. Second, the head of Third Point,
Dan Loeb, got a board seat, as did two other Third Point designees,
and a bit later, the CEO of Sotheby’s resigned.120 Did Loeb have a
better idea for how Sotheby’s should be run? Time should tell.
Consider for contrast the following story. In the well-known 1989
case of Paramount v. Time,121 the Delaware Supreme Court permitted
the Time board to restructure a merger with Warner in order to avoid
giving shareholders the ability to vote on a competing transaction, a
hostile oer for Time by Paramount at a signicant premium to Time’s
120
121

Hill, Quinn, and Davido Solomon, supra note 5, at 712-720.
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A 2d.1140 (Del. 1989).
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market price. “One concern was that Time shareholders might elect to
tender into Paramount’s cash oer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of
the strategic benet which a business combination with Warner might
produce. . . Further, the timing of Paramount’s oer to follow issuance
of Time’s proxy notice was viewed as arguably designed to upset, if
not confuse, the Time stockholders’ vote.”122 The court held that “the
duciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of
a time frame for achievement of corporate goals.”123 It seems fair to say
that many, if not most, scholars who teach the case teach it an example
of bad agents taking advantage and wanting to hold onto their jobs
even if it meant depriving shareholders of the opportunity to accept a
very high oer. The Paramount premium was quite large, and certainly
in hindsight, the shareholders would have been far better o had they
been able to accept it. But in this case, as is generally so, the agents
said that they needed leeway to carry out their ‘better idea.’ And the
court gave it to them.
In 2017, the Dutch printmaker Akzo Nobel N.V. was targeted by the
U.S. hedge fund Elliott Management.124 Akzo Nobel rejected a hostile
takeover bid by the U.S. competitor PPG Industries on the grounds that
“the proposal undervalue[d] AkzoNobel, contain[ed] signicant risks and
uncertainties, ma[de] no substantive commitments to stakeholders and
demonstrate[d] a lack of cultural understanding.”125 Elliott challenged
this decision in the Dutch specialist court for corporate aairs (the
‘Enterprise Chamber’), which rejected the complaint. Shortly afterwards,
Elliott led a petition with the same Enterprise Chamber to have the
chairman of Akzo’s supervisory board removed. (Note that, in the Dutch
dual-board model, the supervisory board appoints the management
board). The Dutch court also rejected this petition. Interestingly, in
both cases Elliot lost on grounds that shareholders cannot take control
122

Ibid. at 1153.
Ibid. at 1154.
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B. H. Meijer and A. Deutsch, “Round Two: Elliott Advisors, Akzo Nobel Face
O in Dutch Court”, Reuters, July 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-akzo-nobel-shareholders-activism-idUSKBN1AC11X.
125
J. Sillars, “Dulux Firm AkzoNobel Rejects Third Takeover Bid
from PPG”, Sky News, May 8, 2017, https://news.sky.com/story/
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of the company’s strategic direction away from the board. But, in
practice, a (supervisory) board still needs the support of the company’s
shareholders to be re-elected. Note that Elliott had become the largest
shareholder in Akzo, with a 9.5% stake, and claimed the support of
Azko’s top 20 shareholders.126 And indeed, the Akzo board’s victory
was rather pyrrhic. The result of Elliott’s engagement was a standstill
agreement which gave Elliott one representative on the supervisory
board, two agreed-upon independent supervisory board members, and
a commitment to divest a part of Akzo’s business. We will see what
results: at this writing, Akzo is not doing particularly well. 127
In 2013, the Fiat group, which makes Fiat cars (and was formerly
the largest listed Italian company) reincorporated the rst of its holding
companies – the group’s truck maker CNH – into the Netherlands in
order to introduce loyalty shares, something that was not allowed by
Italian law until 2014.128 The loyalty shares mechanism confers one
extra voting right on all shareholders holding their stock for three
years, as reected in records kept by the company.129 But the genius
126

Meijer and Deutsch, supra note 124.
T. Sterling, “U.S. Activist Investor Ends Feud with Dutch Paintmaker Akzo Nobel”, Reuters, Aug. 16, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-akzo-nobel-shareholders-idUSKCN1AW0D3. See also J. Leijten and J. Kooiman,
“Akkoord AkzoNobel en Elliot over conict”, NRC.NL, Aug. 16, 2017, https://
www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/08/16/akzonobel-en-elliot-begraven-strijdbijl-a1570067 (in
Dutch).
Recent news (R. Bloemenkamp, “AkzoNobel Struggling against Headwinds”, MarketMogul, May 8, 2018, https://themarketmogul.com/akzonobel/) reveal that Akzo
has been struggling since the settlement of the battle with Elliott. After cashing
in a super-dividend, Elliott has reduced its stake to about 5%. The company is
expected to return more cash to shareholders in the near future. In 2018, Akzo’s
share price has uctuated between A
C75-80 per share, which is lower than the highest
oer received by PPG Industries (A
C96.75).
128
The law in the Netherlands did not expressly allow loyalty shares, but its
exibility was such that the shares were eectively permitted. There were also
subsequent reincorporations in 2014 (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles), 2015 (Ferrari) and
2016 (Exor).
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Shareholders who registered their shares at the moment of the (crossborder) merger into the Dutch entity received the loyalty shares immediately.
See, e.g. CNH Industrial, “Loyalty Voting Structure”, in Annual Report 2014,
available at http://www.annualreport2014.cnhindustrial.com/en/report-operations/
corporate-governance/loyalty-voting-structure. Shares must be deregistered in order
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of this scheme, as we shall explain shortly,130 is that shareholders
must armatively agree to not transfer their shares except upon a
requested de-registration, which then eliminates the extra voting rights.
Shareholders apt to make such an agreement are far likelier to be the
controlling shareholders, who do not contemplate selling their stock
in the normal course, than many of the other shareholders, who are
more likely to value liquidity, and in particular, institutional investors
whose business models contemplate regular trading.131 As a result,
for example, the Agnelli family manages to control CNH with over
40% of voting rights but only 26% of the shares, indirectly owned by
the family’s fund Exor.132 Contrast this with BlackRock, which owns
3.2% of the shares but only 2.5% of the voting rights. The Agnellicontrolled companies could not be targeted by an activist campaign
even if an activist managed to garner the support of the majority of
the shareholders.
3.2

Hostile Takeovers and Shareholder Activism: The Role of
Disclosure of Large Stakes

The 1960s marked the emergence of so-called corporate raiders seeking
to take over companies. While hostile takeovers have not gone away,
the raiders’ successors can be said to be shareholder activists, who try
to inuence companies to do what they think the companies should be
doing (and are not doing).133
to be traded. Deregistration implies losing the extra voting rifts. As of 31 December
2017, only the Agnelli family’s fund, Exor, and Piero Ferrari (the son of Ferrari’s
founder) had registered their shares in the Fiat group companies to obtain loyalty
shares.
130
See infra, text accompanying note 236.
131
For instance, index funds trade in order to replicate as much as possible the
index that they are tracking. Dedicated funds prot from trading timely on their
superior information. In both examples, gaining extra voting power is not sucient
motivation for institutional investors to limit their freedom to trade.
132
CNH Industrial, Annual Report 2017, available at http://www.cnhindustrial.
com/en-us/investor_relations/shareholder_meetings/shareholder_documents/
2018/CNHI_Annual_report_2017.pdf . Note that, because the Agnelli family only
owns around 53% of Exor, their economic interest in CNH is slightly above 14%.
133
See generally A. N. Vollmer and P. R. Q. Wolfson, “The Williams
Act: A Truly ‘Modern’ Assessment”, Harvard Law School Forum on

336

The Corporate Governance of Existing Laws and Techniques

The Williams Act, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was
passed in 1968.134 When it was originally proposed in 1965, its focus
was on the bad consequences of acquisitions. The Senator proposing
the bill, Harrison Williams, stated that: “[i]n recent years we have
seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white-collar
pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown
in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split
up most of the loot among themselves.”135 Williams acknowledged that
the bill was intended to disadvantage corporate raiders.136 The bill
in its pro-management form was not adopted, however. The nal bill
represented an attempt to level the playing eld, acknowledging the
interests not just of management, but also of acquirers (and of course
shareholders).
One of the most important provisions in the bill, Section 13(d),
requires disclosure of stakes larger than 5% in companies subject to
the ’34 Act (that is, public companies), so that management is not
taken by surprise, nding out that there is a large shareholder it had
not previously known about. The disclosure, on Schedule 13D, is to be
made within 10 days of the acquisition, during which time the acquirer
can acquire an unlimited number of additional shares.137
There have been considerable disputes as to what Section 13(d)
requires and what it should require. Should the ten-day period be
shortened? Should there be a limit on acquisitions during the ten-day
period? What counts as ownership, and when should dierent ‘owners”
interests be aggregated for reporting purposes?138 (There is something
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), Oct. 22, 2011,
available
at
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
The-Williams-Act-A-Truly-Modern-Assessment.pdf . See also Hill, Quinn, and
Davido Solomon, supra note 5, 9-12.
134
Pub. L. 90–439, July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454. See Vollmer and Wolfson, supra
note 133, at 5-7; Hill, Quinn, and Davido Solomon, supra note 5, at 93-95. One
important focus of regulation in the Williams Act was acquirers seeking to acquire
companies for cash. They were subject to very few requirements, especially in contrast
to acquirers who sought to use stock to make their acquisitions.
135
111 Congressional Record 28257 (1965).
136
See Vollmer and Wolfson, supra note 133.
137
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act is codied at 15 U.S.C. §78m.
138
See Hill, “An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate,”
supra note 24, at 483-88 and citations therein.
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curious about the debate. The initial time periods were established when
determining ownership, and making required lings, took considerable
time, whereas now both can be done extremely quickly. Yet the debate
is conducted at full volume, as though the technological change were
somehow irrelevant).
The ten-day window to disclose the acquisition of signicant stakes
is important for shareholder activists’ business model. Such activists,
typically activist hedge funds, prot mostly from identifying companies
they believe are undervalued, bringing about changes, and securing a
sucient share of the gains from such changes to make their engagement
worthwhile.139 Typically, the activist purchases a small but signicant
stake in the company, a toehold, sometimes smaller than the disclosure threshold, and then begins its campaign seeking to persuade the
management to implement particular changes.140
Having to disclose an acquisition of shares immediately would complicate activists’ ability to conduct their campaigns. Not only would
managers have more time to react, including by erecting defenses, but
more importantly, stricter disclosure requirements would reduce the
activist’s returns. These returns depend signicantly, albeit not necessarily exclusively, on the accumulation of a toehold while the market
is still in the dark about the activist’s intentions. 141 As a result of the
disclosure, the stock price quickly comes to incorporate the expectations
of activist’s engagement and further gains, if any, would have to be
shared with the other shareholders. As noted above, the disclosure
requirement was enacted when the acquisitions at issue were those by
corporate raiders who would seek control of the company, to give management time to react. Although the possibility of cheaply purchasing
a toehold aects the protability of takeovers as well, takeover bidders
139

Because activist shareholders prot from identifying target companies whose
stock market returns can be improved at least in the short term, this has been called
entrepreneurial activism. A. Klein & E. Zur, “Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:
Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors”, 64 Journal of Finance 187, 2009.
140
Initial stakes can vary widely, as can post-disclosure acquisitions. See
generally Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group, 2017 Activism Year in
Review, January 2018, available at https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/
lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf
141
See text accompanying notes 77-78.
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have several other ways to recoup the cost of screening the market for
potential targets.142
The present-day debate over how attenuated a person’s relationship
with shares of stock can be before she is considered an owner of that
stock, whether the window to report should be ten days, and what someone can do during the window, is between those who think shareholders
are needed to constrain managers, and those who think managers need
more leeway to pursue the company’s interests. Those who support
Section 13(d) in its present form are in the former camp; those who
think Section 13(d) should be tightened to require more disclosure or
restrict acquisitions during the 10 day period are in the latter camp.
The debate may be shifting, but in somewhat contradictory ways.
First, at this juncture, might the specter of activist engagement may
be suciently pervasive that the 13(d) ling would be experienced by
a company as a dierence in degree rather than a dierence in kind?
That is, on this view, activism is an ever-present threat, and companies
(that is, managers) shouldn’t wait until a 13(d) is led to act (that
is, defend themselves). 13(d) would not be doing enough for managers
on this view – and even tightening it up so that more disclosure was
required would not save managers from having to fend o activists.
Second, and going in the opposite direction: could the stylized dance-o,
where activist interest is something to be discouraged and guarded
against, be at times giving way to something more nuanced, wherein
companies take seriously the idea that activists might be a source of
good ideas? Whether companies see activist engagement as unfortunate
but inevitable, or potentially a good thing, today’s trend is towards
regular company engagement with all sorts of investors.143
142

See S. Betton, B. E. Eckbo, and K. S. Thornburn, “Corporate Takeovers”, in B.
E. Eckbo, ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Vol. 1
(North-Holland, 2008). On the contrary, Gilson and Gordon, supra note 53, at 904,
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As discussed in Chapter 2, underlying the debates as to what Section
13(d) should require (and as to staggered boards and poison pills) are
the two canonical worldviews, one in which traditional agency costs
of managers loom large, such that vigilance to ensure they do not
‘take advantage’ is warranted, and the other in which some subset of
shareholders are trying to ‘take the money and run,’ for their own benet
but to the ultimate detriment of the corporation and its shareholders. 144
But the need to address justication costs is not part of that story.
Section 13(d) serves as some constraint on management relative to,
for instance, a regime with disclosure at a far higher threshold (or, for
that matter, no disclosure). But the constraints, such as they are, are
applicable to all companies – Section 13(d), and its functional equivalents
in Europe145 apply to every listed company and do not allow opting
out. Generically, Section 13(d) may lead to more engagement between
managers and activists than might be the case were its requirements
less expansive. But nothing about the engagements thus far seems to
appropriately address the justication issue. Our solution, described in
detail in Chapter 4, provides for a particular sort of leeway agreed to
under particular circumstances; we expect that agreement is particularly
apt to be reached under conditions of uncertainty, where justicationmotivated decisions would impose more costs than the agency costs
minimized by more and more traditional managerial constraint. We
express no view as to the broader 13(d) debate; our perspective is simply
that a regulatory regime applicable to all companies does not address
the issue of justication costs insofar as these call for company-specic
solutions.
144

One of us discusses the competing worldviews, anchoring them to competing
prototypes and identities, in Hill, “An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term
Investor Debate,” supra note 24.
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European rules on ownership disclosure are stricter than in the U.S. EU law
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“Shareholder Activism in the CMU”, supra note 24.
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Antitakeover Statutes

Just as law sought to give managers fair warning of accumulations of
stock of their companies, it also sought, at management’s behest, to
put obstacles in the way of acquirers who management disfavored.146
Beginning in the 1960s, U.S. states began adopting antitakeover statutes
after they were approached by companies in their states fearing actual
or potential hostile acquirers. Early statutes took a variety of dierent
forms, and some were invalidated. Eventually, in two decisions, the U.S.
Supreme Court provided sucient guidance as to the types of provisions
that would and would not pass muster.147 Antitakeover statutes now
take many dierent forms, including: business combination statutes,
which prevent bidders conducting a tender oer from merging with a
target without getting board approval or an extremely high percentage
of the shares in the oer; fair price statutes, which require all shares to
be acquired at the same price; and control share acquisition statutes,
granting other shareholders a right to prevent a shareholder acquiring
a signicant percentage of the company’s shares from voting those
shares.148 There are also statutes dealing with staggered boards; we
deal with those below. 43 U.S. states have antitakeover statutes of
some sort.149
146

Commentators have persuasively argued that the current debate on the shorttermism stemming from hedge fund activism resembles that of the 1980s on the shorttermism stemming from hostile takeovers. History does not seem to have borne out the
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Recent empirical work has found that these statutes probably do
not have much eect.150 (Other mechanisms, notably the poison pill,
especially in combination with staggered boards, are far more eective,
at least to fend o hostile takeovers.151 As we will discuss in the next
two subsections, the pill by itself or even with a staggered board is of
only limited eectiveness against activists).
Signicantly, for our purposes, the adoption of these laws has been
justied by, and used to perpetuate, the traditional story, of managers
seeking to hold onto their jobs without regard to whether doing so
is good for the shareholders, to the exclusion of other accounts of
managerial behavior.
In part of this story, managers sometimes claim to be solicitous of
other constituencies, such as employees, when they are ‘really’ being
solicitous to themselves.152 They are, for instance, turning down a
potential acquirer’s bid, not because they fear that their employees will
be red, but because they fear that they themselves will be red. Indeed,
so-called other constituency statutes, statutes that expressly allow
managers to take interests other than those of shareholders into account
in their decision-making, are sometimes characterized as antitakeover
statutes.153
The list of managers running to their state legislatures to request
some form of protection against acquirers is long: Aetna’s managers,
in Connecticut; Burlington, in North Carolina; Arvin, in Indiana;
Goodyear, in Ohio; Boeing, in Washington; Dayton Hudson, in Minnesota; Gillette, in Massachusetts; Heileman Brewing, in Wisconsin. 154
150
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Pennsylvania’s law is, according to some commentators, particularly
helpful for managers seeking to entrench themselves. It requires signicant payments to workers who would lose their jobs in a merger,
which this characterization assumes that management favors more to
discourage acquirers, who would not want to make those payments,
than to compensate any laid-o workers. Still, organized labor joined
with the Chamber of Commerce to persuade the legislature to adopt
Pennsylvania’s law.155
At least in theory, the Williams Act “levels the playing eld” whereas
antitakeover laws are admittedly pro-management.156 And the canonical
story here is, it seems fair to say, anti-management – management is
building a fortress around itself, closing itself to change that might
be good. Antitakeover laws have far less direct eect on those who
would simply seek to inuence management rather than to take it over,
but less eect does not mean no eect, especially insofar as activists
are increasingly getting involved in various respects in takeovers. 157
For our purposes, though, the critical point is that if these laws do
anything, they sometimes grant leeway to management. As such, they
might seem to be useful to reduce justication costs. The problem is,
however, that they do not necessarily grant leeway to management
when our theory suggests it would be needed. Accountability – less
leeway – should reduce bonding and monitoring costs. And, where there
is less uncertainty, what is justiable may also be the best decision all
things considered, such that justication costs should be lower in such
cases. Thus, without appreciable uncertainty, more leeway might raise
bonding and monitoring costs without doing much if anything to reduce
justication costs.
at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1948/; R. Romano, “Rethinking Takeover Regulation”, 5 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 47, 1992,
DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6622.1992.tb00225.x.
155
B. S. Black, “Shareholder Passivity Reexamined”, 89 Michigan Law Review 520,
1990.
156
According to Jonathan Macey, the Williams Act is also pro-management. See
J. R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton
University Press, 2008).
157
Activist Insight 2018, supra note 78, at 6 (“One of [the new] forms of activism
was inuencing the structure and outcome of M&A.”).
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With those and other laws in the background, various techniques
have arisen to give management an ability to ward o unwanted suitors.
We describe those techniques below. They have enjoyed varying degrees
of eectiveness; for a period, it seemed fair to characterize management’s
ability to keep control as quite high, whereas now, activists’ powers are
formidable.
3.4

Staggered Boards

The rst technique we discuss is staggered boards. Staggered boards
are boards whose directors are not elected annually. Instead, there
are dierent classes of board members, and each class’s term is multiyear, ending in a dierent year.158 A typical staggered board would
have three classes, each with a term of three years, so that in each
year, only one-third of the board is elected, and obtaining majority
control requires two election cycles, which should serve to deter many
acquirers. Under Delaware law, Delaware being where most publicly
traded companies in the U.S. are incorporated, directors on such a
board can only be removed for cause unless the certicate provides
otherwise (Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) §141(k)(1));
under the MBCA, directors can be removed without cause unless the
certicate provides otherwise. (MBCA §8.08(a)). But as a practical
matter the result is the same: directors of companies with staggered
boards generally cannot be removed without cause, either because of the
statute (DGCL) or a certicate provision (MBCA); in the latter case,
where the statutory default is otherwise, those choosing a staggered
158

Companies’ certicates of incorporation (charters) or by-laws can provide for a
staggered board, although most staggered boards are provided for in the corporation’s
charter. Indeed, while Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL §141(d)) permits
staggered boards to be provided for in the certicate or the bylaws, the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA) requires staggered boards to be provided for in
the charter. (MBCA §8.06). Changes to corporate charters must be approved by the
board and the shareholders, while changes to bylaws can be made by shareholders
and the board ((MBCA §10.20) with the board having this power in Delaware only
if the certicate so provides (Delaware §109(a) and not having it under the MBCA
only if the certicate so provides). Under Delaware law, if the initial certicate or
by-laws do not provide for a staggered board, a company must obtain shareholder
approval to adopt a certicate or by-law amendment allowing it to have such a board.
(DGCL §141(d)).
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board will also choose the certicate provision since removal without
cause frustrates the purpose of the staggered board.
Staggered boards thus make a company harder to take over. Is this
a good or a bad thing? Again, that depends on whether one thinks that
managers may take advantage of their insulation to act in their selfinterest, including by not subjecting themselves suciently to market
forces that might suggest that a change was appropriate (for instance
because they are hyperopic, being willing to wait ‘too long’ for their
strategies to pay o),159 or whether they need the longer term to
counteract eects of myopia and carry out projects with longer time
horizons. It also depends on whether the deterrence eect on suitors for
such companies is larger than the higher price the more ardent suitors
that remain will pay.
Staggered boards apparently date from the 1920s, but only became
popular in the 1980s, during the rst takeover wave.160 Many companies
have had such boards, although at present, many fewer do (and very few
159

“[T]here is a risk that both institutional investors and activist investors may
be myopic, to the end of increasing the value of a speculative option. But there is a
corresponding risk that company managers may be hyperopic, acting to increase the
option value of their control by extending its length, especially if, because of poor
performance and strategy, it is then out of the money.” Gilson and Gordon, supra
note 53, at 917.
160
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, supra note 151, 994. Regarding the debate
over staggered boards and their impacts, see generally K. J. M. Cremers and S. M.
Sepe, “The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards”, 68 Stanford Law Review 67,
2015; Y. Amihud, M. Schmid, and S. Davido Solomon, “Do Staggered Boards Aect
Firm Value?”, forthcoming, Iowa Law Review, available at http://cear.gsu.edu/les/
2017/04/Steven-Somonon_Staggered-boards.pdf ; E. Catan and M. Klausner, “Board
Declassication and Firm Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed
Billions in Firm Value?”, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-39, Sept.
1, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2994559;
R. Weill, “Declassifying the Classied”, 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 891,
2006; M. Ganor, “Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?”, 33 Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law 149, 2008; M. G. Doré, “The Iowa Business Corporation
Act’s Staggered Board Requirement for Public Corporations: A Hostile Takeover
of Iowa Corporate Law?”, 60 Drake Law Review Discourse 1, 2012; D. Kim, Board
Classication and Shareholder Value: Evidence from Corporate Law Amendments,
Doctoral Dissertation, Business Administration, University of Texas at Austin,
2016, available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/38159/
KIM-DISSERTATION-2016.pdf?sequence=1.
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do on the S&P 500), owing to considerable pressure on companies to destagger their boards.161 The pressure has come from governance activists,
including, notably, Lucian Bebchuk’s Shareholder Rights Project at
Harvard Law School, which was largely focused on getting companies
to get rid of their staggered boards.162 Many did so, and the project
was terminated.
The Shareholder Rights Project was highly controversial for various
reasons, some of which are not relevant for our purposes (such as
the role of Harvard, and whether the project counted as ‘practicing
law.’) But what is relevant for us is the debate between those who
believe staggered boards are bad for companies and those who disagree.
Underlying and motivating the project, it would seem, is the ‘staggered
board as entrenching management’ view, in which manager agency costs
are front and center, and managers very much need the possibility of
discipline from at least the prospect of directors they didn’t choose,
or associated ease by which the company might be taken over. As we
have discussed, opponents of the project paint shareholder activists as
preventing directors, and management more broadly, from being able
to carry out ideas that are good for the company.
Interestingly, several states have enacted laws requiring staggered
boards, at least as a default. Some of the laws were enacted to help local
corporations seeking to fend o hostile acquirers. The Iowa law was
adopted at the behest of Casey’s, a company seeking to avoid being taken
over by Alimentation Couche-Tard, Inc., a Canadian corporation. A
hostile bid for Norton Company prompted the Massachusetts bill; regular
161

EY Center for Board Matters, “IPO Corporate Governance Then and
Now: The Evolution of Board and Governance Practices Three Years After the IPO”, Board Matters Quarterly, January 2017, at 7-8, available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-board-matters-quarterlyjanuary-2017/$FILE/EY-board-matters-quarterly-january-2017.pdf; C. Bowie, “ISS
2016 Board Practices Study”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
and Financial Regulation (blog), June 1, 2016, available at https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practices-study/; “Fewer Classied Boards
Could Mean Higher Director Turnover”, Equilar Blog, March 7, 2016, available at
http://www.equilar.com/blogs/84-fewer-classied-boards.html.
162
“Shareholder Rights Project—121 Companies Agreed to Move towards Annual Elections”, 2017, available at http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/
companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml.
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calls by Ball shareholders for Ball to de-stagger its board prompted the
Indiana statute, and Oklahoma’s staggered board statute was designed
to assist Chesapeake Energy retain its staggered board.163 Oklahoma
repealed its law two years after adopting it, once activist shareholders
nevertheless managed to replace the majority of the Chesapeake board,
and threatened to re-incorporate in Delaware. 164 The laws’ genesis
might seem to support at least their motivation, if not their eect,
to entrench boards and management. But do they? And if so, is that
problematic if their eect is positive for companies?
The debate on this subject has been active and heated.165 Empirical
163

Iowa Code §490.806(A) (Supplement 2011); Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, chapter 156B, §50A, chapter 156D, §8.06(b)–(g) (West 2005 & Supplement
2011) (codifying Massachusetts’ staggered board law); Indiana Code Annotated,
§23-1-33-6(c) (LexisNexis 2010); Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, title 18, §1027(D)
(West 1999 & Supplement 2012); Doré, supra note 160, at 4-8; M. M. Brown et al.,
§103[B], “Charter and Bylaws”, in Takeovers: A Strategic Guide to Mergers and
Acquisitions, 2017 Supplement, at 1-9 n.14.
164
J. Wertz, “Declassied: Chesapeake Wants ‘Relief’ from an
Oklahoma Law It Helped Write”, NPR—State Impact, June 8,
2012,
available
at
https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2012/06/08/
declassied-chesapeake-wants-relief-from-an-oklahoma-law-it-helped-write/;
“Oklahoma Reverses Law, Chesapeake Energy Pleased”, Akron Beacon Journal—Ohio.com (blog), March 20, 2013, available at https:
//www.ohio.com/akron/pages/oklahoma-reverses-law-chesapeake-energy-pleased;
D. Gilbert, “Chesapeake Gets Reversal of Oklahoma Staggered-Terms Law”,
Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2013, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323639604578370730747650130. Interestingly, in 2013, shareholders rejected the company’s attempt to return to a unied board; fewer than the
required votes to eliminate the staggered board structure were cast in favor of doing so.
See “Chesapeake Energy Shareholders Reject Board Declassication”, Reuters, June
14, 2003, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chesapeakeenergy-meeting/chesapeakeenergy-shareholders-reject-board-declassication-idUSBRE95D0OY20130614. But
in 2014, shareholders did approve the company’s proposal to declassify the
board, and since then, the board has been a unitary, unclassied board. See J. F.
Marks, “Chesapeake Shareholders Approve Reforms”, NewsOK, June 14, 2014,
https://newsok.com/article/4912918/chesapeake-shareholders-approve-reforms.
165
Much of the heat in the debate has come from sparks ying between shareholder rights champion Lucian Bebchuk and leading shareholder activism critic and poison pill inventor Marty Lipton. See, e.g. L.
Bebchuk, “Wachtell Lipton Was Wrong About the Shareholder Rights
Project”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), April 9, 2013, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2013/04/09/wachtell-lipton-was-wrong-about-the-shareholder-rights-project/;
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L. Bebchuk, “Still Running Away from the Evidence: A Reply to Wachtell
Lipton’s Review of Empirical Work”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), March 5, 2014, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/05/still-running-away-from-theevidence-a-reply-to-wachtell-liptons-review-of-empirical-work/; L. Bebchuk, “Don’t
Run Away from the Evidence: A Reply to Wachtell Lipton”, Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog),
September 17, 2013, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/
17/dont-run-away-from-the-evidence-a-reply-to-wachtell-lipton/; M. Lipton and
T. Mirvis, “Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project is Wrong”, Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog),
March 12, 2012, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/
harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-wrong/; M. Lipton, “The Bebchuk Syllogism”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), August 26, 2013, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2013/08/26/the-bebchuk-syllogism/; M. Lipton, “Current Thoughts About Activism”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation (blog), August 9, 2013, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2013/08/09/current-thoughts-about-activism/. See also, e.g. Cremers and Sepe,
“The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards”, supra note 160; K. J. M. Cremers and S. Sepe, “Board Declassication Activism: The Financial Value of
the Shareholder Rights Project”, working paper, June 2017, available at https:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962162; L. Bebchuk and A. Cohen, “Recent Board Declassications: A Response to Cremers and Sepe”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
(blog), May 23, 2017, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/23/
recent-board-declassications-a-response-to-cremers-and-sepe/; K. J. M. Cremers
and S. Sepe, “Board Declassication Activism: Why Run Away from the Evidence?”, working paper, June 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991854; K. J. M. Cremers, L. P. Litov, and S. Sepe,
“Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited”, 126 Journal of Financial Economics 422, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneco.2017.08.003; A. Cohen
and C. C. Y. Wang, “How Do Staggered Boards Aect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment”, 110 Journal of Financial Economics 627,
2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneco.2013.08.005; Y. Amihud and S. Stoyanov,
“Do Staggered Boards Harm Shareholders?”, working paper, November 2015, available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/DoStaggeredBoardsHarmShareholders.pdf ; A.
Cohen and C. C. Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov”, working paper, December 2015, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697352; Y. Amihud and
S. Stoyanov, “Do Staggered Boards Harm Shareholders?”, 123 Journal of Financial
Economics 432, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneco.2016.04.002; A. Cohen and C.
C. Y. Wang, “Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value”, 125 Journal
of Financial Economics 637, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneco.2017.06.004; Kim
dissertation, supra note 160.
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evidence has been oered to show that they are bad for company
value,166 good for company value, 167 have no eect on company value,168
or have certain good eects for certain types of rms.169 Dierent people
have dierent views as to what should be done, depending on their views
as to staggered boards. As noted above, Professor Bebchuk has worked
to get companies to eliminate their staggered boards. Professors Cremers
and Sepe, whose empirical work supports the value of staggered boards
166

See, e.g. Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, supra note 151; L. A. Bebchuk and
A. Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards”, 78 Journal of Financial Economics
409, 2005; Cohen and Wang, “How Do Staggered Boards Aect Shareholder Value?”,
supra note 165; Cohen and Wang, “Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder
Value”, supra note 165; O. Faleye, “Classied Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial
Entrenchment”, 83 Journal of Financial Economics 501, 2007; R.-J. Guo, T. A.
Kruse, and T. Nohel, “Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered
Boards”, 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 274, 2008; O. Karakaş and M. Mohseni,
“Staggered Boards and the Value of Voting Rights”, working paper, updated May
2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628954.
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2009/1/1.74.full.pdf+html; D. F. Larcker, G. Ormazabal, and D. J. Taylor, “The
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Economics 431, 2011, doi:10.1016/j.jneco.2011.03.002; W. Ge, L. Tanlu, and J.
L. Zhang, “What Are the Consequences of Board Destaggering?”, 21 Review of
Accounting Studies 808, 2016, doi 10.1007/s11142-016-9362-2.
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doi:10.1016/j.jcorpn.2008.09.008; A. Duru, D. Wang, and Y. Zhao, “Staggered
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under some circumstances, have argued for a change in law wherein
staggered boards should be the default conguration: “the board should
have exclusive authority to initiate a charter amendment to opt out of
the staggered board default,” and “Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange
Act, which allows shareholders to submit precatory proposals, should be
amended to exclude destaggering proposals from the range of admissible
proposals.” “In its strongest version, this proposal would also involve
rolling back majority voting standards by mandating the adoption of
plurality voting standards.” “Moreover, in order to ensure widespread
shareholder agreement, the board’s destaggering proposal should be
subject to a two-thirds supermajority requirement.”170
It is perhaps not surprising that empirical evidence supports such
dierent conclusions. Obviously, over the period of time that must be
taken into account, many things are happening. There will never be
two corporations, identical but for the fact that one has a staggered
board and the other does not. Indeed, companies with staggered boards
are dierent from those without staggered boards precisely because of
the staggered boards.171
A recent empirical paper addressed the staggered board debate,
noting rst the two main opposing positions: “One theory claims that a
staggered board facilitates entrenchment of inecient management and
thus harms corporate value. Consequently, some institutional investors
and shareholder rights advocates have argued for the elimination of the
staggered board. The opposite theory is that staggered boards are value
enhancing since they enable the board to focus on long-term goals. Both
theories are supported by prior and conicting studies and theoretical
law review articles.” The paper concluded, however, that “neither theory
has empirical support,” and that “on average, a staggered board has
no signicant eect on rm value.” “The eect of a staggered board is
idiosyncratic; for some rms it increases value, while for other rms it
is value destroying.” The authors conclude that their “results suggest
caution about legal solutions which advocate wholesale adoption or
170

Cremers and Sepe, “The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards”, supra note
160. We compare this proposal with ours in Chapter 4.
171
See, e.g. Amihud, Schmid, and Davido Solomon, “Do Staggered Boards Aect
Firm Value?”, supra note 160. See also discussion in note 24, supra.
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repeal of the staggered board and instead point to an individualized
rm approach.172 A forthcoming paper argues to the contrary, that
staggered boards are value-adding in certain circumstances.173 And so
it continues.
Where does this leave us? Until recently, the debate was largely
conducted using the language of traditional agency costs, wherein the
default or reigning presumption seems to have been that managers
were using such boards to entrench themselves. With the emphasis
on technical empirical work, the theoretical underpinnings are less in
evidence. As noted above, there are major disputes as to what empirical
evidence shows. Interestingly for our purposes, one empirically grounded
dispute is as to whether particular companies do better with staggered
boards. Some authors argue that staggered boards are valuable for
companies that are engaged in innovation;174 other authors argue that
the evidence shows no such thing.175 The former being correct is at
least consistent with, and may provide some support for, our theory.
Our bottom line is that even if staggered boards are helpful for
companies engaged in innovation, we think our solution, described in
Chapter 4, is more precisely focused on the problem at issue. Staggered
boards do get at managerial leeway for a particular period of time, just
as our solution does. But staggered boards are not particularly eective
in fending o activists, as we explain below. Moreover, staggered boards
are not suitable as a way to give managers leeway for a specied (three,
ve, any) number of years, and/or under a prescribed set of conditions,
as we recommend in this article. A company either has a staggered
board or it does not: managers’ and shareholders’ only options are to
introduce or remove a staggered board, and for strategic reasons, they
may fail to do so even when doing so would be desirable.
172

Y. Amihud, M. Schmid, and S. Davido Solomon, “Settling the Staggered Board
Debate”, (September 8, 2017), forthcoming, University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034492.
173
K. J. M. Cremers and S. M. Sepe, “Is the Staggered Board Debate Really
Settled?” (2018), working paper on le with the authors.
174
See, e.g. Cremers, Litov, and Sepe, supra note 165.
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See, e.g. Amihud, Schmid, and Davido Solomon, “Do Staggered Boards Aect
Firm Value?”, supra note 160.

3.5. Poison Pills
3.5

351

Poison Pills

To complement our consideration of staggered boards, we briey discuss
poison pills. Poison pills were invented by Martin Lipton of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, in 1982, the ‘heyday of corporate raiders.’ An
article described Lipton’s motivation in inventing the pill as “giving
boards of a target company a chance to ‘level the playing eld’ and
have time to weigh oers.”176 Pills eectively require an acquirer to
negotiate with a board or replace the board – they make the acquirer’s
shares lose value once the acquirer exceeds a certain share threshold.
The acquirer can’t just buy shares from shareholders in a tender oer;
at a certain point, the pill is triggered and shareholders other than the
acquirer can buy additional shares at a price that eectively dilutes the
value of the of acquirer’s stock. Acquirers hence won’t ‘buy through
the pill.’ A board can adopt a pill without shareholder approval. It can
also remove a pill at any time before it is triggered – that is, before the
acquirer buys the threshold amount.
Especially in combination with a staggered board, a poison pill
is a particularly eective deterrent to hostile pursuit of a company.
Pills by themselves are not very eective at deterring hostile acquirers
because the acquirers can mount a proxy ght to replace the board.
Pills combined with staggered boards, though, result in needing two
election cycles to replace the majority of the board needed to eliminate
the pill, making the two together an extremely potent combination, at
least against hostile takeover attempts.177
By contrast, poison pills have limited eectiveness in fending o
shareholder activists. Poison pills impose severe nancial penalties on
those buying more shares than a triggering threshold, but they do
not restrict those buying less than such a threshold. Activists can
still prot from the acquisition of a toehold below the pill threshold. Moreover, poison pills are not eective against a ‘wolf pack’ of
176

S. Ovide, “Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill”, Wall Street
Journal, December 29, 2010, available at https://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/
marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/.
177
See Hill, Quinn, and Davido Solomon, supra note 5, at 443-447; Bebchuk,
Coates, and Subramanian, supra note 151.
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activist hedge funds178 so long as the wolf pack is able to avoid meeting denitions under which their holdings would be aggregated so
as to meet the threshold. And again, in the absence of a staggered
board, a proxy ght can yield new board members who would redeem the pill to allow the activist to acquire more than the low
threshold.
Even in the presence of a staggered board, proxy ghts also can yield
board members who are more receptive to the activist’s ideas as to how
to run the company.179 How can a proxy ght be won? Activists (and
for that matter acquirers) must garner sucient support from other
shareholders to win a proxy ght. Note that shareholders are more likely
to vote against a management that has ignored shareholder proposals
receiving majority support,180 including proposals to de-stagger the
board.181 Because the presence of a staggered board increases the
probability of management losing a proxy ght, even the combination
of poison pills with staggered boards is ultimately ineective against
shareholder activists.
Empirical work on poison pills has tended to nd them to be valuereducing.182 That being said, since just about every company can quickly
adopt a poison pill, in a sense all companies have a pill, even if only
178

This is because U.S. law is quite lenient on treating a group of shareholders as
acting in concert. See Coee and Palia, supra note 30, at 564, 568-569. European
rules are stricter (and thus less welcoming for wolf packs). See Kraakman et al., The
Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 90, at 60-61. However, as we will explain in
the text accompanying notes 186-190, infra, European jurisdictions do not feature
poison pills.
179
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the acquirer’s proposed acquisition. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,
16 A.3d 48 (Delaware Chancery Court, 2011).
180
S. Choi, J. Fisch, and M. Kahan, “Who Calls the Shots?: How Mutual Funds
Vote on Director Elections”, 3 Harvard Business Law Review 35, 2013, at 61.
181
See Coee and Palia, supra note 30, at 603 (“[I]t is probably already too late to
save the staggered board, as momentum has gathered to purge it in all cases.”)
182
See, e.g. R. Comment and G. W. Schwert, “Poison or Placebo? Evidence on
the Deterrence and Wealth Eects of Modern Antitakeover Measures”, 39 Journal
of Financial Economics 3, 1995, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/0304405X9400823J; K. J. M. Cremers and A. Ferrell, “Thirty Years of
Shareholder Rights and Firm Value”, 69 Journal of Finance 1167, 2014, available at
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jo.12138.
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a “shadow” pill. Companies with pills thus can’t be compared with
those without them to determine whether the pill has an impact on the
company’s value.183 Finally, recent work considering whether pills are
value-reducing has argued that it is not that pills are value-reducing;
rather, the value reduction comes rst, and the pill comes afterwards. 184
Note how the traditional debate is instantiated in both the impetus
for the pills’ development, and the sometimes-negative reaction to the
pill. Consider this discussion from a 2012 article from Time Magazine,
Corporate Raiders Beware, discussing poison pills in the context of Carl
Icahn’s pursuit of Netix:
Proponents of poison pills say that they protect companies from
slash-and-burn corporate raiders more interested in making a
quick buck than in nurturing a long-term strategy that will enable
companies to reach their full potential.
If nothing else, they force hostile takeover artists to negotiate with
boards, and put pressure on potential buyers to increase their bids.
One 2005 study by FactSet found that companies using poison
pills were able to raise their price tag 24% higher than companies
without such plans. In the case of Peoplesoft, the takeover target
only agreed to rescind its poison pill provisions and allow itself to
be bought by Oracle after the larger company more than doubled
its bid from an initial $5.1 billion to $10.3 billion.
Critics of poison pills, like Icahn, describe these supposed
“shareholder-rights plans” as inimical to real shareholder rights.
Poison pill provisions, he complains in a post on his blog (yes,
183

See, e.g. J. C. Coates IV, “Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique
of the Scientic Evidence”, 79 Texas Law Review 271, 2000; M. Klausner, “Empirical
Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps Forward and Some Steps Not”,
Stanford University and European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working
Paper No. 381/2018, January 2018, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3097568.
184
See E. M. Catan, “The Insignicance of Clear-Day Poison Pills”, NYU Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 16-33, September 7, 2016, available at https:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2836223; Cremers et al., “Shadow
Pills and Long-Term Firm Value”, working paper, January 18, 2018, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074658; Cremers and Ferrell,
supra note 182; Coates, supra note 183.
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Carl Icahn has a blog), “can be put in place and removed by the
directors as they please whenever they please without a shareholder vote.” Pointing out that other countries put many more
restrictions on companies instituting poison pill plans, he argues
that the boards of American companies “should not be allowed
to hide behind a poison pill indenitely.” Shareholder “activists”
like Icahn claim that they help to shake out bad management and
unlock value in troubled companies. Shareholders frustrated with
management often welcome the attention of shaker-uppers like
Icahn.185

Again, here is the traditional framing: the ‘good agent’ managers
need protection against the “slash and burn” raiders “more interested in making a quick buck than in nurturing a long-term strategy
that will enable companies to reach their full potential,” or the ‘bad
agent’ boards are “hiding” indenitely behind poison pills, needing
to be “shaken up” by the prospect and perhaps fact of losing their
jobs.
To us, the lessons here are fourfold. First, the empirical work here
is largely driven by the traditional framing. Second, as is the case with
empirical work in related areas, the work does not and cannot elucidate
how justication concerns might be aecting the results—this is not
being tested for. Third and most importantly, the evidence is consistent
with the possibility that giving managers more leeway is at least not
value-detracting, and may be value-adding. Fourth, the poison pill is
just one of the many ways to grant management leeway, and perhaps
not even the most eective way in the face of activist shareholders (as
opposed to hostile bidders).
After our consideration of 13(d), antitakeover laws, poison pills, and
staggered boards, we consider alternative strategies, which have been
more frequently used by non-U.S. companies.
185

David Futrelle, “Corporate Raiders Beware: A Short History of
the ‘Poison Pill’ Takeover Defense”, Time, Nov. 7, 2012, available at
http://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate-raiders-beware-a-short-history-ofthe-poison-pill-takeover-defense/.
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3.6

The (Lesser) Role of Staggered Boards and Poison Pills in
Europe

Outside the U.S., staggered boards and poison pills do not play nearly
as important a role in corporate governance. In Europe, for instance,
staggered boards do not make much dierence in terms of management
accountability to shareholders, for several reasons. First, many European
jurisdictions provide shareholders with the non-waivable right to remove
directors at will, which, combined with the right of shareholders to
call special meetings to replace directors,186 makes staggered boards
ineective to entrench the board.187 Second, in Europe, staggered boards
cannot be combined with poison pills. In most European jurisdictions,
the issuance of new shares requires shareholder approval,188 which
deprives poison pills of their fundamental appeal, the fact that they can
be adopted unilaterally by the board.189
186

This right is typical of European jurisdictions. See Kraakman et al., The
Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 90, at 55-56. By contrast, in Delaware,
the default rule is that shareholders cannot call such a meeting. Ibid. See DGCL
Section 211(d). Some Delaware corporations provide for shareholder-called special
meetings if certain conditions are met, but this is not the norm. Other states’ laws vary.
Governance activists have proposed, sometimes with success, that companies’ charters
or bylaws be amended to allow shareholders to call special meetings. See generally
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/02/special-meeting-proposals-2/.
187
See Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 90, 55-56.
188
Ibid., 216-217.
189
Some European jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands and France, support
functionally equivalent takeover defenses. These, however, work dierently than the
pill. Functional equivalents to the U.S. poison pills are, for instance, the French
“bons Breton” or the Dutch protective preference shares. Similar to the poison pill,
these mechanisms work through the issuance of new shares. Crucially, in France
as well as in the Netherlands, the board must be preauthorized by a shareholder
meeting to issue these shares, and the authorization requires periodic renewal (for
instance, every 5 years in the Netherlands). Due to other legal constrains, these
mechanism do not dilute the hostile bidder as does the poison pill. In France,
the bons Bretons are warrants that must be issued to all the existing shareholders, though the shares acquired through the (mandatory) bid do not count, which
eectively dilutes a successful bidder. In the Netherlands, there is no economic
dilution, but simply a very cheap issuance of shares accounting for 50% of the
voting rights by a formally independent, but as a practical matter board-friendly,
foundation (“Stichting”). See ibid., 216-217; and L. Chazen and P. Werdmuller,
“The Dutch Poison Pill: How is it Dierent from an American Rights Plan?”,
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Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, at least in continental Europe,
a majority of listed companies have controlling shareholders who, by
denition, control the board.190 Staggered boards play at most a minor
role in this setting. The presence of a controlling shareholder makes the
discussion of takeover defenses, such as staggered boards and poison
pills, largely irrelevant because a change in control normally requires
the controlling shareholder’s approval. In the presence of a controlling
shareholder, the key variable is voting power, in particular whether the
latter is sucient for controlling shareholders to prevail over dissident
shareholders at the general meeting. This power is normally sucient
to fend o a hostile acquirer,191 but not necessarily enough to avoid
pressure from shareholder activists.192
Because staggered boards also exist where there are controlling
shareholders, they must serve some function other than management
entrenchment. Staggered boards seem to support the stability of governance in the aftermath of an IPO (for instance, to reect the founder’s
vision) or even directors’ independence from certain constituencies, 193
notably including other controlling shareholders. Notwithstanding controlling shareholders’ control of the board, and their sometime-ability
to re all of its members without cause, staggering the terms of oce
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
(blog), December 1, 2015, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/01/
the-dutch-poison-pill-how-is-it-dierent-from-an-american-rights-plan/.
190
Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 90, 79-89.
191
Even if the controlling shareholder does not own more than 50% of the company,
she will normally have enough voting power to approve the board’s defensive tactics
and in any event, to block a post-takeover squeeze-out, which, in Europe requires a
majority of 90% or even 95%. See Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 OJ (L142) 12, available
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:142:0012:
0023:EN:PDF.
192
As we have seen in Chapter 2, this depends on whether controlling shareholders
are majority shareholders and on the statutory rights of minority shareholders in
many European jurisdictions (for instance, the appointment of a short slate of
directors). In other words, activists may interfere with the controlling shareholders’
choices, although they cannot oust them from control.
193
R. B. Adams, “Chapter 6—Boards, and the Directors Who Sit on Them”, in
B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, eds., The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate
Governance, Vol. 1 (North-Holland, 2017).
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mildly commits controllers to preserving board autonomy. That controlling shareholders sometimes choose staggered boards supports our
point that staggered boards may be ecient in certain contexts.
3.7

Deviations from One-Share, One-Vote: Dual-Class Shares and
Loyalty Shares

One other approach that potentially addresses the issues raised by
shareholder activism is deviating from “one-share, one-vote” (1S1V).
As we noted in Chapter 2, departures from 1S1V are implemented
via what are called Control Enhancement Mechanisms (CEMs), giving
managers or controlling shareholders voting power disproportional to
their ownership. CEMs are responses to hostile takeovers and shareholder activism; they are functionally equivalent to staggered boards
and poison pills. However, insofar as the pressure on management to
make justication-motivated decisions stems more from the threat of
activism than from the threat of a hostile takeover, 1S1V departures
are becoming more important than traditional takeover defenses. One
reason is that, as we have seen, the most powerful U.S. takeover defense
– the poison pill/staggered board combination – is not always eective
against shareholder activists. Furthermore, outside the U.S., takeover
defenses are not common, in part because so many companies have
controlling shareholders, and controlling shareholders have less need
of such defenses to fend o hostile takeovers.194 However, controlling
shareholders may be like managers in their aversion to shareholder
activists. Thus, they, like managers, may want to enhance their voting
power in order to lessen the probability or power of activist engagement.
Departure from 1S1V can be achieved in a number of ways. Examples of CEMs include pyramidal group structures, cross ownerships,
194

Note the important exception of the Netherlands, in which takeover defenses
have traditionally played a prominent role in corporate governance. See A. de Jong,
A. Röell, and G. Westerhuis, “Changing National Business Systems: Corporate
Governance and Financing in the Netherlands, 1945–2005”, 84 Business History
Review 773, 2010. Perhaps the most powerful of these defenses, the so-called protective
preference shares, is eective also against shareholder activists. See Chazen and
Werdmuller, supra note 189. However, as evidenced by the AKZO Nobel case discussed
at the beginning of this Section, even “unsuccessful” activists may ultimately get
their way.
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dual-class shares,195 and more recently, loyalty shares (also known as
tenure voting).196 In this article, we will focus on the two most popular
techniques.197 These are dual-class shares, where, paradigmatically, one
class, held by founders and/or her family members has the only, or a
much higher, vote, than the other class, and loyalty shares, which gain
greater voting power when they are held for longer periods.
3.8

Dual-Class Shares

Dual-class stock is a mechanism by which, traditionally, one set of owners
retains control over a company. The second ‘class’ can be nonvoting,
or have some limited voting power while the rst class stays in control.
The paradigmatic use is by a founder retaining control of her company
notwithstanding conducting a public oering, but dual-class shares need
not be issued only at the IPO stage. Insofar as dual-class stock entrenches
management, it does so because the shareholders who continue to control
the company on account of their shares of the controlling class of shares
favor, or, not infrequently, are, the management.
Dual-class stock has long been controversial because it violates the
1S1V principle. From 1926 and lasting for nearly 60 years, companies
with dual-class stock could not be listed on the New York Stock Exchange.198 Facing pressure by competing exchanges, NYSE relaxed
195

L. A. Bebchuk, R. Kraakman, and G. Triantis, “Stock Pyramids, CrossOwnership, and Dual-Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating
Control From Cash-Flow Rights”, in R. K. Morck, ed., Concentrated Corporate Ownership (University of Chicago Press, 2000).
196
L. L. Dallas and J. M. Barry, “Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased
Voting”, 40 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 541, 2015.
197
Pyramidal groups and cross-ownership are problematic insofar as they may
be used not only to enhance voting power, but also to expropriate value from
investors. The most developed jurisdictions try to avoid expropriation by regulating
conicts of interest strictly, for instance in related-party transactions. See, e.g. A.
M. Pacces, “Procedural and Substantive Review of Related Party Transactions
(RPTs): The Case for Non-Controlling Shareholder-Dependent (NCS-Dependent)
Directors”, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 399/2018, May 2018, available at https:
//ssrn.com/abstract=3167519. Such regulations, however, increase the cost of these
techniques to separate voting power from ownership.
198
R. J. Jackson, Jr., “Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate
Royalty”, speech transcript, undated, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-royalty.
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the prohibition in 1984. This allowed companies to introduce dualclass stock in midstream, prompting the SEC to prohibit dual-class
recapitalization.199 The SEC prohibition was eventually struck down by
courts, but it was reintroduced by the stock exchanges. As a result, in
the U.S., listed companies cannot introduce shares that have more than
one vote per share in midstream.200 They may, however, go public with
multiple classes of stock. Moreover, they may issue nonvoting stock in
midstream.
The arguments favoring and opposing dual-class stock are the familiar ones: will management use the leeway of not having to fear
takeovers to pursue innovative long-term projects, or to entrench itself?
And, not surprisingly, there is a debate, as a matter of both theory
and empirical evidence, as to the eect of dual-class shares on company value, with support for the proposition that they add value, 201
that they have no eect,202 and that they are value-reducing.203 Very
199

S. M. Bainbridge, “The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4”, 69
Washington University Law Quarterly 565, 1991.
200
See generally L. A. Bebchuk & K. Kastiel, “The Untenable Case for Perpetual
Dual-Class Stock”, 103 Virginia Law Review 585, 2017, at 596-9.
201
B. S. Sharfman, “A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use
Dual-Class Share Structures in IPOs”, forthcoming, Villanova Law Review, 2018,
available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2591&context=fac_pubs. See also T. J. Chemmanur and Y. Jiao, “Dual-class IPOs:
A Theoretical Analysis”, 36 Journal of Banking and Finance 305, 2012, available at
https://www2.bc.edu/thomas-chemmanur/paper/Dual%20Class%20IPOs.pdf .
202
G. Morey, Multi-Class Stock and Firm Value: Does Multi-Class Stock Enhance Firm Performance? A Regression Analysis, Council of Institutional Investors,
May 2017, available at https://www.cii.org/les/publications/misc/05_10_17_
dual-class_value_study.pdf.
203
B. Nicholas and B. Marsh, “Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights”, Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (blog), May 17, 2017, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-consequencesof-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights/ (this is admittedly
from a law rm that represents institutional investors, some of which are presumably ‘deprived’ in this sense); IRRC Institute, Controlled Companies in
the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Ten Year Performance and Risk Review, October 2012, available at https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
FINAL-Controlled-Company-ISS-Report1.pdf; P. Gompers, J. L. Ishii, and A. Metrick, “Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States”,
23 Review of Financial Studies 1051, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp024.
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well-known companies such as Google and Facebook have gone public with dual-class capital structures, arousing considerable debate. 204
Dual-class shares companies have become so prominent in the US
markets that they account for nearly 10% of the value of the main
indices.205
Dual-class stock has increasingly been criticized. Following lobbying
from the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an organization that
primarily represents U.S. pension funds, S&P Dow Jones decided to
exclude all new dual-class oerings from its main indices (including
the prominent S&P 500). Similarly, the FTSE Russell now excludes
from its indices all companies which have less than 5% of their voting rights held by public investors.206 Moreover, since 2017, ISS has
recommended voting against directors of companies with dual-class
shares structures that do not have “reasonable” sunset mechanisms.207
204

See, e.g. A. Tan and B. Robertson, “Dual-Class Shares Are Coming
Under Fire—Again: Class Warfare Erupts as Markets and Investors Wrestle
with Shareholders’ Preferential Voting Rights,” Bloomberg Markets, September 28, 2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-27/
can-democracy-stage-a-comeback-at-stock-exchanges; Joann S. Lublin, “Big Investor Group to Push for End to Dual-Class Shares: Coalition’s CorporateGovernance Campaign Turns Up the Heat on Many U.S. Companies”,
Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2017, available at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/big-investor-group-to-push-for-end-to-dual-class-shares-1485817380; Eva
Marcotrigiano, “Facebook Shareholder Pushes for 1 Share, 1 Vote”, Westlaw Corporate Governance Daily Brieng, June 13, 2016, 2016 WL 3223678;
Matt Orsagh, “Dual-Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is It a
Troubling Trend for Investors?”, Market Integrity Insights (blog), April
1, 2014, available at https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/04/01/
dual-class-shares-from-google-to-alibaba-is-it-a-troubling-trend-for-investors/.
205
Bebchuk and Kastiel, “The Untenable Case”, supra note 200, at 594; M. Cremers,
B. Lauterbach, and A. Pajuste, “The Life-Cycle of Dual-Class Firms”, ECGI Finance
Working Paper No. 550/2018, May 2018, at 5, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3062895 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3062895.
206
B. S. Sharfman, “The S&P and FTSE Russell Should Reverse
Course on Dual-Class Shares”, Oxford Business Law Blog, Nov. 8, 2017,
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/11/sp-and-ftse-russellshould-reverse-course-dual-class-shares.
207
A. W. Winden, “Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of
Dual-Class Stock Structures”, forthcoming, Columbia Business Law Review, earlier
version as Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper
Series No. 228, August 2017, at 4, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3001574.
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ISS’s recommendation reects investors’ increasingly negative view of
‘perpetual’ dual-class stock.208 Indeed, investors are increasingly requesting that companies include sunset provisions when implementing
dual-class stock structures.209
Dual-class shares have always been a way for companies to entrench
their management. If the managers, or the controlling shareholders
supporting them, command more than half of the votes, the company
is eectively insulated from hostile takeovers and from shareholder
activists as well. Because, at least in the U.S.,210 there are no statutory restrictions on how far voting power may depart from ownership,
dual-class shares may grant managers control regardless of their ownership. For instance, if supervoting shares command ten votes per share,
owning one share more than 5% of the company is sucient to control it. The dierence between voting rights and ownership is 45%.
This dierence is called the “wedge.” The wedge is a measure of the
control enhancement provided by this mechanism, as well as by other
CEMs.
CEMs are not recent inventions. Indeed, they have a long history
(including in academic debates).211 Because the traditional takeover
defenses have only limited eectiveness against activist shareholders,
dual-class shares have recently become a subject of considerable interest.
In the U.S., such shares may be the only eective defense against activists, and are regarded by activists as a major hurdle.212 In a similar
vein, institutional investors have traditionally opposed deviations from
1S1V. That being said, their opposition hasn’t prevented them from buying into dual-class stock companies, and BlackRock, a leading provider
208

See Jackson, “Perpetual Dual-Class Stock”, supra note 198.
Professor Bebchuk and Kastiel have argued for doing precisely this. See Bebchuk
and Kastiel, “The Untenable Case”, supra note 200. See also text accompanying
notes 278-287.
210
Such limits exist in other jurisdictions. For instance, 1:10 is the maximum in
Sweden. See Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance, supra note 118, 207.
211
See, e.g. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, “Extreme Governance”, supra note 203;
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, supra note 195.
212
M. Weingarten and E. Klein, “2016 Shareholder Activism Report”, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
(blog), Dec. 1, 2016, available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/01/
2016-shareholder-activism-insight-report/.
209
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of index funds, has publicly criticized S&P and FTSE’s decisions to
exclude dual-class companies from their indices.
Outside the U.S., there are dierent regimes governing dual-class
stock. In the UK, the investor community was more eective than they
were in the U.S. at opposing dual-class shares. Traditionally, UK listed
companies avoided such shares. With the inux of foreign companies
into the UK market, however, the number of companies with dualclass shares increased.213 Institutional investors lobbied, successfully,
for a regulatory reaction. As a result, the Financial Conduct Authority
introduced a rule mandating 1S1V for all the companies admitted to
the Premium Listing of the London Stock Exchange.214 This approach
is consistent with the UK tradition of banning takeover defenses. 215
Continental Europe has been somewhat less welcoming to hostile
takeovers. Reecting this posture, dual-class shares are more common in continental Europe than they are in the U.S and the UK. 216
Some jurisdictions (e.g. the Netherlands) have always allowed dual-class
shares along with several other takeover defenses; in other jurisdictions (e.g. Sweden) dual-class shares have always been common; other
jurisdictions (e.g. Italy) have long allowed nonvoting shares and recently introduced multiple voting shares. This higher frequency of
dual-class shares is unsurprising given that in many European jurisdictions, by contrast with the United States, boards cannot fend o
a hostile takeover unless shareholders authorize them to do so.217 In
213

B. R. Chens, “The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?)”, 33 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 503, 2013.
214
See P. Davies, “Related Party Transactions: UK Model”, ECGI Law Working
Paper No. 387/2018, February 2018, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3126996 at 45 (commenting on the UK Listing Rule 7.2.1A).
215
D. Kershaw, “The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’S Takeover
Defence Prohibition”, 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 267, 2007.
216
On average, they account for about one fourth of listed companies, according to
M. Bennedsen and K. M. Nielsen, “Incentive and Entrenchment Eects in European
Ownership”, 34 Journal of Banking & Finance 2212, 2010, available at http://www.
kaspermeisnernielsen.com/IEEO_JBF.pdf.
217
See article 9 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/25/EC,
supra note 191, and L. Enriques, R. J. Gilson, and A. M. Pacces, “The Case
for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an application to the European Union)”, 4
Harvard Business Law Review 85, 2014, available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/HLB103_crop.pdf , on how it is implemented in Europe. More
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these countries, companies may only be insulated from hostile takeovers
or shareholder activists if they have a controlling shareholder. Many of
these controlling shareholders employ CEMs to secure their position
even though they own less, and sometimes signicantly less, than half
of the company’s equity.
Deviations from 1S1V are problematic from the perspective of incentive alignment. Controllers whose nancial stake is smaller than their
voting power have less incentive to create value for the shareholders as
a group.218 This is of course a familiar story – the controllers with their
disproportionately high voting power play the role of managers, less
vigilant about pursuing shareholder value than their own advantage.
1S1V is classic incentive alignment: voting power is in proportion to
share ownership and hence economic interest.219 A few commentators,
including one of us,220 have criticized the one-size-ts-all character of
this preference for 1S1V. Separation of control and ownership, including
as a result of CEMs, the existence of a controlling shareholder, and
the use of takeover defenses, happens too often for it to be inecient.
For example, in 2015, 15% of U.S. IPOs had dual-class stock.221 Indeed
neither theory nor empirical evidence can demonstrate that as a general
generally, see Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance, supra note 118, at 212221, on legal distribution of powers. See also, e.g. M. J. Van Ginneken, “The US
Poison Pill from a Dutch Perspective”, in S. H. M. A. Dumoulin, ed., Tussen
Themis en Mercurius (Kluwer, 2005), 121-141, at 122 (noting how the 13th EU
Directive on takeover bids from 2004 states that “once a takeover bid is announced,
the target board may not take frustrating action without approval of the general
meeting of shareholders, to be given after the announcement of the bid.”). Yet
certain EU jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, have nevertheless developed
ways to defend against hostile takeovers without a shareholder vote. Regarding the
Dutch use of the “stichting” system, sometimes referred to as the “Dutch Poison
Pill,” see, e.g. Chazen and Werdmuller, supra note 189; S. Raice and M. Patrick,
“The Rise of the ‘Stichting,’ an Obscure Takeover Defense: Mylan Puts in Place
an Ancient But Powerful Dutch Legal Structure to Fend O Teva’s Hostile Bid,”
Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2015, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-rise-of-the-stichting-an-obscure-takeover-defense-1429716204.
218
See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, “Extreme Governance”, supra note 203.
219
S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, “One Share-One Vote and the Market for
Corporate Control”, 20 Journal of Financial Economics 175, 1988.
220
Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance, supra note 118, at 218-221.
221
Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste, supra note 205, at 1.
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matter 1S1V is ecient – or inecient.222 Most likely, whether a dualclass structure is ecient depends on context. As argued by Professors
McCahery and Vermeulen, this context evolves with time, over the
rm’s life cycle. As a consequence, initially ecient arrangements as
to the ownership and control structure may later become inecient.
Importantly, this ineciency does not depend on accountability being
excessive or insucient per se, but rather on the failure of ownership and
control structures to support the goals of “sustainable” (long lasting)
growth and value creation.223
To understand how dual-class shares work, it is useful to look at
why a shareholder would acquire a controlling interest and how the
existence of such an interest aects the company. Private benets of
control (PBC) reward the extra eort and cost of owning a substantial
portion of the company in order to control it. PBC are usually regarded
as a source of ineciency in corporate governance, but this is not
necessarily the case. First, there are at least two kinds of PBC. One
kind reduces shareholder value, for instance by expropriation. This kind
of PBC includes the traditional agency costs, such as those arising
from self-dealing and empire building. The other kind, for instance the
appropriation of psychic benets that are worthless to investors, does
not.224 Both kinds of PBC may reward corporate control. Even when
they reduce shareholder value, the alternative – managerial control –
may be worse, insofar as managers also can extract PBC. They may be
222

See J.-N. Caprasse, C. Clerc, and M. Becht, Report on the Proportionality
Principle in the European Union 15, 26–27, May 2007, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/nal_report_en.pdf ; M.
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more apt to do so than controlling shareholders are since controlling
shareholders’ nancial stake in the corporation makes the extraction of
value-reducing PBC less attractive.225
Second, controlling shareholders may have a vision, i.e. they may be
entrepreneurs in the sense discussed in this article. Although commentators have argued that the controller’s ability to realize her vision should
not be understood as a private benet of control,226 again, this is not
necessarily the case. As argued by one of us,227 the reward of this vision,
namely of entrepreneurship, can be characterized as PBC if investors
do not value it but controllers do. Such benets reect, for instance, the
pride of controlling a company that has realized the controller’s vision.
Because these PBC are idiosyncratic to the controlling shareholder,
they are called idiosyncratic PBC.
Idiosyncratic PBC have important implications for dual-class shares
and CEMs. Going public with a dual-class shares structure implies
a discount on the shares sold to the investing public, as the latter
anticipate adverse consequences from incentive misalignment – that
is, they pay less for x% of the shares that hold x% of the equity
but less than x% of the votes, since they presume that those holding
disproportionately high percentages of the vote will act in their own
interest as much or more as they do in the interests of those holding
disproportionately low percentages of the vote. The owners of the shares
prior to the IPO bear this discount as the opportunity cost of opting
out of a 1S1V structure. It follows that owners choosing a dual-class
stock structure must accord as high a value to the idiosyncratic PBC
as they do to the increase in the discount on noncontrolling stock
reecting the investors’ heightened concerns about value-decreasing
PBC (i.e. agency cost). The discount on noncontrolling stock causes the
225
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controlling shareholder to limit the control enhancement to an amount
justied by the size of her idiosyncratic PBC.228 Only a large size of
the latter will allow for a large discount, and hence a large departure
from 1S1V, i.e. a large wedge. Large wedges are not often observed. In
fact, founders have to retain some degree of ownership in equilibrium
to signal their commitment, thereby keeping the IPO discount down
to acceptable levels (the higher the wedge, the higher the discount). 229
Moreover, distinct from the controller’s vision as such, idiosyncratic
PBC can be cashed in as a control premium if, later on, the controlling
shareholder decides to part with control.230 This is also an important
eect. Because the prospect of selling control at a premium is realistic so
long as a buyer can emerge, the controlling shareholder is induced to be
realistic in estimating idiosyncratic PBC ex ante, which also contributes
to limiting the size of the wedge between ownership and control.
This approach to dual-class shares structures provides a plausible
explanation for how they can be ecient when they are established. A
controller facing uncertainty ex ante may, at the IPO stage, choose a
governance system in which she will not have to justify her decisions to
investors, so long as she is willing to pay a price for this (in the form of
228
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a discount on the noncontrolling stock) and investors accept this price
(buying noncontrolling stock at a discount).
But this account, in which dual-class shares can be ecient, is
not complete. Dual-class shares may support a higher extraction of
PBC which are less benign than idiosyncratic PBC. The controlling
shareholder could simply steal or empire-build without accountability
to investors – who would therefore be reluctant in the rst instance to
invest, or ask for an excessive discount. This suggests that the control
aorded by dual-class shares should be subject to certain limits in order
to keep equity nancing of enterprises viable.
If a controller non-opportunistically assigns an (idiosyncratic) value
to the discount, investors, fearing that she will behave opportunistically, will demand a larger one or won’t invest at all. Limits, for
instance in the form of credible legal and/or reputational constraints
on self-dealing, would prevent or minimize the chance of opportunism,
thus permitting a desirable bargain to go forward. Second, a controller
may, especially at some point midstream, after the corporation was
created, overvalue idiosyncratic PBC and hence not be willing to sell
her stake when doing so would be ecient. For instance, the controller may stubbornly fail to acknowledge the failure of her vision,
or, as is not uncommon in Europe, her judgment may be compromised because she wants to pass her “legacy” to her ospring. Using
this reasoning, Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel have recently argued
that corporate law should impose mandatory sunsets on dual-class
shares.231 Indeed, they argue more broadly that dual-class shares
may yield insucient – and inecient – accountability of management (including for this purpose controlling shareholders). We respond to their argument in Chapter 4,232 but for now, note only
that while insucient accountability is or may become a problem
during a company’s existence – indeed, it is the canonical problem
focused on by those favoring more power for activist shareholders –
excessive accountability, as we have argued, is or may become a problem as well. Sunsets may solve the problem of insucient account231
232
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ability, but they do not address the problem of excessive accountability. A 1S1V structure may become inecient, in particular when
the company would benet from a more entrepreneurial management,
but managers are stuck trying to get the leeway the company needs
by means of defensive strategies. Because dual-class recapitalizations
are prohibited in the U.S. and are dicult to implement in other
parts of the world, there seems to be no satisfactory private ordering solution to the problem of excessive, as opposed to insucient,
accountability.
Loyalty shares, to which we turn next, seem to provide a way out
of this bind.
3.9

Loyalty shares

The debate over loyalty shares (also sometimes referred to as tenure
voting) also reects the international resonance of the long term/short
term debate as we have framed it in this article. The shares potentially
allow companies to reduce their accountability to investors in order to
pursue a long-term strategy at some point in their lifecycle.
Sparked by the reincorporation of a major Italian carmaker – the
former Fiat group, now known as Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA)233
– to the Netherlands, loyalty shares have become popular in Europe.
Several jurisdictions, including Italy and the Netherlands, allow companies to opt into having such shares. In France, loyalty shares have been
an option for a long time. However, since 2014, the Loi Florange has
made loyalty shares the default regime for publicly held companies. 234
By contrast, in the U.S., investors are expressing increasing discomfort
with deviations from 1S1V, whether in the form of loyalty shares or
dual-class shares.235 Loyalty shares resemble dual-class shares, although
233
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they dier insofar as they are easier to introduce midstream, and they
are somewhat less eective in entrenching management.
Loyalty shares are meant to reward long-term (typically two or
three year) ownership, as dened by the company’s charter (or by the
legislator). The reward may be nancial, such as a super-dividend or a
warrant.236 More often, however, the reward of loyalty shares consists
in extra voting rights. The holders of loyalty shares for longer than
the specied period will receive extra voting power, namely two or
more votes per share, in the proportion set forth in the charter or
by the law. Importantly, this benet is linked to a minimum holding
period. In one scheme (called “low-high”) all the shareholders start
with 1S1V. After holding their stock for the requisite period of time,
the shareholders receive extra voting rights. These extra voting rights
are not transferable, i.e. the stock reverts to 1S1V upon trading. This
restriction allows loyalty shares to be implemented also with a “high-low”
scheme, according to which all existing shareholders get super-voting
rights, but the shares lose such rights once they are traded.
Loyalty shares tilt the balance of corporate power towards long-term
shareholding, rewarding relatively long holding periods with higher
voting power. Loyalty shares, it is argued, incentivize long-term investments. But is this true? Maybe not. First, long-term shareholding
does not necessarily imply long-term decision-making.237 Index funds
are the paradigmatic long-term shareholders. But, as we discuss in
Chapter 2, some evidence suggests that their voting may reect nonlong term interests, notably acceding to activist campaigns targeting
underperforming companies, or favoring general policies for all of their
portfolio companies that help them economize on the costs of deciding
how to vote.
Second, it is hard to restrict loyalty shares to long-term owners: despite recent developments in technology,238 benecial ownership remains
236
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dicult to identify. Moreover, loyalty shares may be used strategically:
having been a long-term shareholder who supports long-term investment
at one time does not necessarily commit to supporting long-term policies
in the future.239
Loyalty shares do support long-term ownership. However, they do
so by being attractive to controlling shareholders, who are credibly
committed to maintaining ownership for an indenite time and to
making decisions based on this long-term horizon. Indeed, both in
Europe and in the U.S., before loyalty shares were banned by the stock
exchanges, controlling shareholders have always been the ones to cause
the introduction of loyalty shares. While the controlling shareholders
obviously qualify for the extra voting rights stemming from the length of
their ownership, other investors qualify for the extra voting rights as well,
something that is not the case for dual-class shares. Thus, in principle,
loyalty shares should be less attractive to controlling shareholders than
dual-class shares. This is especially so since other shareholders getting
loyalty shares may be able to mount, or support, activist campaigns.
However, the advantage of loyalty shares over dual-class shares is that
because the former treat all shareholders equally, they can be introduced
by already-listed companies.
By contrast, introducing dual-class shares may be dicult for 1S1V
companies. Recall that dual-class companies are banned altogether from
the UK Premium Listing. Although other European jurisdictions allow
dual-class shares, in practice these cannot be introduced in midstream
to enhance the power of controlling shareholders to the disadvantage
of minority shareholders.240 In the U.S., dual-class recapitalizations
239
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treating existing shareholders disparately are likewise prohibited by the
stock exchanges. Loyalty shares can be a good option to increase managerial leeway in midstream because they should not run afoul of these
prohibitions: they do not discriminate among shareholders other than
by reason of the length of time of their shareholding. Indeed, Professor
Davido Solomon and his coauthors have argued that introducing them
in midstream should be allowed notwithstanding that the introduction
of tenure voting is cited by the NYSE as an example of prohibited
recapitalizations.241 As reected in long-standing Delaware case law,
the absence of discrimination allows the controlling shareholder to introduce tenure voting with a simple majority, without need for a majority
of the minority to approve the transaction or for a court to review its
entire fairness.242
Although loyalty shares do not formally distinguish among shareholders except as to the length of ownership of their shares, as a
practical matter the qualifying holding periods of two or more years
make loyalty shares less liquid than common stock. Loyalty shares are
therefore generally not attractive to institutional investors. Institutional
investors who hold shares for long periods of time may end up with
higher voting power, but this may not be because of a strategic decision to do so. Index funds prioritize tracking indices accurately, so
that the ability to timely exit from investments is crucial. 243 Because
implementing their investment strategy requires them to be able to
trade stock freely, in the aggregate they will benet less from loyalty shares than controlling shareholders, who only sell stock when
they can do so without losing control. Over time, just as is the case
with dual-class shares, loyalty shares will create an increasing wedge
between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and their ownership.
not happen, however. Currently, Class A and Class B shares of Altice trade at about
the same price on the Euronext market (i.e. they are equally attractive to investors).
241
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Unsurprisingly, institutional investors have opposed loyalty shares
as much as they have dual-class shares. However, unlike with dual-class
shares, they may be unable to stop the midstream introduction of
loyalty shares. This is suggested by recent European experience with
loyalty shares. In one instance, after the Loi Florange became eective,
institutional investors opposed the introduction of loyalty shares in
Renault, the state-controlled French carmaker. However, they failed
to obtain the two-thirds majority required to opt out of the newly
introduced default rule that provided for the introduction of such shares.
In a recent paper, Professor Becht and his coauthors have shown that the
controlling shareholder – in this case, the French state – has been able
to introduce loyalty shares unilaterally in as many as 14 French listed
companies, increasing its wedge between voting rights and ownership
from 0.69% to 5.7% on average.244
The holders of loyalty shares are thus not the long-term institutional investors, but the controlling shareholders, who hold those shares
to protect their tenure. But why have European controlling shareholders, who have managed to fend o hostile takeovers for decades,
suddenly become interested in loyalty shares? The short answer is
that hedge fund activism is on the rise in continental Europe, 245 and
the presence of large shareholders holding a plurality of the voting
shares – the classic European controlling shareholder – is not enough
to make such activism toothless.246 This is conrmed by the recent
experience with hedge fund activism in a few European countries.
For instance, activist hedge funds have been able to secure board
seats in Italy, taking advantage of legislation mandating the appointment of directors representing minority shareholders.247 In Sweden,
which likewise has a tradition of controlling shareholders, a local
hedge fund managed to successfully engage a number of companies
244
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controlled by the most prominent controlling shareholders of Sweden.248 Importantly, in Europe as in the U.S., activist hedge funds
need the implicit or explicit support of institutional investors to have
any impact. In this respect, loyalty shares can only aord controllers
limited protection from accountability to investors. If non-controllers
held their shares for a suciently long period, even in the absence
of a specic strategy to do so, with the extra voting power granted
by their loyalty shares they could be able to outvote a controlling
shareholder.
Whether, and under what circumstances, loyalty shares are sucient
to fend o shareholder activists is ultimately an empirical question, as
to which there is as yet insucient data. Professor Randall Thomas
and his coauthors have recently conducted a theoretical simulation of
dierent scenarios in which loyalty shares could play a role.249 Their
analysis reveals that loyalty shares are eective at protecting control
only when the “inside” ownership – whether of the management or
by controlling shareholders supporting them – is high (commanding
more than 20% of voting power). (Interestingly, although loyalty shares
are more eective in protecting control when ownership is 30% rather
than 20%, the dierence in the degree of protection is small, suggesting
that loyalty shares could be a way for controlling shareholders to sell
stock while maintaining control). When the inside ownership is low (3%,
for instance), the advantage of loyalty shares is limited. An important
nding is that the lower the inside ownership, the higher the risk of
being outvoted on account of a recommendation against management
from a proxy advisor (ISS and Glass Lewis being the most inuential
such advisors). The impact of institutional investors blindly following
ISS is comparatively lower in the presence of a controlling shareholder.
However, the proportion of institutional investors voting independently
as opposed to blindly following proxy advisors varies with context. There
is some empirical evidence that ISS shifts at most 10% of votes in the
248
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US.250 However, this is likely to vary considerably across jurisdictions,
companies, and over time.
In conclusion, loyalty shares seem to be nearly as eective as dualclass shares in protecting controlling shareholders from other shareholders’ interference, provided that the controlling shareholder maintains
substantial ownership (i.e. at least 20%). Loyalty shares are not as
eective as dual-class shares to protect managers. The big advantage of
loyalty shares as compared to dual-class shares is that loyalty shares
can be introduced in midstream. However, this is also a disadvantage
because, in some jurisdictions such as the U.S. and the Netherlands,
the introduction of loyalty shares requires only a simple majority vote
so long as shareholders are not treated disparately. As revealed by
the European experience, this may enable controlling shareholders to
increase the wedge between voting power and ownership unilaterally,
i.e. even if a majority of minority (institutional) shareholders oppose it.
The foregoing has described the principal techniques, laws, and regulations that potentially help management defend against the advances
of activist shareholders and others opposed to the managers’ control or
agenda: staggered boards, poison pills, antitakeover statutes (including
constituency statutes), Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, dual-class
shares, and tenure (loyalty) shares. We have argued thus far that as
they are presently used, these techniques do not suciently address
the problem of justication-motivated decision making, which yields
both agency costs and social costs. Chapter 4 sets forth and defends
our proposal to address this problem.
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Our Proposal

4.1

The proposal

We propose a contractual solution. Managers and controlling shareholders should be able to negotiate with institutional investors for a
CEM. We expect that this would most likely occur when managers
determine that the business context that they are facing has become
highly uncertain. Shareholders should have the right to approve or veto
what management proposes. Management might simply propose CEMs
for a set period of time. Or it might propose CEMs for a set period of
time but terminable earlier if certain specied conditions are not met.
In order to mimic as much as possible the IPO setting – where
CEMs can be introduced, with investors deciding whether to buy in
or not – outside shareholders should have a veto right, for instance by
way of a Majority of Minority (MOM) vote. The economic rationale for
this veto right is that the management must oer investors something
in exchange for the entitlement to control. In particular, managers or
controlling shareholders can only hope to persuade shareholders to agree
if the CEM is limited in time, compensation is paid, and/or there are
countervailing measures, such as – for instance – board seats reserved to
minority shareholders for as long as the CEM lasts or if certain results
375
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are not achieved.251 We discuss some possibilities in this subsection,
but we think companies and their shareholders should be able to craft,
based on a set of stylized options, something that suits the company’s
particular needs and circumstances.
We think dual-class shares are the best suited to achieve our proposal’s goals. Companies should be able to engage in dual-class recapitalizations explicitly. Dual-class recapitalizations could confer upon
the incumbent management sucient voting power to fend o activists
or hostile takeovers in exchange for any consideration agreed upon
with (minority) shareholders. As discussed further below, our proposal runs counter to the current trend in the U.S. academic and
policy debate, which is concerned with sunsetting existing restrictions
on management accountability rather than introducing new ones in
midstream.252
Our proposal does not reect the state of the law in the United States
or in Europe, which for various reasons make such a deal impossible as a
practical matter. As mentioned, dual-class recapitalizations with voting
stock are prohibited by the U.S. stock exchanges rules. In the UK, dualclass companies are not even allowed to enter the Premium Listing to
start with. Although some continental Europe jurisdictions, such as the
Netherlands, allow dual-class recapitalizations with a simple majority
of the votes, shares of the new class must be distributed pro-rata, which
defeats the control-enhancing purpose of dual-class shares.253
We believe the law should be changed to permit the introduction of
such CEMs. Companies potentially beneting from periods of insulation
might otherwise go private or avoid valuable innovations, instead playing
it safe; alternatively, companies seeking insulation might pursue broader
insulation than they need or would be desirable if an alternative such
as our proposal is not available.
251
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Our proposal preserves many of the benets of accountability while
potentially reducing some of its burdens, notably the burden of justication costs. Compared to general curbs on shareholder activists – such
as stricter rules on disclosing large stakes (such as shortening the time
period, restricting acquisitions post-triggering the disclosure threshold,
or even reducing the size of the threshold)254 – our solution does not
undermine hedge funds’ incentives to engage poorly managed companies and provide feedback. We instead let the individual companies
decide whether they benet from exposure to hedge fund activism, or
would prefer insulation from such activism in order to embark on a
highly uncertain project. The onus is on the management and/or the
controlling shareholder to persuade outside investors to approve the
introduction of CEMs. In other words, we propose a pro-investor default
rule. Our proposal thus diers from the solution in some jurisdictions of
continental Europe, such as in France, where setting loyalty shares as
the default has resulted in the unilateral redistribution of voting power
from investors to controlling shareholders. Likewise, our proposal diers
from other scholars’ recommendations to set staggered boards – or their
functional equivalents – as a default rule.255
On the contrary, we argue that 1S1V should be the default rule,
whereas dual-class shares would have to be opted-into. The law and
economics literature has several criteria to identify desirable default
rules. Majoritarian default rules save on transaction costs. Penalty
default rules incentivize information revelation. None of this seems to be
particularly relevant in the bargaining between professional managers
and professional investors. More recently, Professor Ayres has suggested
another criterion to determine the default-altering rule based on the
cost of opting out. According to this criterion, the ecient default rule
is made costly to opt out of (i.e. it’s a “sticky default”) in order to
screen for the situation in which opting out is ecient. Only in the latter
situation are the private benets of opting out sucient to oset the
(social) cost of the non-default regime. Dual-class shares reect precisely
254
255
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this situation: they are economically ecient when the controller’s PBC
are higher than the cost to investors of holding noncontrolling stock
(as reected by the discount on noncontrolling stock).256 If dual-class
shares were the default, however, they would be hard to opt out of
even when the PBC were lower than the cost to investors. Because
idiosyncratic PBC are, after all, unveriable, it is easier for controllers
to oer investors higher returns (a lower stock price) to opt out of 1S1V
than for investors to oer PBC compensation to opt out of dual-class
shares. The same reasoning applies to the proposal by Professor Cremers
and his coauthors to make staggered boards the default, particularly
when the altering rules confer on the board – as their proposal suggests
– a stronger veto than is currently the case.257
Already-listed 1S1V companies that want to opt into a lower accountability regime should face a slightly dierent default. In particular,
dual-class recapitalization should feature a default sunset clause. This
default rule would save transaction costs, particularly, because it takes
distributional concerns o the bargaining table.
By contrast with IPOs, the shareholders in an already-listed 1S1V
company have their shares in a company that by denition has no
CEM. In 1S1V companies, all shareholders have equal entitlement to a
control premium. Introducing dual-class shares in midstream shifts the
entitlement to a control premium to controlling shareholders, something
for which noncontrolling shareholders should be compensated. This
compensation would correspond with the discount on noncontrolling
stock in a dual-class IPO, which we discussed earlier: this is the price for
the controlling shareholders’ right to cash in their (idiosyncratic) PBC
eventually.258 In midstream, however, disagreement between managers
and investors over the value of control will likely prevent such a deal
from being made. More likely, parties will have to settle on a sunset
clause. A sunset clause eectively prevents controlling shareholders from
cashing in a control premium as the CEM is to expire in a number of
years, and in any event, upon trading the controlling stock. 259
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By the same token, sunset clauses should not be imposed on existing,
permanent dual-class structures, unless this is agreed upon by controlling
shareholders. Sunsetting existing dual-class shares is equivalent to the
promise to collapse them – that is, to reunify multiple classes of shares
into one – at a future date. Imposing a sunset clause amounts to a
redistribution from the controller to the noncontrolling shareholders.
Whenever dual-class shares are established without a sunset provision,
reunication should be a voluntary decision and the law should facilitate,
not prohibit, compensation for reunifying the shares into one class. 260
Finally, in order to avoid a forced redistribution from controlling
to noncontrolling shareholders, or vice versa, the existing regimes of
dual-class shares should be grandfathered. In practice, grandfathering is
unlikely to play a major role because most jurisdictions already feature
a 1S1V default, as we advocate, although they may not allow opting
out of 1S1V at all.261 However, investors should have an eective veto
on opting out of 1S1V if CEMs were initially prohibited. Conversely,
controlling shareholders should have a veto on returning to 1S1V if –
as in France – control enhancement is the default rule.
4.2

A (less desirable) alternative

As discussed above, law may present an obstacle to our proposal. Public
companies in the U.S. may not conduct dual-class recapitalizations
except for issuances of nonvoting stock: dual-class recapitalizations with
voting stock are not permitted under stock exchange rules. For practical
reasons, issuing nonvoting shares is only worthwhile for companies
that already have a controlling shareholder (and perhaps supervoting
shares).262 That being said, dual-class recapitalizations may be feasible
260

Ibid., 54.
The gist of our proposal is, indeed, that corporate law should allow publicly
held companies to enter dual-class recapitalizations with a MOM vote.
262
Issuing nonvoting shares indirectly enhances the voting power of a controlling
shareholder, if there is one. Managers, however, would have to issue supervoting
shares to themselves in order to enhance their voting power suciently. Note,
in addition, that the law of Delaware allows dual-class recapitalizations upon a
simple majority vote, which under-protects investors especially in the presence of a
controlling shareholder. A company not listed on an exchange and incorporated in
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using tenure voting structures (that is, loyalty shares), 263 which, as we
noted above, are increasingly common in Europe, where, likewise, there
are restrictions on dual-class recapitalizations.264 Although time-phased
voting would seem to fall within the U.S. stock exchange prohibitions,
structuring such voting may be possible. In particular, in order to pass
muster under existing law, extra voting rights would be allocated based
on the holding period without discriminating among shareholders. This
is precisely the way in which loyalty shares have been introduced in
various European jurisdictions, either by way of legislation, private
ordering, or both.
Absent a change in the law, loyalty shares oer an advantage over
other alternatives. As noted above, loyalty shares can be introduced
in midstream while dual-class shares cannot – at least, not in ways
that allow the management or the controlling shareholder to directly
enhance their voting power.265 Formally, tenure voting/loyalty shares
immediately confer upon every shareholder extra voting rights (or the
expectation thereof) in proportion to their stake. Crucially, however, the
shareholder who sells her shares before a certain number of years loses
the extra voting rights (or fails to get them). But not all shareholders are
similarly situated: while the logic underlying tenure voting is to reward
the loyalty of long term investors, this logic neglects the economics of
institutional stockholdings, which reveals that liquidity and governance
(via both exit and voice) are complements, not substitutes.266 Because
institutional owners cannot commit to whichever holding period is necessary to qualify for extra voting rights, the latter will benet only
the management or the controlling shareholders who introduced the
loyalty shares to start with – most other investors will trade them eventually. Thus, although in theory noncontrolling shareholders also qualify
Delaware could in theory engage in dual-class recapitalizations with both voting and
nonvoting stock. See supra, text accompanying note 242.
263
Berger, Davido Solomon, and Benjamin, supra note 235.
264
Recall that dual-class shares are banned from the UK Premium Listing, whereas
other European jurisdictions either prohibit the midstream introduction of supervoting shares or make such recapitalizations unsuitable for control-enhancing purposes.
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for loyalty shares, in practice the CEM will increase the controlling
shareholder’s voting power, as many of the other shareholders sell their
holdings and hence lose their loyalty shares.
Loyalty shares therefore are not ideal for the purpose we envisage, to
enable managers and controlling shareholders to contract with investors
for the desired leeway. As revealed by the European experience with
such structures, loyalty shares can be introduced unilaterally by the
controlling shareholders, particularly if the latter is the state, without
giving institutional investors any real say. Should the shares pass the
scrutiny of the exchanges in the U.S., they could likewise be introduced
midstream by way of a simple majority vote. A controlling shareholder
could thus introduce tenure voting unilaterally in the U.S. as well, short
of a change in Delaware law, insofar as the law presently allows altering
the voting structure of the securities without further scrutiny by courts
and/or approval by a Majority of Minority shareholders. 267 Professors
Bebchuk and Kastiel have recently advocated such a legal change.268
The dual-class recapitalization that we advocate fares much better.
Because the transaction by which the company comes to have a CEM
would entail the dilution of existing stock, something that is currently
prohibited, management would presumably have to pay something for
the supervoting stock to be issued to them and, because they have a
conict of interest, the transaction would have to be validated by a MOM
vote giving institutional investors the veto right that we advocate. In
this way, institutional investors would enjoy the protection of a property
rule as at the IPO stage.269
We expect – although we would by no means require – dual-class
recapitalizations to be combined with a sunset clause. While a sunset
clause enables the holders of supervoting stock to pursue their vision
unimpeded for as long as the restriction is in place, it makes dual-class
267
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shares distributionally neutral because, as is typically specied in a
sunset clause,270 controllers would lose the entitlement to supervoting
rights upon trading their stock. Consequently, controllers could not cash
in idiosyncratic PBC by selling control to a third party. That controllers
cannot secure a control premium should make a midstream introduction
of the CEM easier for institutional investors to accept.
In conclusion, dual-class recapitalizations enable managers and controlling shareholders to negotiate with institutional investors for CEMs
in midstream. Outside shareholders would have a veto right on the
restriction, as they do in the IPO setting, when they decide whether
to invest in dual-class shares companies that are selling shares to the
investing public for the rst time. In midstream, this veto right could be
operationalized by way of a majority of the minority (MOM) vote. The
incumbent management would have to persuade investors accounting
for a majority of the minority to agree on how long the management’s
special rights would last, and any extra rights that would be granted
to minority shareholders during that time, such as a certain number
of seats on the board. Although all shareholders, including both individual and institutional investors, would be entitled to vote, we would
expect that voting would mainly be done by institutional investors, 271
whose stakes make taking the trouble worthwhile.272 A MOM vote
thus eectively confers upon institutional investors a veto right on the
management’s proposal to enter into a dual-class recapitalization.
4.3

What Might Management Propose? Some Thoughts

One mechanism that might be considered is a class of stock akin to
preferred stock, where, unlike the typical preferred stock, the preference
was as to voting rights rather than dividends. Managers (and/or controlling shareholders) could be entitled to purchase supervoting shares
sucient to fend o shareholder activists and hostile takeovers. (In
jurisdictions other than the U.S. there may be functionally equivalent
270

Winden, supra note 207.
In general, individual investors’ stakes are too small to make it worthwhile for
them to vote. Edmans and Holderness, supra note 88, at 546.
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ways to achieve the same result). The class of stock could convert into
common stock at some point, on terms to be negotiated. The (institutional) investors eectively would dictate the price of the grant of
extra voting power to the management or controlling shareholders so
long as they have a veto right on the proposal. This implies setting the
insiders’ ownership (and consequently, the wedge) at levels which make
the proposal acceptable to institutional investors.273 The issuance could
require a MOM vote, and its terms could be required to reect input
from a Special Committee (SC) of independent directors. In this regard,
a dual-class recapitalization implemented by way of preferred stock
(or otherwise) implies a similar conict of interest as a going private
transaction, which suggests that the legal regime should be similar. 274
There is, however, an important dierence with a company that
goes private: the company entering into a dual-class recapitalization
remains a public company. This fact aects the negotiations. Because
the institutional investors are not selling their shares (as they would
be doing if the company was going private), in all likelihood the grant
of extra power would have to be temporary. Thus, we expect that a
dual-class recapitalization would include a sunset clause. Continuing the
preferred stock example, the controllers would likely convert their shares
into common stock at the date and the ratio agreed upon, reecting the
amount they paid to purchase the shares. This would allow controllers
and investors to share in the prot stemming from the controller’s
vision. Or, the sunset clause could be extended in another MOM vote
adequately informed by the SC advice if the controller managed to
persuade investors that they needed more time. In any event, the length
of the restriction would have to be nite for distributional reasons. The
right to control a company indenitely includes the entitlement to a
control premium. Introducing dual-class shares in midstream implies
transferring this entitlement from the investing public to the controllers.
273
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As we argued, disagreement about the value of control of an already
listed company is likely to make such a transfer impossible. Sunset
clauses, on the other hand, can make CEMs distributionally neutral.
Note how this is dierent from an IPO situation. Companies often
go public with ‘perpetual’ dual-class shares structures, having no sunset.
This is increasingly controversial in academic and policy debates. 275
However, as we explained in the previous Section,276 the investors’
decision to buy into such structures (at a discount relative to 1S1V
structures) reects an implicit agreement between the founders and
public shareholders about the prospective value of control. Therefore,
we argue that sunset clauses should not be mandatory, although they
are likely to be introduced by private ordering along with a dual-class
recapitalization.
Sunset clauses are only one example of the type of term we envision
in order for institutional investors to allow managers and controlling
shareholders some leeway from justication (and thus, from activist
shareholders). In order to persuade shareholders to approve the (temporary) restriction on their voting power, or to allow managers to pay
a lower price than they otherwise would for the supervoting rights, the
management might specify certain nancial results or other kinds of
measurable indicators which, if not met, could trigger early conversion
(possibly at a penalty rate) into common stock (and hence termination
of the extra voting rights). By the same token, for as long as the “preferred stock” was outstanding, the agreement between the controller
and institutional investors could include board representation for the
latter, to reduce monitoring costs. Board representation (or more board
representation) could also be conditional on the company’s results:
for instance if certain nancial results were not met within a given
time, institutional investors could be given the right to have greater
representation on the board.
Why would institutional investors enter into this kind of contractual
agreement? After all, institutional investors are the arbiters of most, if
not all, the prospective engagements by shareholder activists. 277 They
275
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might prefer case by case decision-making, where they could appraise
activist campaigns on their individual merits. The contractual solution
we advocate allows the institutional investors to credibly commit to a
long-term perspective as envisioned by the management and reected
by the proposed length and terms of the CEM. This approach could be
particularly valuable for index fund managers, which do not have the
resources to screen the merits of individual campaigns and hence are
apt to develop a standardized strategy for use in all activist shareholder
campaigns.
4.4

Addressing Some Contrary Views

We argue above for dual-class structures that could be permanent if
management was able to obtain shareholder approval. By contrast,
Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel have recently argued that permanent
dual-class shares structures should be prohibited – or, to put it dierently, dual-class shares should include a mandatory sunset clause. 278
Their argument is that the only defensible justication for dual-class
shares is the superior talent of the founder who introduced them. This
advantage – the argument runs – recedes over time, which is reected
in the fact that dual-class companies trade at a discount compared
with single class companies. Indeed, controlling shareholders do not
have incentives to collapse a dual-class structure when such a structure
becomes inecient.
A recent empirical study of U.S. companies with dual-class shares
companies might seem to provide support for Bebchuk’s and Kastiel’s
argument.279 Such companies initially outperform their single-class
peers in a matching sample on every performance measure, but this
advantage seems to disappear with time. On average, after 6 to 9 years,
dual-class shares companies – which have not, meanwhile, reunied their
shares – underperform their peers. Note, however, the limitations of this
study. First, the research acknowledges that the negative performance
reects factors others than time, notably including the increase in the
278
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wedge between voting power and ownership over the years. Whatever
motivates the increasing wedges (for instance, family ownership, which
we discuss below), higher wedges disincentivize dual-class reunications,
particularly when such reunications are ecient. Second, according
to the same study, the evidence that dual-class rms underperform
their peers after 6-9 years is not consistent across performance measures.280
Although Bebchuk’s and Kastiel’s concern is a legitimate one, their
argument goes too far.281 To begin with, the existing empirical analyses
of companies with dual-class shares do not take into account the eect
of family ownership, which, according to another recent study, is the
real reason why the performance of controlled companies decreases with
time.282 This nding accords with the intuition that founders cannot
transfer their talents in a succession. CEMs do not make this problem
worse, at least insofar as controllers cannot unilaterally increase the
control enhancement.
280

In particular, as opposed to Tobin Q, the Total Q of dual-class rms does
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Secondly, the claim that dual-class shares are irreversible is exaggerated. Both in the U.S. and in Europe, dual-class structures are
sometimes collapsed. Particularly in the United States, such dual-class
unications may be accomplished by compensating controlling shareholders.283 This is because controlling shareholders can sell their stake
for a premium over non-controlling stock, something that cannot be
done in Europe because of the rules on mandatory bids, which eectively
prohibit control premiums.284 Critically, dual-class structures can be
collapsed by compensating controlling shareholders. From this standpoint, the increasing insistence by institutional investors that public
companies collapse or sunset existing dual-class structures seems like
a redistribution request. As explained previously, the motivation for
holders of supervoting shares to part with control is to cash in their
idiosyncratic PBC upon selling their stake. This allows controllers to
obtain a reward on their investment in entrepreneurship. Similarly, the
compensation controllers may receive for agreeing to collapse a dualclass shares structure reects such a reward. Whenever shareholders are
able to compensate the controller for introducing more accountability,
dual-class shares need not be as permanent as they look. Collectively,
investors compensating controlling shareholders for collapsing a dualclass structure midstream are paying back the discount they received
at the IPO stage.
Furthermore, note that the price investors will pay to reunify dualclass shares will not necessarily remain constant. Particularly when the
controlling shareholder realizes that her contribution to the company’s
success is limited (for instance, because of age or diculties with suc283

Winden, supra note 207.
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the impact of this rule on ecient and inecient sales of corporate control. Such
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shareholders’ receipt of a control premium. See generally Goshen and Hamdani,
supra note 226, at 604 and E. B. Rock, “MOM Approval in a World of Active
Shareholders”, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 389/2018, March 2018, available at
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cession), the compensation will likely be small.285 There will surely be
frictions impeding the ability to come to an agreement, especially if
the controlling shareholder is overoptimistic about the value of control
or is only able to consume PBC ineciently – for instance, by way
of expropriation or empire building.286 However, unless the controller
is allowed to increase the wedge between control and ownership, for
instance by unilaterally awarding loyalty shares or introducing other
CEMs, inecient PBC consumption will be constrained by the legal and
contractual safeguards accompanying the original limitation of accountability (and reected by the size of the discount on noncontrolling stock).
Overoptimism about the value of control, on the other hand, is likely to
be short-lived. A mismanaged company will eventually do so poorly that
it will need external nance, which the nanciers will only provide on
condition that more accountability is established. Ultimately, managerial
accountability will be reintroduced when it is ecient to do so.
We therefore disagree with Bebchuk and Kastiel that dual-class
shares warrant regulatory limitations, particularly concerning the length
of the period for which such shares should be allowed. Whether dualclass shares established at IPO are temporary or permanent should
be decided by private ordering. Indeed, IPO companies with dualclass shares often include voluntary sunsets.287 While, as we argued,
listed companies will eventually collapse dual-class structures when
such structures have become inecient, we are skeptical that listed
companies can introduce dual-class shares when they become ecient.
The management of a publicly-held company seems to be unable to
negotiate limitations on accountability with shareholders even when
these limitations are needed to support entrepreneurship in corporate
governance. Indeed, more generally, we worry as much about controllers
facing what we have called excess accountability when they would like
to be more entrepreneurial as about shareholders facing diculties in
eliminating existing restrictions when such restrictions are no longer
285
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ecient and the company would benet from short-term feedback.
Paring back restrictions on accountability is not dicult, at least not
as a legal matter. For instance, takeover defenses may be dismantled
and dual-class shares structures may be collapsed (i.e. the classes
reunied) so long as the beneciaries of the restriction – the controllers
(managers or controlling shareholders) – agree. By the same token, law
should facilitate limiting accountability whenever the beneciaries – the
noncontrolling shareholders – agree.
4.5

Our bottom line

In the highly polarized policy debate on the allocation of power between
shareholders and management, the purists in the respective camps argue
that one single solution is ecient. That is to say, according to the
‘shareholder advocates’, management should always be accountable to
shareholders; on the contrary, according to the ‘insulation advocates’,
this should almost never be the case. (This may overstate the case,
but only slightly). Because both approaches neglect uncertainty, they
also overlook the fact that entrepreneurs seeking funding and investors
seeking good ideas to nance are well situated to agree on the power
allocation that suits them best. We expect that they will be particularly
inclined to do so when the business faces considerable uncertainty. 288
Shareholder advocates claim that any degree of insulation of management from shareholders’ intervention is inecient because it increases
288
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agency costs.289 They would prohibit staggered boards and other enhancement mechanism that could entrench management and thereby
allow it to continue to pursue bad ideas and enrich itself.290 In specic
contexts, such as takeovers or shareholder activism, this contention is
sometimes tempered by the observation that agency costs can also stem
from dierent sources, that is to say an acquirer’s empire building or an
activist’s short-termism.291 Such qualications are usually considered
of an insucient order of magnitude to support management insulation.292 Agency cost, however, also stems from the need to justify to
investors that are in turn agents of retail investors. Managers who are
accountable to institutional investors will seek short-term performance
or otherwise make conventional decisions that can be justied in the
event of a bad outcome. While in some situations this is the best way
to maximize shareholder value, in situations of high uncertainty it is
not. Therefore, even within the realm of agency costs, the case for
shareholder empowerment across the board is not theoretically straightforward. Most important, the claim that management accountability
is the obvious solution to the corporate governance problem is hard to
reconcile with a reality in which a sizeable minority of companies in the
United States, and the vast majority of companies around the world,
choose the opposite solution.
Insulation advocates fare no better. Some scholars have argued that
staggered boards should become a quasi-mandatory rule.293 Similarly,
insulation advocates welcome dual-class and loyalty shares.294 Some
289
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commentators would even use legislation – in particular, making Section
13(d) stricter – to curb the activists’ ability to prot from engaging
the management of public companies, insofar as the knowledge of their
interest in and anticipated engagement of the company should raise
the purchase price for their own initial stake.295 The key argument
used by insulation advocates is based on the superiority of managers’
information to that of shareholders. Because managers know better how
to run the business, shareholder intervention can only be motivated by
opportunism.296 Specically, activist shareholders (as well as takeover
bidders in the past) seek to extract benets that are not shared with the
other shareholders. In a sense, this claim is stating the obvious: public
shareholders need to secure private benets from intervention in order to
overcome free riding. But the claim that insiders always know better than
outsiders is implausible on its face. Insiders can behave opportunistically
too, or simply be wrong. Introducing innovation and uncertainty into the
picture does not change this observation. All companies have to innovate
in order to survive, and the odds of successful innovation cannot be
estimated with precision. The length of a company’s innovation cycle
will signicantly determine whether companies benet from a regime of
more or less accountability to investors. Again, empirical evidence in
the United States, as well as in other developed stock markets, oers
examples of both types of arrangements.
The varying degrees of management accountability that we observe
are in principle neither too low nor too high. The accountability we
observe in corporate governance normally reects an agreement between the company’s founders and IPO investors, which, as we have
seen, should have been ecient at the time the IPO took place. However, this initial agreement may later become outdated because companies face varying degrees of uncertainty during their (they hope, long)
295
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existence.297 For instance, some companies for which dual-class shares
were initially ecient might later benet from the higher accountability
stemming from 1S1V. Also, the initial arrangement may be altered
unilaterally by one of the parties. For instance, a controlling shareholder may increase the wedge between voting power and ownership,
as the French state recently did.298 There are also examples in the
other direction, such as the campaign by institutional shareholders to
de-stagger the boards of U.S. public companies, including for instance by
threatening to withhold voting support for directors at annual elections.
The ecient arrangement concerning the allocation of powers between shareholders and management varies across companies, and with
time, because the uncertainty they face calls for dierent degrees and
frequency of justication. There is always a simple – albeit not costless – way for entrepreneurs to avoid justication to shareholders and
markets, which is to keep or take the company private. Conversely, the
simple way to maximize the proceeds from going public is to make
management fully accountable to shareholders. Companies choosing
full or limited accountability do this for a reason. For these initial
arrangements to remain ecient over time, two conditions must be met.
First, outside shareholders should be protected from unilateral actions
by the management or the controlling shareholder—that is, by means of
duciary duties or functional equivalents, investors should be protected
from expropriation.299 Second, managers and controlling shareholders
should be able to negotiate adaptations of the existing accountability
arrangement with shareholders – that is, controllers should be able to
contract for insulation from shareholder intervention.300 The adaptation
of existing arrangements as to management justication to investors
is dicult in midstream, when companies are already publicly held.
Managers or controlling shareholders may try to take advantage of
investors; likewise, the latter may seek redistribution from the former.
Our proposal provides a solution to this problem.
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Thus far, we have principally considered corporate governance and in
particular, the allocation of power between managers and shareholders.
We have argued that managers’ anticipated need to justify their decisions
can yield agency and social costs. Our account also considered the extent
to which shareholders themselves (and their nanciers) have had to
justify their decisions.
We think that justication-motivated decision-making is potentially
problematic in other realms as well. Justication is not just to other
market participants. Market actors are also potentially accountable to
legal authorities. There will often be signicant overlap in what serves
as justication in the market and under law, since legal authorities will
often look to the standard among peers in order to evaluate the conduct
of the agent, and the standard among peers will often be informed by
what law requires or favors as to the agent’s conduct. But law has its
own constraints and concerns. In particular, as we explain below, the
need for lawmakers, including regulators, to justify themselves may add
another level of complexity to the mix.
Regulators may be slow to revisit regulations: justifying staying
with the status quo is typically far easier than justifying something new.
393
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This eect complements another familiar eect: interest groups who are
about to become worse o can bring considerable pressure to bear.301
Importantly, in nancial regulation, the latter eect is procyclical. The
impact of nancial industry’s lobbying on regulation is strongest during
market booms, when the case for curbing nance is hard to make to
the public. Interest groups are less inuential in a downturn, when the
public is alert to nancial crises and the crises’ adverse eects on daily
life. As a result, nancial regulation tends to be overly lenient during
expansions, and overly strict during recovery.302
That nancial regulation is pro-cyclical is a well-known problem. But
the need for policymakers to justify their decisions under conditions of
uncertainty plays an important role in it. Similar to the case of managers
of a public company, regulators anticipating needing to justify their
actions will tend to ‘play it safe’ instead of being entrepreneurial. 303
This implies ‘conventional’ decision-making, failing to introduce curbs
on banking when they may prevent a nancial crisis or introducing such
curbs when they may delay a recovery.
One example is the Federal Reserve’s failure to update the capital
requirements of banks to reect the massive use of Credit Default
Swaps (CDS) in the years preceding the global nancial crisis. 304 At
some point – well before September 2008 – it was clear that American
International Group (AIG) was insuring a substantial part of the U.S.
banking system against the default of the then-outstanding mortgage
backed securities. Regulators chose to allow this vulnerability of the
banking system to continue, something that eventually harmed society.
This decision was justied by the rules on counterparty risk at the time.
Choosing an alternative course of action would have required requesting
an update of the capital requirements rules, which is costly to justify –
301

J. A. den Hertog, “Economic Theories of Regulation”, in R. J. van den Berg
and A. M. Pacces, eds., Regulation and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012),
25-96.
302
M. K. Brunnermeier et al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation
(Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, UK, 2009).
303
See Knight, supra note 12, at 361.
304
R. Levine, “The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the
Recent Crisis”, 12 International Review of Finance 39, 2012, https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01133.x.

Some Applications in Finance

395

to peers, interest groups, and the public that ultimately benets from an
economic boom – when it is uncertain that the protection of additional
capital will ever be needed.
The bias stemming from policymakers’ need to justify can and does
go in the opposite direction. The mantra of nancial regulation after the
global nancial crisis has been that banks should hold more, and higher
quality, capital.305 This is a justied reaction to the excessive risk-taking
by overly leveraged banks in the years preceding the global nancial
crisis. Capital requirements, however, are not costless. Firstly, imposing
higher capital requirements on banks limits their lending capacity, which
might be undesirable at a time when the economy is recovering from a
nancial crisis.306 Secondly, whereas higher bank capital is no panacea
for nancial stability, it may create an illusion of safety and lead to
more regulatory arbitrage as well.307 Again, adapting capital adequacy
requirements to the varying economic circumstances would be preferable,
but this is too costly to justify under uncertainty about the future. As a
result, in the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, banking regulation
has mainly focused on enhanced capital requirements.308
This example illustrates how the perceived need to justify oneself
aects the decisions of policymakers. Accountability of policymakers can
be compared and contrasted with accountability of corporate managers.
By contrast with market participants, who, as principals, are serving
their own interests, or, as agents, are serving their principals’ interests,
lawmakers are supposed to be serving the “public interest.” But, as is
305
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well known, policymakers, while in theory only serving the society’s best
interests, are also self-interested. Their incentives will be aligned with
the interest of those constituencies (including the nancial industry’s
lobbyists) on which the policymakers’ position and status ultimately
depends. Thus, that policymakers need to justify their actions is desirable to promote accountability to the “real” principals, namely the
citizens of a given country. As in the principal-agent setting of market
participants, standardization of justications is also benecial because it
reduces monitoring costs. For example, a straightforward increase of the
capital requirements of banks is far easier to explain to the public than
is a countercyclical ne-tuning of the risk weights of specic classes of
assets. The former can be explained by reference to the readily accessible
concept of moral hazard; the latter dees accessible explanation. The
former is easier to monitor than the latter.309
Justication thus plays a benecial role, in limiting the agent’s discretion and hence her ability to act in a self-serving manner, including
being captured by interest groups. However it does so by encouraging
or even requiring the agent to act in a way that we cannot know is
desirable given uncertainty. Returning to the previous example, uncertainty makes the “right” amount of capital that banks should maintain
for purpose of nancial stability impossible to determine. Still, the
requirement that policy interventions be justied according to the conventional wisdom may, at precisely the wrong time, lead to actions,
such as policing moral hazard when banks face a liquidity crisis and
309
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thus need support rather than punishment, that are inferior to those
that would make more economic sense at the time but are costlier to
justify.
A major complication in policing nancial instability is that anticyclical policies go against the received wisdom supporting the status
quo.310 This problem is exacerbated by justication, which draws on
the received wisdom. Requesting banks to hold more capital in good
times will upset the banking lobbies precisely when the facts seem to
support their views that restrictions are unnecessary. This makes it
dicult for policymakers to justify unconventional curbs. On the other
hand, relaxing the capital requirements in bad times appears to serve
the interest of the lobbyists exactly when their views are weaker in the
eyes of the public. This makes it dicult for policymakers to justify
actions supporting rather than curbing the banks.
As in corporate governance, while a justication requirement seemingly improves principal-agent relationships by reducing the cost of
monitoring the agent, in fact the same requirement may cause the agent
to underperform whenever there is substantial uncertainty and the
decision that is easier to justify is not necessarily the best one for the
principals.311 An attempt to limit discretion in order to limit agency
costs of one sort turns out to potentially yield such costs of another
sort. Again, this is true for market participants and for those involved
in ensuring that regulations are enforced, including the policymakers
having the discretion to intervene to deate a bubble or give market
participants the exibility to recover from a slump.
The prominent role of uncertainty in the regulation of nancial markets makes this context somewhat special. Uncertainty is the quintessence
of nancial exchange.312 Although sophisticated risk models try to
tame this uncertainty, they cannot eliminate it. When risk models fail,
310
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aecting several markets simultaneously, a systemic crisis may ensue. In
this situation, policymakers fail, too, because justication of nancial
regulation is based on the same risk models that failed by overlooking
uncertainty to begin with.
Eliminating justication is not an option to cope with this problem.
Society benets from clear guidelines as to what is good conduct of
its representatives and likewise, from their accountability based on
such guidelines. However, accountability of nancial policymakers must
be designed in such a way as to ensure that decision-making takes
uncertainty into account, although this conduct is more dicult to
justify. Failure of policymakers to do so will prevent them from coping
with the negative externalities of banking eectively. In other words,
when nancial regulation ignores uncertainty, the result is nancial
instability, which, as we have recently experienced, may have dramatic
repercussions for the well-being of ordinary people.
Traditionally, banking regulation has sought to prevent banking
crises by focusing on the stability of individual banks (micro-prudential
regulation).313 That implies controlling banks’ risk-taking both directly,
through banking supervision, and indirectly, setting capital requirements
against bank assets weighted for their risk. This is a cat-and-mouse
game that banking regulation is bound to lose.314 First of all, risk-taking
must be based on conventional models. Banks have incentives to get
around the regulatory denition of risk from the moment in which these
models are known. Second, banking can be performed by a number
of nancial institutions other than banks, and those institutions are
not subject to the same regulations. Indeed, the institutions can be
structured precisely to not have the attributes that would render them
subject to the regulations. The sucient condition is that the institutions’ liabilities are accepted as “safe” under a conventional model of
risk assessment. AIG and all the other nancial institutions engaged
313
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in the so-called “shadow banking” are clear examples of how easily this
condition can be met.315
The pitfalls of the traditional approach, as evidenced by the global
nancial crisis, have prompted policymakers to look at systemic risk
more broadly, for instance by way of macro-prudential regulation. 316
Simply put, macro-prudential regulation tries to identify and contain
risk-taking, as well as the externalities stemming from it, from a systemic rather than an individual perspective. That said, both macro and
micro prudential regulation suers from the same problem: Financial
regulation cannot be expected to be so dynamic to timely adapt to
nancial innovation and thus counter regulatory arbitrage. The presence
of uncertainty provides high-powered incentives for nancial institutions
to minimize the regulatory consequences of risk taking, because this
strategy will make their banking business (both ocial and shadow)
more protable. In other words, banking institutions engaging in regulatory arbitrage are simply being entrepreneurial. However, by doing
so, they impose a negative externality on the society.
To cope with the negative externalities of banking eectively, policymakers should be entrepreneurial too. This is a rather ambitious
goal, if only because policymakers have incentives that structurally
dier from those of bankers. These incentives are generally weaker than
in the private sector. Because policymakers are motivated more by
reputation and prestige than by monetary incentives, the mechanisms
of accountability are crucial. Currently, these mechanisms exacerbate
the problem because an obvious (and inexpensive) way for policymakers
to foster their reputation is to take actions than can readily be justied.
These actions are hardly entrepreneurial.317 On the one hand, they tend
315
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to follow the risk models from the private sector, thereby increasing the
illusion of safety that these models support. On the other hand, as we
have seen in the previous examples, justication prevents policymakers
from leaning against the wind, even if they realize that this would serve
society better. Leaning against the wind is unlikely to earn policymakers
any credit and may even upset some of the constituencies to which they
are accountable.
A few commentators have proposed introducing a new set of players,
independent from both the private sector and the regulators, to prompt
regulators to seriously consider dierent perspectives. Some economists
have suggested introducing an advisory body on nancial stability
regulation, called “The Sentinel.”318 In a similar vein, some legal scholars
have advocated the introduction of “Regulatory Contrarians” in several
areas of policymaking, including banking regulation.319 These proposals
address an important part of the problem: regulators tend to become
complacent, particularly when they lack input from sources that may
show how they are going wrong. Such a feedback is missing especially
from nancial regulation due to the procyclicality of the debate on
nancial stability, as hinted before. Regulatory contrarians and similar
gures seem to ll in this gap because they would have an explicit
mandate to identify potential problems with the existing regulations,
which are being overlooked by policymakers because of agency cost,
regulatory capture, or mistake.
The challenge for regulatory contrarians is to get policymakers
to listen to them.320 For obvious reasons, in all existing proposals,
the contrarians cannot compel the policymakers to act, as otherwise
their position would become indistinguishable from that of regulators.
Proponents of this approach seem rather optimistic that contrarians
would create more awareness among policymakers that they might be
missing something in the buildup of systemic risk, which would, in turn,
result in timely actions to counter it.321 If we look at history, however,
particularly the latter (timely action) is not a foregone conclusion. The
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destiny of Cassandras is to remain unheeded until history proves them
right, which is usually too late. A few economists and market players
did predict the global nancial crisis. Nevertheless, regulators did not
listen to them.322 Arguably, giving contrarians institutional stature
would give their opinion more weight. However, changing the behavior
of nancial policymakers may be dicult so long as their accountability
regime is unchanged, certainly when memories of the most recent crisis
have receded.
The regime governing the regulation of nancial stability needs to
provide less of an incentive for policymakers to think in terms of justication, or more of a counterweight against such thinking. Policymakers are
supposed to exercise judgment as to when and whether to lean against
the wind. In the domain of nancial stability, these policymakers are
normally the central banks, because they have superior information on
nancial indicators that may hint at the presence of a bubble.323 Central
banks have another advantage: because they have a legal monopoly
on money creation, they are the most credible “re extinguisher” in a
crisis. Having to use their monetary powers parsimoniously in a crisis
in order to full their mandate and preserve their independence, central
banks have both the knowledge and the incentives to act in a timely
manner on the factors potentially leading to systemic risk – in other
words, they are well positioned as “smoke detectors” as well.324 The
big problem is that, to fulll this role, central banks need to be able to
“take away the punch bowl as the party gets going,” which is extremely
dicult to do if such action has to be justied. Policing ination, which
central banks typically do, is unpopular as well, but it can be justied
322
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by objective indicators. Such indicators do not exist for systemic risk.
Policing systemic risk would become impossible for central banks if they
had to provide justications on a regular basis. For example, institutions
that are not formally subject to prudential regulation would have reason
to challenge, as arbitrary, a central bank’s decision to impose capital
or liquidity requirements on the grounds of some imprecise measure of
systemic risk. After all, a bubble is only conclusively a bubble after it
has burst.
Relieving central banks from the need to justify their actions is
unthinkable (and undesirable) in a democratic society. However, the
presence of regulatory contrarians, as suggested by the recent literature,
may be helpful in allowing central banks to be accountable without
having to justify their actions on a regular basis.
Here is the solution we recommend. Regulatory contrarians should
be asked to provide a non-binding opinion on the proposals by central
bankers to introduce preventative macro-prudential regulations, and on
the failure to make such proposals. This second opinion is useful because
a fundamental problem in assessing the central bank’s conduct is that
we do not observe the counterfactual world in which they have not
acted. This problem becomes slightly less severe if two expert decisionmakers have independently agreed that a certain policy is warranted to
reduce systemic risk. Moreover, the second opinion provides a separate
channel for the accountability of central bankers because the contrarian
may publicly disagree on either action or inaction.325 When this is the
case, central bankers may still decide to act or not, in accordance with
their initial determination. Because the opinion of the contrarian is
not binding, departing from the contrarian’s advice would not make
central bankers accountable, which in turn implies that central bankers
would not have to be defensive in their judgment. As in the case of dualclass shares for corporate managers, at rst glance this may sound like
excessive leeway. However, note that the central bankers – like managers
taking commitments to avail themselves of CEMs – would still have
incentives to take care in exercising judgment. For instance, time may
325
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prove central bankers wrong rather than the contrarian having been
right, in which case the central bankers’ reputational capital would be
depleted. The presence and public resonance of regulatory contrarians
allows for an ex-post assessment of the central bankers’ conduct, without
having to constrain their judgment ex-ante by way of justication.
Having discussed public nancial actors, we now oer one nal
example, involving private nancial actors. It involves the role of ratings
and rating agencies in the nancial crisis. As noted in the introduction,
an important factor in the nancial crisis was money managers’ willingness to treat high rating agency ratings of subprime securities as a
near-sucient condition to their purchase of those securities.326 Indeed,
the extent to which money managers justied their disastrous investments in Enron, and in subprime mortgage securities, by referring to
their reliance on ratings by a few well-known rating agencies, Moody’s,
Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch Investor Services, presents a challenge
for orthodox economic theory: money managers should expect that they
might be getting ‘lemons’ and either discount accordingly or look at
the information they were receiving with a far more critical eye. 327 But
money managers seem to have been far more concerned with getting in
on ‘hot new issuances’ of subprime securities than in researching the
characteristics of those issuances. Interestingly, and tellingly as to how
justication works, the fact that all three agencies had been known to
get it grievously wrong as to Enron did not stop money managers from
characterizing their reliance on the agencies as reasonable when the
managers lost disastrously on their subprime investments.
The money managers’ best assessment as to how to proceed for
their clients would probably not have been to purchase those securities,
certainly in the years closest to the crisis: notwithstanding the ratings,
there was increasing concern that the ratings might not be accurate,
and that we might have been in a bubble that was about to burst. But
the money managers’ interests were best served by assuring that they
326
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would do no worse than their peers, who were also buying the securities.
Besides the substantive benets of being in a herd, there were also
considerable benets of being able to justify what they did by reference
to the ratings and to what others were doing.
One of us has articulated a possible solution: an ‘unsafe harbor,’
wherein courts would require money managers who are being sued to
provide evidence that they had done independent inquiry, the aim being
to limit a particular strategy associated with justication, herding. 328
Note that one cost of the anticipated need for justication is that the
creation of a community which coalesces around norms that are created
in part for the ease of coalescence. This dynamic may help explain
why the three major rating agencies have managed to hold onto their
market shares notwithstanding dramatic misratings as well as signicant
legislative eorts to get markets to make more use of other agencies.
The costs of the three agencies’ continuing dominance are well-known:
higher priced, lower-quality services, and the ability to move markets
in ways that can be quite destructive.329
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6
Conclusion

Corporate governance is largely about the allocation of power between
controllers (typically managers but sometimes controlling shareholders)
and shareholders. The principal challenge of corporate governance is
often, if not typically, understood to involve reducing the costs of agents
acting for themselves when they should be acting for the corporation
and its shareholders. Acting for themselves can include pursuing projects
that benet them more than the corporation, or seeking to hold onto
their jobs in the face of hostile acquirers or to continue their control in
the face of activist shareholder campaigns, notwithstanding the benets
of such acquisitions or campaigns to the corporation. Such reductions
may be achieved through aligning managers’ incentives with those of
the corporation and its shareholders, and improving how managers are
monitored and subject to the discipline of the market, including by
allowing those who would unseat or seek to inuence management to
have more power.
In this story, managers themselves know when they are acting to
benet themselves, and good corporate governance would constrain or
prevent them from doing so or punishes them after the fact. Where
they are pursuing their self-interest and not the corporation’s, or where
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their ideas are not the best ones, others with what they think are better
ideas are free to pursue those ideas if they can nance them, and the
market sorts everything out. This is largely the story of what might be
called the pro-activist-shareholder camp, where traditional agency costs
of this sort loom large.
The opposing camp thinks that ‘others’ are all too often people
who have gured out how to benet themselves at the expense of the
corporation and its (other) shareholders, and that relatively speaking,
traditional agency costs are much less of a peril, such that managers
should be helped to defeat acquirers and activist shareholders when
they wish to do so.
This article describes a neglected agency cost: the incentive for those
believing themselves to be accountable to others to act more to justify
themselves than because they think that the course of action they are
choosing is best for their principal. And it is not just an agency cost.
There are social costs as well, such as the costs of foregone research
and development. Moreover, those engaging in justicatory decisionmaking are not just agents, or doing so to justify themselves to their
principals. Those motivated to use more readily justiable strategies
include people answering to others who are not formally their principals,
such as nanciers, the broader community, and lawmakers.
The more uncertainty there is, the more what is justiable may
diverge from an actor’s assessment of the best way to proceed were
justication not so much at issue. Having identied these costs, we then
argued for a solution – a better combination of managerial discretion and
accountability than presently exists, that managers and shareholders
could agree upon, whether in an IPO – as is already the case in many
jurisdictions – or when a company is already public. With greater
recognition of the problem and its costs, more attention can be paid to
minimizing it – something that should benet corporations, as well as
the broader society.
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